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 This dissertation advances a networked approach to social movements via the 
study of contemporary environmental protests in China. Specifically, I examine anti- 
paraxylene protests that occurred in 2007 in Xiamen, in 2011 in Dalian, and in 2014 in 
Maoming via news reports, social media feeds, and conversations with witnesses and 
participants in the protests. In so doing, I contribute two important concepts for social 
movement scholars. The first is the treatment of protests as forces majeure that disrupt 
networks and force the renegotiation of relationships. This turn helps scholars to trace the 
movement of the social via changes in human consciousness as well as changes in 
relationships. The second concept I advance is wild public networks, which take seriously 
new media as making possible different forms of protest. This concept is especially 
important in studies of social movement in China where censorship and surveillance are 
widespread. By advancing these two concepts, I offer scholars new tools to trace the 







TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iii 
LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................... vii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... ix 
Chapters 




TWO: A SHORT HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTALISM IN CHINA .........................13 
 
Environmental Shifts in Imperial Times: A Series of Crises...................................... 14 
The Mao Years............................................................................................................ 22 
The Environmental Impacts of China’s “Opening”: A Rising Culture of Protest...... 29 
Xiamen, 2007.............................................................................................................. 44 
Obstacles and Grounds for Hope................................................................................ 52 
 
THREE: THEORIZING SOCIAL MOVEMENTS ....................................................... 58 
 
Moving Social Movements......................................................................................... 61 
Moving Theories on Moving the Social..................................................................... 75 
Stirring Winds of Change........................................................................................... 81 
Civic Duty and the Rhetoric of Nationalism in Crisis................................................ 86 
Supplementing Network Theory............................................................................... 114 
 
FOUR: SORTING CHAOS: WILD PUBLIC NETWORKS......................................... 119 
 
Moving Past Binaries to Sort Chaos......................................................................... 126 
Wild Public Networks............................................................................................... 128 
Force Majeure.......................................................................................................... 135 




FIVE: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AS FORCE MAJEURE:  
           XIAMEN’S 2007 PX PROTEST.........................................................................144 
 
Social Movements, Cohesion, and Democracy.......................................................... 148 
Assembling Assemblages and Wild Public Networks............................................... 154 
Tracing the Polysensus of Protest.............................................................................. 173 
Protest as Force Majeure........................................................................................... 176 
Changing Relationships, Changing Politics............................................................... 179 
 
SIX: THE DISAPPOINTMENT IN DALIAN............................................................... 182 
 
An Explosive Past...................................................................................................... 188 
A Culminating Storm................................................................................................. 204 
Coalescing Forces....................................................................................................... 206 
Motivating Movement................................................................................................ 212 
From Disappointment to Unexpected Implications.................................................... 223 
Conclusion.................................................................................................................. 229 
 
SEVEN: MAOMING: NETWORKS OF CORRUPTION AND ACTIVISM.............. 232 
 
Historical Reaches...................................................................................................... 233 
Face(ing) Corruption.................................................................................................. 236 
Pathways of Panmediation......................................................................................... 239 
Maoming Networks... ................................................................................................ 244 
A Return to Protests: Battling the Rhizomatic  Reaches of Skepticism and 
Mistrust....................................................................................................................... 251 
Weixin Webs and QZones Swell to a Force Majeure................................................ 255 
Renegotiating Relationships: Moving the Social....................................................... 267 
Moving Toward New Forms of Civic Engagement................................................... 274 
Conclusion.................................................................................................................. 282 
 
EIGHT: CONCLUSION: FORCE MAJEURE: UNDERSTANDING  
       SOCIAL MEDIA, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND  
       RHETORIC AS FORCE.................................................................................. 286 
 
China’s Environmental Movement Writ Large.......................................................... 289 











LIST OF FIGURES 
 
1. A Dalian protestor..............…………………………………………………… 100 
2. A Maoming protestor.............................…………………………………….... 100 
3. Dalian protestors hold a sign .………………………………………………... 101 










 This manuscript is truly a product of relationships and networks. As a result, I 
view this manuscript as a coauthored piece that I could never have completed without the 
guidance, support, and generosity of so many people, many of whom must remain 
nameless. First and foremost, I want to thank Dr. Kevin DeLuca for introducing me to 
new networks of thinking, helping me to navigate these complex connections, opening up 
new ways of being and seeing in the world, sharing connections, guiding, and being a 
dependable and endless source of support. I also want to thank him for the difficult and 
pivotal research he has done in social movement studies, visual rhetoric, media studies, 
and environmental communication, which has helped to open up space for this type of 
research. Conducting research abroad in China would have been impossible without him, 
as would have been writing this manuscript. I also am deeply grateful to Dr. Janet Theiss 
for helping me to get to and navigate a research site 6,000 miles away from home. 
Without her support to learn the language and the connections she helped me make, this 
research would not have been possible, nor would it have been as rich and engaging as I 
hope you will find it. Her advice during the dissertation process was invaluable to 
creating what I hope is a nuanced perspective on the environmental protests occurring in 
China. I want to thank Dr. Kent Ono for not only sharing his connections in China, but 
also, along with the department of communication and the College of Humanities at the 
University of Utah, for supporting my travel to research sites in China. Again, without 
  vii 
these connections and support, I would not have been able to realize this important 
project.  
Dr. Sean Lawson deserves many thanks for being a positive and supportive 
committee member and for introducing me to Science and Technology Studies, which 
was foundational for this strand of new media research. I want to extend thanks to Dr. 
Marouf Hasian for helping to broaden my understanding of social movement scholarship 
and for always asking prodding and challenging questions to push my research to the next 
level. Dr. Ye Sun has been what I consider to be an honorary committee member because 
she has provided important support, guidance, and patience, especially in times of need.  
So many people have proven to be instrumental in the collection of research 
outside the University of Utah as well. Dr. Jennifer Turner of the Wilson Center in 
Washington, DC acted as a pivotal connection. Her immediate generosity allowed me to 
forge the initial connections that would blossom and multiply as I conducted my research 
in China. To that end, I also want to thank all of the anonymous protestors and ENGO 
leaders who not only spoke to me, but connected me to other interviewees. My networks 
in Beijing were invaluable, including my IUP teachers and classmates (Melvin Barnes, 
Verity Robins, and Andy Teumer, among others). I also want to thank Kirsten Lindholm 
and Jared Woolly for their help in and from Beijing. 
 This type of research is virtually impossible without financial support, which is 
why I want to thank the Eccles family for establishing the Marriner S. Eccles Graduate 
Fellowship that allowed me to devote time to translating interviews and concentrate on 
my research during the 2015 to 2016 academic year. This research is also greatly 
indebted to the three Foreign Language and Area Studies fellowships that provided the 
  viii 
opportunity to learn the Chinese language in China at both Nankai University and 
Tsinghua University. I also benefitted greatly from the Confucius Institute scholarship I 
received to study at Nankai University and want to thank Dr. Fusheng Wu for his 
encouragement and support in that process.  
Diane Brunner deserves a great deal of thanks for her constant support, 
encouragement, generosity, and listening skills that she has provided for decades. Last, 
but far from least, I am unendingly grateful for Christopher J. Metz and his consistent 
love and encouragement during my excursions abroad. He has provided much needed 
emotional support while adjusting to life in China, during the hundreds of hours I spent 
writing this document, and while conducting the research that led to this incredible 
project. I thank Chris for making life as a PhD student as balanced and full of adventure 




















In 2014, as I was preparing to go abroad to China and begin collecting research for 
this dissertation, I contacted one of my Chinese friends studying in Beijing to tell him I 
would be on his campus for the summer and asked him to meet. He told me he was not 
able to do so because he was in the hospital. When I asked why, he told me he had been 
diagnosed with throat cancer and he was undergoing surgery to fix it. My friend had not 
yet even graduated college. He seemed far too young to have throat cancer, but was 
handling it frighteningly well. When we finally met a few weeks later, I asked him if he 
knew what caused his cancer. He very matter of factly answered that it was because of 
the polluted water in his hometown. Over half his family had the same kind of cancer. 
Luckily, it was easy to treat. They just removed part of his throat and kept him on a liquid 
diet until he healed.  
A little over a year later, in the midst of writing the last chapter of this dissertation, 
one of my closest contacts in China sent me pictures of Shanghai from his Weixin social 
media account. When I asked him why he was in Shanghai, he told me he was 
accompanying his dad to the doctor. His dad had stomach cancer and no one in his 
village was capable of diagnosing and treating it, so he had to travel to a bigger city with 
better hospitals and doctors who specialized in cancer treatment. “Do you know what the 
  
2 
cause is?” I asked. “Environmental pollution,” he answered, “because of the chemical 
pollution.” This cancer was not so easily curable and would require weeks of treatment 
and surgery. He told me that since a chemical plant moved into his village in 2009, many 
people were diagnosed with the same kind of cancer. He sent me pictures of black rain 
pooling on the streets and speckling the cars.  
This is a refrain across China. Entire villages are afflicted with the same types of 
cancer. It has become frighteningly commonplace. People are losing their fathers, their 
mothers, and their only children. They are losing their land to garbage and runoff, and 
they are losing native species of plants and animals that are also struggling to find clean 
water and food. The relationship networks that constitute their lives are being interrupted 
as people pass away prematurely. Loss on this scale makes old ways of living and making 
do impossible. These are the stakes for the Chinese people today. 
In this type of climate, protest has come to be the only way some people can force 
their governments to listen. Protests, especially violent protests, draw attention to the 
issues at hand while embarrassing local governments who cannot keep the peace. The 
advent of social media has made these citizen-led protests possible on larger scales and 
helped to take officials to task. People across China are protesting against chemical 
plants, garbage incinerators, molybdenum processing plants, and wastewater pipelines 
and being thrown in jail and silenced. But sometimes they are also winning. As these 
wins build up, citizens are beginning to renegotiate their relationships with officials. The 
work of this dissertation is to trace these changes, to map the movement of the social and 
the changes to relationships. 
China’s environmental crisis is incredibly complicated. It is not simply a battle 
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between the victimized citizens and the big bad government. Rather, China’s 
environmental crisis would be better described as a series of overlapping networks that 
have converged to create a crisis, which is in constant transition and negotiation. This is 
why I approach China’s environmental movement from a networked perspective that 
investigates and traces relationships. I turn to history to consider how Mao Zedong’s 
treatment of nature altered people’s relationship with the land, which then impacted 
people’s attitudes toward environmentalism. I look to changing political policies to trace 
how Deng Xiaoping’s decentralization of power post-Mao created a climate ripe for 
further exploitation of the environment in pursuit of GDP growth. I explore the networks 
of environmentalism that emerged in response to the degradation of the land, water, and 
air alongside ancient and contemporary notions of civic duty. I also turn to cellphone, 
social media, and Internet networks to follow flows of data and information in the form 
of images, text messages, video, and microblog posts as they bounce across wild public 
screens (DeLuca, Brunner, & Sun, 2016).  
I have chosen to focus on protests, in particular, in this dissertation for several 
reasons. First, to date, protests in China have been largely understudied and 
undertheorized. Much of this likely has to do with the decentralized nature of protests. 
They are not planned very far in advance, there is no leader, and they often are singular 
events, meaning that they do not occur as a series of protests over a span of months or 
years. Thus, to predict when one would happen where would be a difficult task. Second, 
protestors are not only difficult to find, but often reluctant to talk with people about their 
participation for fear that they will be punished by government officials. Third, protests 
in China are incredibly wild and unpredictable. They arise, seemingly out of nowhere 
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(though not for no cause), and automatic and human censors often erase traces of their 
occurrence from the Internet. What is left is scattered and fragmented remains.  
These difficulties may explain why scholars of China’s environmental movement 
often turn to Environmental NonGovernmental Organizations (ENGOs) (Gao, 2013; Lee, 
Plambeck, & Yatsko, 2012; Tang & Zhan, 2008; Yang, 2005; Zhan & Tang, 2013). 
While these studies make important contributions to scholarship, with between 250 and 
500 protests occurring in China each day (Human Rights Watch, 2013), scholars would 
be remiss not to pay more attention to these eruptions that are altering relationships 
between the people and their government. Furthermore, while ENGOs perform important 
research, collaborate with the government regarding select policies, and raise awareness,  
Chinese ENGOs are still limited in their capacities, as they (1) lack resources to act  
independently and influentially, such as financial support, a knowledge and 
information infrastructure, social recognition, and a large constituency, and (2) are 
restricted in their freedom to act under the current political and legal system in China. 
(Xie & Mol, 2006, p. 70) 
 
Though much has changed since Xie and Mol wrote this chapter in 2006, much has also 
remained the same. At the same time ENGOs are strengthening their ties with the 
government and the people and being awarded more funding, they are also subject to the 
whims of the central government, often forcing them into vulnerable positions 
financially, as is evident in the 2015 proposal to restrict foreign donations to Chinese 
NGOs. This topic, which is also incredibly complex, warrants its own book; however, 
studies of ENGOs provide only a partial picture. We must also examine protest. 
Before going further, I want to address how I, as a foreign researcher, went about 
overcoming the aforementioned boundaries I identified. First, I am unable to conduct 
research by participating in protests because they are largely spontaneous. Should I be 
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privy to them in advance and attend them, I would risk losing access to China (i.e., I 
would likely be denied a visa for reentry to China). To study protests, I look at news 
reports in both Chinese and English language outlets, images, blogs, and social media 
feeds. I also draw from interviews with participants in the protests, which brings me to 
my second point—how I am able to gain access to protestors.  
As a White female, I immediately read as a foreigner in China and many people 
(outside of ENGO employees) have been reluctant to talk with me because they suspect I 
am a reporter. Thus, I have had to utilize my guanxi networks to be vetted as an academic 
and not a reporter. My Chinese colleagues have been able to attest to the goals of my 
research and assure interviewees that the information they disclose will be used only in 
academic research. In cases in which I have encountered scheduling conflicts, I have 
turned to Chinese colleagues in the communication field to conduct interviews for me. 
Each interview is anonymized and only identified by the location of the protest in which 
they participated. The participants’ genders have also been anonymized and any 
identifying information has been removed.  
Finally, I have had to deal extensively with censorship. According to news reports 
and interviewees, censorship practices were deployed during the protests examined 
herein, which have made finding social media posts and blogs more difficult. Fortunately, 
many savvy and hyperaware protestors saved the images they encountered during the 
protests and reuploaded them to foreign social media feeds and/or crossposted their 
comments from platforms like Weibo to Twitter to keep a record of what transpired. The 
existence and pervasiveness of censorship also forced me to change my tactics to also 
examine not what was there, but what was missing (Latour, 2007; Wander, 1984). This 
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led me to find and examine leaked documents with orders from the government to delete 
certain words, phrases, or discussions and look to lists netizens compiled regarding what 
words were censored when. In each case study, I trace a tangled web of missing words 




In Chapter Two, “The History of Environmentalism in China,” I trace the history of 
environmental protest in China beginning in the 18th century through the Mao years and 
China’s reformation to illustrate that China’s environmental movement is driven by 1) a 
confrontation with environmental crises that were leaving many human and nonhuman 
animals sick and dying and 2) a sense of responsibility toward the local and national 
community, what people refer to as gongmin yiwu, or civic duty. As such, environmental 
movements are able to draw massive crowds that give local governments no other choice 
than to respond.  
In this chapter, I also trace the rise of ENGOs in China in relationship to policy 
changes and shifts in global power relations. Delving into the emerging ENGO 
landscape, I explore how organizations formed relationships with the media to raise 
awareness and, eventually, cull support for opposition to projects that threatened human 
and nonhuman environments. Due to the limits on ENGOs, however, they have not been 
able to take the same extreme measures that protestors do. Thus, the government 
enforced restrictions on ENGOs may have contributed to these citizen eruptions.  
By looking at how environmental activists—both ENGOs and citizens—have utilized 
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the tools available to them including mass media press and then blogs, bulletin board 
systems (BBSs), cell phones, and social media, I am able to trace how the environmental 
movement has changed with the everchanging media landscape. Thus, one function of 
this chapter is to set the stage for my analysis of the use of social media in environmental 
activism across China and how different media make possible different forms of protest. 
Using a combination of scholarship from communication and sociology, I identify the 
binaries that have shackled social movement scholars for decades in Chapter Three 
including rational/irrational, order/disorder, online/offline, reason/affect, and 
success/failure and trace their impacts. I argue that the terrain upon which social 
movements are occurring has changed with the introduction of the Internet, social media, 
and smartphones, and scholars must adapt our practices. China offers fruitful case studies 
because 1) it experiences between 250 and 500 protest per day and is therefore an active 
site of social movements, 2) these events are occurring outside a political system that 
sanctions protest and 3) with over 650 million Internet users, the Chinese people are 
conducting these protests on a panmediated landscape. 
Weaving together poststructuralist theories from Bruno Latour, Gilles Deleuze, and 
Felix Guattari with communication scholar Michael McGee and sociologist James Jasper, 
I propose a theory of wild public networks to advance the following: 1) the importance of 
examining protests in terms of the movement of the social, 2) the need to address 
dynamism and movement in the study of social movement, and 3) the need to move past 
the binaries that have structured social movement scholarship. In so doing, I make a shift 
from studying individuals or organizations to studying interactions and networks. The 
case studies I examine trace changing discourses, censorship practices, relationships, and 
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flows of information. 
Chapter Four extends the work of Chapter Three by further theorizing wild public 
networks, which weaves together forces—of affective appeals and rational arguments—
rather than binarizing them. This networked approach, which emphasizes movement and 
wildness, helps scholars to consider protests as the eruption of amorphous networks that 
grow and transform while also transforming political processes, physical spaces, and 
ecologies of thought, method, societies, and movement. 
In 2007, protests erupted in the coastal resort town of Xiamen, China, and these 
events serve as the basis for Chapter Five. People marched in the streets for 2 days 
against a proposed paraxylene (PX) chemical factory to be built in their city. In the face 
of this public opposition, the government hurriedly postponed plans for the plant and 
after months of ensuing debate, public opinion hearings, and environmental impact 
statements, the plans for the plant were cancelled.  
Looking to the 2007 anti PX protests in Xiamen, China, I trace how various dynamic 
assemblages functioned to foment a protest that would impact the country’s 
contemporary environmental movement. These assemblages include the 
political/academic/economic assemblage that connected scientists to real estate agents, 
the global/digital media assemblage that linked netizens and citizens via burgeoning 
online networks and widespread mobile phone use, and the environmental crisis/civic 
duty assemblage, which tethers the practice of sacrificing on a personal level to benefit 
the common good with environmental awareness. Together, their varied movement and 
trajectories coalesce to form protests, which I term a force majeure because they have the 
capacity to disrupt corruption networks and encourage new enactments of citizenship 
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capable of empowering local communities across China. 
This term, force majeure, first helps to capture change, movement, and becoming (a 
la Deleuze and Guattari), which are an integral part of what is happening in China. 
Second, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, force majeure is both “irresistible” 
and “overwhelming.” This concept is important to contemplating networks, which have 
constructed pathways for this tsunami of opposition to disrupt corruption, stir pressure 
from Beijing, and physically move a plant. Third, the term helps to privilege force, or 
relationships between two actants rather than the actants themselves.  
By examining Xiamen as a force majeure rather than a protest initiated by rational 
groups of environmentalists, I explore a new way of studying social movements that 
presupposes neither democracy nor rationality. This model moves away from linear 
progressions and promises no particular end result. What it does focus on is the 
conglomeration of forces, or assemblages, that coalesced to move people to the streets, 
which moved the government to back down, which inspired others to also fight against 
corruption using China’s environmental laws in cities across China. 
In Chapter Six, I look to the masses of people that showed up in Dalian to protest the 
operation of an existing PX plant located on their shoreline in 2011. The protests 
appeared to be a big success. After only hours of demonstrating, the mayor stood atop a 
police van with a megaphone and announced to the crowd the plant would be shut down 
and moved elsewhere. News of the event spread across the country via social media, and 
with it came hope that other towns could follow the precedent set by the people of 
Dalian. However, when I spoke to protestors involved, disappointment sat heavy in the 
air. The mayor never carried out his promise to the people. They told me the plant did not 
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even shut down for a week and was never moved. Their mayor had lied to them.  
The shortage of PX in China made this factory incredibly important to businesses all 
along the oil processing chain, a network difficult to disrupt. The fact that it was already 
built meant that a relocation would cost the company far too much money to justify. 
Many Chinese people outside Dalian, however, never heard about this part of the story, 
meaning that the story of Dalian remained a story of hope. This was partially due to the 
censorship apparatuses in place. News of the story flew across social media as events 
were unfolding in real time. Onlookers witnessed the crowds, the chanting, the arrests, 
and the mayor submitting to the people on their smartphones, iPads, and computer 
screens. They cheered their fellow citizens as they watched from afar. The local paper 
pronounced the peoples’ victory; however, shortly after the protests, news of the event 
was censored, which meant that follow up stories never made it into the papers or social 
media. Rather than dousing hopes, the fragmented story spread to other towns as a 
success story, which inspired many in Maoming to protest violently against plans for a 
PX plant when they came to their town.  
By 2014, when the Maoming protests erupted, anti PX protests had become rather 
common and local officials across China were prepared to deal with them, which Chapter 
Seven explores in depth. They knew they needed to shut down social media, stifle the 
opposition, and, if need be, announce they would cancel plans for the plant to appease 
protestors. So when people began gathering at the capitol building and marching through 
the streets in Maoming, the government quickly censored terms on Weibo and shut down 
social media channels. This did not, however, stop the protests. People deployed a 
multitude of creative practices to avoid censorship. Rumors of police beatings drew 
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crowds of onlookers to the street, exacerbating the situation.  
Protestors burned police stations, threw water bottles at enforcement officers brought 
in from nearby cities, and kept coming to the streets. Unlike Xiamen and Dalian’s 
protests, the Maoming protests lasted an entire week and were marked by violence and 
destruction. Documentation of the event may have been stalled by the government’s 
attempts to shut down lines of communication, but creative users were able to circumvent 
these, and those patient enough to wait until the events were over could then share what 
had unfolded over Weibo, blogs, and BBSs. 
When asked why they participated in the protests, interviewees responded by saying 
they were inspired by the successes in Xiamen and Dalian and felt they, too, could defeat 
plans for the PX plant. They were also acutely aware of the corruption that plagued their 
local government, as dozens of officials had recently been expunged on graft charges. 
The protests were dually motivated by fear of pollution and the widespread corruption 
that had infiltrated the area. Believing they could succeed as others had, especially with 
environmental justifications on their side, the people of Maoming attacked fraudulent 
officials and demanded they listen. They interrupted networks of corruption. When local 
officials finally caved to the people, the people demanded that their submission be in 
writing, disseminated over social media, and posted to the government website. These 
channels would not only serve as proof to the people of Maoming, but to officials in 
Beijing and onlookers from around the country.  
Together, these three case studies help to chart changing protests alongside the 
proliferating social media platforms and how activists have changed and adapted their 
practices to circumvent censorship and organize opposition. They also trace the 
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transformation and expansion of protests from environmental protests to protests that also 
address corruption and a growing dissatisfaction with government practices. As a result, 
we can witness how, in the wake of these protests, networks shift and are interrupted to 
make space for new forms of civic engagement. 
 
Conclusion 
The conflicts in China, the rapid change and growth, the shifting and growing 
networks all create spaces of contention and contradiction. One of the major incongruities 
found in Chinese policies and practices is that which lies between the push for rapid 
economic growth alongside the demand for environmentally friendly practices—the very 
contradiction that has helped to foment the protests in Xiamen, Dalian, Maoming, and 
elsewhere. This competition is often discussed in win/loss terms, as if one will prevail 
and the other fail. This dissertation argues otherwise. Within this space of maodun, or 
contradiction, exists complex networks—of hostilities and competing interests, 
corruption and a sense of civic duty, new media and old relations to the land—that do not 
necessarily lead to triumphs and failures, but eruptions that create space for new 
configurations and relationships. Beyond good or bad, these new spaces open 
opportunities for alternative practices. Within them, hope that new relationships will 










A SHORT HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTALISM IN CHINA 
 
In 1737, under the Qianlong emperor, China’s first recorded environmental protest 
occurred. One hundred and eight residents in the Huqiu hill district outside of Suzhou 
signed and submitted a petition to their local officials that detailed the offenses of a local 
dyeing factory. According to the paperwork, the villagers believed the factory was 
polluting their water supply, which was in turn killing their crops, rendering the water 
unsuitable for making tea, and causing general health problems. In the list of offenses, the 
villagers also added that they were “outraged” their “celebrated religious beauty spot 
[was] being treated with such disrespect” (Dunstan, 1998, p. 699). Authorities responded 
by having a previously stated prohibition on dyeing carved in stone (rather than written 
on paper). 
These villagers, in no way, were environmentalists as we think of them today, for the 
word nature had not yet even been introduced in the Chinese language. Not until the 
twentieth century did the Chinese develop a word that mirrored the Western notion of 
nature as a world separate from humanity, meaning that these people likely saw land, the 
cosmos, and humans as part of an interrelated system rather than nature as an “other.” 
The people from this small village were fighting against a polluting dyeing factory 
because it was responsible for the rapid deterioration of their systems—their food crops, 
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water supply, and religious site.  
Similarly, people in China today are realizing that any environmental pollution 
contaminates their bodies through the air, water, and land, which are all intimately 
intertwined in a continuous flow. Thus, when they are fighting against dangerous 
chemical factories, dyeing industries, garbage incinerators, wastewater pipelines, and 
other polluting industries, they are fighting for the environment and themselves and all 
that flows between them. To better understand environmental protests today in China, a 
brief trip through historical events is warranted. As will be explained in the following 
chapter, a networked approach necessitates attention to historical factors. Furthermore, 
this foray into history offers a changing portrait of social movements that will serve as a 
contrast to contemporary social movements, which are deeply intertwined with social 
media. I will begin this chapter by describing the environmental changes brought about 
by various human interventions from dynastic times to the present. 
 
Environmental Shifts in Imperial Times: A Series of Crises 
Over China’s thousands of years of history, the environment has influenced and been 
influenced by each dynasty in a complex system of droughts, trade routes, agriculture, 
floods, wars, delicate ecosystems, disease, and so on. Different political and economic 
circumstances, in particular, are densely bound up with both environmental sustainability 
and degradation. In the following overview, I will discuss how various political and 
economic regimes have impacted China’s landscape and ecosystems by transforming 
diverse ecologies into monocultures before delving into China’s contemporary turn to 
environmental awareness and advocacy, which signifies a marked turn to more diverse 
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landscapes, ideas, and practices. I will begin by turning back to dynastic times before 
engaging more closely with the Mao era.  
According to Marks (2012), “China’s environmental history is a story of the 
simplification of environments, peoples, and institutions” in which biodiversity shrank 
substantially (p. 7). This movement towards a more streamlined monoculture culminated 
in the Mao Era. Though many factors came into play, centuries of promoting agricultural 
expansion and the concomitant deforestation of massive tracts of land is one culprit, 
which sacrificed ecologically diverse forests for fields of single crops like rice and 
wheat.i The second major factor was the attempt to control waterways through dikes, 
dams, and levees—an effort that promulgated both floods and droughts and inadvertently 
harmed the local wildlife. The third factor that resulted in an ecological imbalance was 
the overpopulation of China, which sacrificed delicate ecologies for human expansion. 
The final factor that created a dangerous imbalance for China was the reglobalization of 




The expansion of agriculture into China’s grasslands during Han colonization marked 
the beginning of what would become a centuries long battle with desertification (Marks, 
2012). The decimation of this northern habitat combined with the introduction of 
irrigation systems ensured that the grasslands would never recover and ultimately turn 
instead into desert. China’s trade pathways established during this era encouraged 
farmers to turn more land over to agriculture to cultivate whichever crops demanded the 
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highest prices at market, which only exacerbated the problem. Massive livestock 
populations that grazed on fields likely prevented abandoned farmland from growing 
back into forests (Marks, 2012).  
As of 1000 CE, China’s Northern plain had been almost entirely converted into 
farmland, and biodiversity was on the decline. During the Ming dynasty, the importation 
of New World food crops made exploitation of further tracts of land, including 
subtropical forests and highlands, possible (Marks, 2012, pp. 205-206). Maize, potatoes, 
and sweet potatoes made their way to China via sea trade routes and spread all over the 
land during the Qing dynasty. They were followed by the import of nutrient dense foods 
including peanuts, tomatoes, chilies, and guavas, which allowed for the population 
explosion that would take place in subsequent years (Albala, 2011). The massive 
deforestation that occurred to make way for all these new crops exacerbated the droughts 
caused by the El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO), resulting in millions of deaths due 
to starvation (Marks, 2012, p. 255).  
When Mao came into power and began what Shapiro (2001) calls a “war against 
nature,” the forests were already struggling. However, rather than afforesting the area, 
many of the remaining trees were decimated in the name of “progress.” Mao’s successor, 
Deng Xiaoping, instituted policies that inadvertently worsened the situation. When he 
gave peasants the freedom to build their own houses, between 1981 and 1985, 195 
million cubic meters of forest were consumed for housing construction. Between 1979 
and 1986, an estimated “19 million acres of arable land were lost under the combined 
assault of soil erosion, urbanization, and industrialization” (Jing, 2010, p. 144). This trend 
did not change after Deng’s death. By 2000, over 25% of China’s landmass was 
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considered to be a desert—an increase of 10% from 1993. According to experts, this 
number is constantly growing and, as Williams (2002) makes clear, there is “nearly 
universal consensus attributing desert expansion in China to human behavior” (p. 15). 
 
Redirecting Waterways 
In addition to sacrificing forests and grasslands for agriculture, the attempts to control 
rivers by building dikes, dams, and diversions also led to a number of environmental 
issues, including massive flooding and droughts. During the Song dynasty, the redirection 
of the Yellow River in 1194 CE to a more southern course had repercussions that lasted 
well into the 1800s. The dry riverbeds of sand in the North combine to form sandstorms 
that have “plagued the region for nine centuries” and make living and farming in this 
region difficult (Marks, 2012, p. 155).  
The excess of dikes on Dongting Lake in the eighteenth century combined with 
increased deforestation led to extensive flooding, with 18 noteworthy floods afflicting the 
surrounding area between 1831 and 1879 (Marks, 2012). Despite the problems stemming 
from dam building, the Chinese government remained undeterred in its expansion of dam 
projects and embarked upon new initiatives with little to no regard for the river or land 
that surrounded it. This led to multiple catastrophes, including the disasters that followed 
the 1962 damming of the Yellow River. In spite of expert advice against building a dam 
on a river with such a high silt content, the project was approved and completed. Shortly 
thereafter, the generators were rendered useless by the silt and the city of Xian was 
flooded. However, dammania persisted and by 1990, all except two of China’s rivers had 
been dammed for a total of 83,387 dams (Marks, 2012).  
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The Three Gorges Dam, the world’s largest and China’s largest engineering feat, 
forced human relocation and the likely extinction of numerous plant and animal species. 
According to Wu, Huang, Han, Xie, and Gao (2003), this type of “habitat fragmentation, 
including both the reduction in habitat area and the alteration of its spatial configuration, 
has been generally recognized as the primary cause of loss of biodiversity and ecosystem 
services” (p. 1239).  After it was built, the area suffered landslides as well as the collapse 
of riverbanks. This rush to hydropower has been largely government driven and has 
lacked important input from those with divergent views (Mertha, 2010), thereby isolating 
the decision-making process in an information monoculture spearheaded by the interests 
of government officials. 
 
Overpopulation  
The third move that resulted in environmental degradation was a drastic increase in 
the human population, which impacted the plant and animal diversity across China and 
continues to do so to this day. Between 1000 BCE and 300 CE, the country’s population 
increased from five to sixty million. This population growth was accompanied by an 
ethnic genocide in which smaller minorities were defeated and replaced with Han people 
and practices. For example, the movement of the Han people to the south of China forced 
out many minorities who lived in the area. The practices the Han brought with them, such 
as agriculture and silver mining, wreaked havoc on the delicate ecosystems that had been 
maintained through centuries of adaptive practices by local peoples. As Marks writes, 
“What had once been a diverse human and natural environment in north China has 
radically been simplified” (p. 101).  
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As human populations increased without regard for the land’s limitations, people 
experienced land shortage and scarcity. Between 1750 and 1950, the population 
expanded from 225 to 580 million. Plots of fertile soil had to be divided into smaller and 
smaller pieces with the doubling of the population every generation, which meant people 
had to make do with less land (Marks, 2012, p. 221). This also impacted peasant’s ability 
to make a living as farmers and increased the amount of waste being produced.  
In recent years, the population increase has led to human encroachment on lands that 
had never before seen humans. People brought industrialization along with them, and air, 
soil, and water pollution levels skyrocketed. This pollution did not limit itself to 
impacting humans, but also threatened the existence of numerous species, ultimately 
leading to the rapid decline of plant and animal diversity. As of 2014, 420 officially 
protected endangered species were located in China (Li, 2014), and as early as 2011, 
scientists estimated that 70-80% of the country’s plant species were threatened (Marks, 
2012, p. 293). Today, the pangolin, which is considered to be a food delicacy, and the 
golden coin turtle, which is used for medicinal purposes, are in severe danger of 
extinction (Li, 2014). This, as well as the rapid decline of other species, is a crisis local 
and international NGOs have been feverishly working to address. 
In addition to decimating nonhuman populations, subsequent population bursts 
including the population boom resulting from Mao’s directive to have large families 
(which will be discussed in more detail below) ended in famine and nutrient-deprived 
landscapes. Bigger families did mean a larger workforce, but such a large workforce 
could not be sustained by an already suffering countryside. Without attention to the limits 
of the land, leaders were doomed to fail.  
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The Resource Exodus 
Finally, the development of an increasingly globalized trade system created a flow of 
resources from China to the outside world. Beginning with the Silk Road as early as the 
second century BCE, tea, silk, and spices were migrating from China to the Middle East 
and Europe. Over the years as trade flourished and China also began exporting porcelain, 
timber, and precious metals, this translated to enormous economic benefits for China, but 
also to deforestation, overuse of lands, and monocultures. For example, when European 
and U.S. demand for ephedra sinica (a drug to treat asthma and common colds as well as 
a diet pill) grew in 2000, the over cultivation of the plant led to the depletion of ground 
cover as well as further desertification (Marks, 2012).  
China’s list of exports has grown and shifted over time, with diverse repercussions for 
different parts of China. The demand for precious metals such as copper and silver has 
increased mining efforts, which are notorious for destroying land and polluting the 
surrounding areas. This trend towards mining has risen in recent times. As of 2015, China 
controls approximately 95% of the world’s rare earth metal production and half of its 
reserves, which are used in electronic devices (Yan, 2015). 
 
Hints of Environmental Discourses 
In the midst of repeated sacrifices of nature’s complex ecosystems in favor of human 
“progress” and expansion is also woven a discourse that has what we would call today in 
the West environmentalist overtones. As early as 250 BCE, there is evidence that the 
Chinese literate classes were aware of the limits of their resources. A book published that 
year titled Guanzi, “expresses awareness that natural resources are limited, and that a 
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successful state should have a ruler who puts limits on their exploitation so that resources 
are not exhausted” (Marks, 2012, p. 71).  
The increasing separation of humans from their environment impacted their 
perception of the world and their relationship with the land. In the Tang dynasty (618-
907CE) as human civilization flourished, people began to remark upon their “separation 
from nature [which was] enforced by city life” (Marks, 2012, p. 164). With cities and 
walls came a pointed separation of people from the larger landscape, a change happening 
again in China today as people are moving from rural to urban areas in astonishing 
numbers. This separation ultimately leads to a more limited understanding of the 
complexity of ecosystems and the limitations of the land and represents a reordering of 
relationships. 
With this separation of people from their land, however, also came a variety of 
preservation efforts. For example, in the 1600s, a Henan Province official proposed a 
“massive reforestation program to address some of the devastation wreaked by the late 
Ming rebellions” (Economy, 2010, p. 43). Those in charge were beginning to realize the 
value of trees in preventing erosion. In the early 1700s, the people of Hangzhou showed a 
“widespread awareness of the value of trees, bamboo, and perennial crops” and their 
ability to prevent erosion (Osborne, 1998, p. 222). At the same time, officials put into 
place severe penalties for exploiting the area’s shared land.  
Though these efforts illustrate recognition of the importance of ecosystems, they were 
more often than not met with resistance by those more interested in short-term profits and 
political power. Despite the awareness of the interconnectedness of humans, plants, lakes, 
water, animals, weather, and desertification, tensions between ecological systems and 
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political and economic systems persisted. During the Mao years, these issues were 
exacerbated as Mao encouraged people to conceive of themselves as superior to the land 
and life that surrounded them, as I will detail below. 
 
The Mao Years 
The Mao Years represented a more concentrated and well-documented assault on 
nature and, thus, deserve greater attention. In the early 1900s, China was in political and 
economic ruin. The series of imperial invasions by European countries left the country 
devastated, with no leader to pick up the pieces. Corruption ran rampant and an 
underground network of warlords ran many areas of the country. China was in desperate 
need of rebuilding, but none of the imperialist invaders were willing to assist China, 
believing it to be too costly an investment.ii Sun Yatsen and the Guomindang arose as one 
of the potential leaders, but Mao Zedong, who rose as an alternative, met their efforts 
with resistance and finally defeated the Guomindang with the power of the peasantry, 
eventually forcing them to retreat to Taiwan. Under Mao, the country was finally largely 
united, but the land they inherited was beset with problems. 
Once Mao was in power, the series of campaigns he led did nothing to undo the 
degradation he inherited. Rather, his policies pulled the country into decades of 
revolution that exacerbated an unsustainable burden on the environment. At the same 
time, he also discouraged and disregarded the opinions and cautions of scientists who 
could have minimized the devastation that ensued. Headstrong and determined, Mao 
proclaimed that “Man’s ability to know and change Nature is unlimited” (Shapiro, 2001, 
p. 68). This approach resulted in the silencing of many scientists who disagreed. Those 
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who did speak up were often sent to the countryside for reeducation so that they too could 
embrace the idea that willpower and the efforts of the people could make most anything 
possible.  
This disregard for science and turn to willpower as the way is evident in Mao’s 
retelling of the “Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains.” In this short story that 
many young students during the Maoist era were required to memorize, the “foolish old 
man” from a small town set his mind on leveling two mountains using only a bucket. 
Many were skeptical of this man, deeming him foolish for attempting such a ridiculous 
feat, but the man kept at the task with dogged persistence, eventually achieving what 
others had considered impossible bucket by bucket. This tale was meant to inspire 
Chinese peasants across the country to persist in the face of tremendous challenges as 
well as imminent failure. This story and “[t]he spirit of the Foolish Old Man...was 
credited with transforming Chinese landscapes by inspiring backbreaking physical 
sacrifices and communal effort” (Shapiro, 2001, p. 103).  
 
Mao’s Mangled Effort at Industrialization 
With science out the window, Mao embarked upon projects shrouded in revolution 
that had many unforeseen impacts on China’s ecosystems. In 1958, he launched the Great 
Leap Forward (1958-1960), for which the “defining characteristic was speed” (Shapiro, 
2001, p. 71). Mao wanted to catch up to and surpass the U.S. and Europe in terms of 
industrialization and believed that it could be accomplished in a completely unrealistic 
period of time that was perpetually being shortened. The Great Leap Forward began with 
a series of irrigation projects that resulted in mass relocations of populations and the loss 
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of arable land. This was followed by the “backyard furnace” campaign, which destroyed 
useful household products and produced 10,700,000 tons of worthless metal (Shapiro, 
2001).  
1958 also marked the year that Mao attempted to increase agricultural production 
beyond reasonable goals. Without the input of scientists, whose knowledge could have 
helped prevent the catastrophes that would follow, people began planting crops too close 
together, overusing fertilizers, and expanding agriculture into the grasslands. As cities 
and provinces across China competed for the biggest yields, increasingly unsustainable 
methods were employed and the “grain choked, failed to grow, and rotted” (Shapiro, 
2001, p. 77).  
On top of these efforts was layered yet another nationwide directive to eradicate the 
“four pests”—flies, mosquitos, rats, and sparrows. The people obeyed and, unfortunately, 
carried out the campaign with great success. People across the country would follow the 
sparrows every evening to their roosting places outside of town and bang pots and bans to 
prevent them from landing. The birds would literally drop out of the sky, dead due to 
exhaustion. Only after the sparrow population reached near extinction did Mao and the 
people realize the gravity of the directive. In the aftermath of the movement, people 
noticed that their crops were being eaten by pests—the very pests the sparrows had been 
consuming before they were slaughtered. The sparrow eventually shed the title of “pest” 
and was reinstated as a bird worthy of painting and poetry. The shifts in networks, 
fortunately for the sparrows, had a rather swift impact on human food systems. 
In the wake of irresponsible farming practices and the annihilation of certain species, 
the Great Famine ensued. Desperate, people across the country descended upon 
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remaining reserves of food, animals, and resources. They scoured the land for anything 
they could eat, including tree bark, roots, rats, and seeds, generating an even more barren 
countryside.  
 
Mao’s Mission to Restructure the Land 
In an effort to raise the country out of this terrible catastrophe and back on the road to 
independence and progress while also revitalizing his political clout, Mao launched the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), which concentrated on increasing domestic production 
of crops as well as revenue. The major problem with this effort was twofold. First, the 
emphasis on universal models of agriculture in a country with an incredibly varied terrain 
meant that local topography and climates were completely ignored. Failures proliferated. 
The second major problem was the forced relocation of 16 million young comrades to the 
countryside. The transplanted youth were completely ignorant of local farming practices 
as well as the importance of local lakes, streams, flora, and fauna in the functioning of 
ecosystems. They merely carried out the plans they were told to enact, which wrecked 
many habitats.  
During this initiative, mountainsides across the country were terraced in an attempt to 
grow crops on their slopes. This tactic was termed “Dazhai-inspired agriculture” and was 
a method taken from a small village that had figured out how to make use of their gradual 
slopes to farm crops using a very labor intensive system. However, this method was not 
suitable for universal application for a variety of reasons, including climate, topographic, 
and soil variances.  
At the same time, wetlands and lakes were filled in with soil to expand farming land 
  
26 
by armies of citizens. Grazing fields were turned into grain farms. The outcome was 
intensified soil erosion on mountains, an abundance of land too saturated with water to 
plant crops, and a loss of the grasslands essential for sustaining livestock. However, Mao 
and his loyalists would accept no excuses for failure of these methods. People who 
doubted the universal agricultural models put forward by Mao were seen as traitors. 
Many of these traitors were scientists were publicly shamed and delegitimized. As a 
result, science became an enemy of sorts that was replaced by blind nationalism. 
 
Unbridled Deforestation 
The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution each had extremely detrimental 
impacts on the land and waterways in China, from which it has yet to recover. In addition 
to the devastation discussed, the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution 
functioned in tandem with the Reform Era to deforest the nation in what Marks (2012) 
calls the “three great cuttings.” The Great Leap Forward’s backyard furnaces devoured 
trees to fuel the fires that ended up producing only useless hunks of metal. During the 
Cultural Revolution, mountains were deforested in the name of Dazhai inspired 
agriculture. This model of agriculture resulted more often than not in soil erosion in 
places where the mountains were too steep or the climate too cold. Finally, with the 
change of power during the Reform Era came further timber consumption via logging for 
housing materials. As people moved from communal living quarters to individual 





Mao’s Mission to Expand the Population 
Another major problem that arose during Mao’s regime was population growth. 
Throughout his tenure, Mao promoted human reproduction, insisting that if the country 
had more people, China’s road to industrialization and modernization would be swifter. 
Mao also believed that a larger population would contribute to China’s military power 
and make it more resilient to foreign threats, including the US. He did this in spite of his 
advisor Ma Yinchu’s advice against it, who warned that unchecked population growth 
would actually impede the country’s development.  
The first issue Mao faced after promoting a population explosion was the Great 
Famine. China’s population grew to a size the land simply could not support, especially 
in the face of the droughts that swept the nation. Tens of thousands of people died. Yet, 
even after the droughts and famine, Mao continued to promote large families and rampant 
procreation. The subsequent increase in people led and is still leading to environmental 
problems. China’s one child policy, which was implemented in the late 1970s, attempted 
to correct the overpopulation problem. Jiang Zemin, one of China’s top leaders until 
2003, deemed China’s massive population its biggest problem, as it can be connected to a 
variety of persistent environmental, social, and political issues. 
 
Mao Bends to the Limits of the Land 
Before long, environmental catastrophes that arose during Mao’s regime simply could 
not be ignored. Mao and his advisors were forced to confront four major issues. One 
issue was the lack of fertile soil for crops after years of overfarming without sensitivity to 
the land. In 1972, directly after Nixon visited China, the first commercial deal was struck 
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between the two countries, and it was for 13 nitrogen-based chemical fertilizer complexes 
(Marks, 2012). This deal was targeted at increasing domestic food production so China 
could feed its growing population and stop relying on Russia for assistance. The second 
catastrophe that occurred was in the coastal city of Dalian (a city that serves as a case 
study in Chapter Six). The entire bay turned black after untreated industrial waste was 
dumped into the water, killing marine life and polluting the shoreline. This very visible 
event demanded attention from officials outside the city. The third crisis was the 
appearance of tainted fish in the capitol city of Beijing’s markets, which drove the issue 
home to the highest level officials. Finally, the fourth was that the Yellow River, which 
had been dammed in several places, failed to reach the sea that year. 
In response to their domestic crises, China took its first step to reintegrate with the 
rest of the world. The same year these crises descended upon China—1972—the country 
joined the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment and developed a state-
level committee to address environmental issues. This committee was the precursor to 
today’s Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) (Economy, 2010). This move 
toward a greater focus on their environmental situation was imperative, as the country 
was being besieged by one environmental crisis after another. In the next section, I will 
trace a series of disasters and responses that occurred after China’s “opening up” to 







The Environmental Impacts of China’s “Opening”:  
A Rising Culture of Protest 
Though Deng Xiaoping’s move to a more capitalist economy was met with 
excitement by much of the world, it would prove to come with its own set of deleterious 
impacts on the environment. According to Marks (2012), Deng’s “developmentalism 
conceived of nature as a vast reserve to be plundered for human needs,” which was not so 
different than Mao in that both believed “humans could—and should—control nature” (p. 
273). The major difference was that Deng would use science to help in his mission, a 
move that would take “years of post-Mao leadership ‘...to rehabilitate the stature of the 
scientific community’” (Marks, 2012, p. 273). 
This being said, Deng did attempt to construct a system under which the environment 
would be taken into greater consideration. In 1979, the first environmental law, called the 
Environmental Protection Law, was promulgated on a trial basis under his leadership. 
Under this law, the government tolerated environmental protests, which had previously 
been a rarity, “so long as they [were] not too disruptive” (Jing, 2010, p. 145). Most of the 
ensuing protests were dealt with on a local level since Deng’s political restructuring 
moved power from the central government to local authorities, thereby giving them a 
great deal of autonomy. One of the most remarkable examples is the case of the Dachuan 
protests, which spanned over a decade.  
 
The Persistent Protests in Dachuan 
Dachuan is located in China’s northeast Sichuan province, and in the 1970s and 80s 
was primarily an agricultural area. When a chemical fertilizer factory moved in on the 
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riverbank and began releasing its wastewater directly into the region's main water source, 
people began noticing that the river was changing. Not only was it getting wider, but 
strange substances were pooling on its surface. Once villagers were able to attribute these 
changes to the factory, a series of protests ensued (Jing, 2010). The first dispute against 
the company came after a horse and 30 sheep went blind after drinking from the river. 
The people became acutely aware that their livestock’s as well as their own health was at 
risk. The residents complained directly to the factory, which temporarily assuaged those 
upset by the pollution by offering some villagers employment. Until then, no one from 
the area worked at the factory, creating a divide between locals and those who moved in 
to run the plant. 
The second incident that provoked outrage stemmed from the reallocation of land that 
occurred after agricultural communes were disbanded. Those residents who were given 
land next to the river quickly found that crops would not grow due to high levels of 
ammonia, which were easily attributable to the factory. Villagers rose up and voiced their 
disapproval by blockading the entrance to the factory, thereby preventing any trucks from 
entering or leaving. Their demands were simple and straightforward—they wanted the 
factory to provide them with tap water—a demand the factory officials would ultimately 
satisfy.  
The third incident occurred in the wake of population control policies when more 
attention was paid to women’s reproductive capacities. Villagers began realizing that an 
increasing number of women were having miscarriages and, with the help of doctors, 
eventually linked it to the pollution in the river. This time, the villagers were not alone. 
The local Party Boss’s wife had suffered numerous miscarriages, which he also attributed 
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to the chemical plant. He became a leader in the effort to bring clean drinking water to 
the entire village, a luxury everyone at the plant already had. The villagers demanded that 
either the factory’s top leaders and their families each drink one bottle of polluted water 
or that the factory pay for access to clean water for the entire village. Factory officials 
chose the latter.   
Protests intensified and became more frequent between the early 1980s, which 
witnessed only a handful of uprisings, and the early 90s, which saw over 300. During 
these protests, human health “remained the most contentious issue in each phase of the 
village’s struggle against the factory” (Jing, 2010, p. 148). In 1996, one of the largest and 
most offensive protests took place after a flood broke the bridge over the river, which had 
to be extended after the factory’s wastewater caused the river to widen. The enraged 
villagers marched to the entrance of the factory and, again, asked factory officials to 
come out and talk to them. They wanted the officials and their families to drink the water 
they had brought from the tainted river. When officials refused to do either, the villagers 
brought several trucks loaded with water from the river and used hoses to pump the 
contaminated water over the factory walls. After 10 days of being barraged with 
contaminated river water, the officials finally agreed to give Dachuan 150,000 yuan to 
build a bridge and provide an alternative and safe water source for 600 people (Jing, 
2010).  
Over the course of the decade of protests, villagers became increasingly more 
informed about the dangers of water pollution as well as their rights and the methods they 
could employ to protect themselves, their families, land, and livelihoods. Unlike later 
protests, they went directly to the factory, bypassing any local laws or procedures. With 
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each new tragedy came new tactics for dealing with the polluting factory and people also 
obtained new knowledge about the country’s environmental laws. Together, these 
protests show how  
Chinese villagers can become instant political activists when their livelihood is 
threatened....These protests are not meant to save an endangered environment for its 
own sake....Rather, they are aimed at seeking social justice to prevent the ecological 
basis of human existence. (Jing, 2010, p. 159) 
 
With or without environmentalism, these people will still fight for environmental causes. 
They are not a niche group, but the masses fighting for their lives. 
By the end of the 1980s, the central government had founded China’s Ministry of 
Environmental Protection (MEP). The fact that China was facing massive environmental 
challenges was warrant for constructing a special department devoted to addressing 
environmental concerns. Moreover, the central authorities were well aware that 
environmental degradation and disasters were accompanied by social and economic 
losses that could hurt their national GDP.  
With the development of a formal department tasked with dealing with the 
environment came the training of lawyers and judges on environmental laws and issues 
beginning in the 1990s (Economy, 2010, p. 20). This movement toward public 
responsibility for collective resources was crucial as social welfare programs declined 
and support from the central government was withdrawn. People began taking these 
issues into their own hands and public participation in environmental protection increased 
dramatically. 
One marker of this rise in public participation was the founding of ENGOs. 
Established in 1994, Friends of Nature (FON) became China’s first formal ENGO, and 
paved the way for the thousands of ENGOs to come after it. Its mission was to increase 
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popular participation in environmental issues. The climate it entered was nurturing and 
open in that the government was permitting media investigations of pollution and 
infractions as a means of increasing awareness, investment, and participation. The 
government also supported grassroots efforts, which were seen as a way of involving the 
public in taking responsibility for the collective. Though the government did not want 
protests to take place or “social unrest” to occur, they were looking to the masses for help 
in solving their ever evolving environmental conundrums.  
Just over a decade after FON was founded, in 2006, 354,000 NGOs were officially 
registered, but “if one attempt[ed] to account for NGOs that [were] not registered with 
the government, the number by some accounts [was] as high as eight million” (Economy, 
2010, p. 137).  Just 3 years later, the official number of registered organizations had risen 
to 414,614 (Gao, 2013). As of 2014, of the registered NGOs, over 3,500 of them were 
considered to be environmental NGOs (Wang, 2014), with many more operating 
unofficially as grassroots organizations or as registered businesses (a practice that allows 
organizers to sidestep registering with the government).  
 
The Huai River Runs Black 
In addition to being the year that saw China’s first ENGO, 1994 also marked the year 
that the Huai River literally turned black after factories along its banks released untreated 
waste, killing 26 million pounds of fish and rendering the water undrinkable (Economy, 
2010). This posed a problem to all the villages that drew from the Huai for drinking 
water. The media, now encouraged to report on such incidents, arrived on the scene to 
gather information. Rather than confront the problem, the local authorities attempted to 
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cover up the incident and, in response, the incensed villagers pelted officials with eggs. 
With the story now exposed on various media channels, the central government was 
alerted of the incident and quickly became involved. Local officials were told they would 
be fired if they did not stop the pollution and clean up the river. As a result, a reported 
1,000 factories were either shut down or relocated (Economy, 2010).  This incident helps 
to illustrate how the government’s changing attitude toward pollution impacted the lives 
of citizens and how media would be used to garner support. 
In the following years, people took it upon themselves to seek various means of 
educating the general population about the environment and environmental issues moved 
from the local to the national. For example, Liao Xiaoyi (also known as Sheri Liao) 
established the Global Village of Beijing, and with it a show called Time for the 
Environment, which aired 300 episodes on CCTV between 1996 and 2001. She also 
produced numerous documentaries aimed at increasing awareness and action. According 
to Economy (2010), Liao is, in part, responsible for the media becoming “an essential 
element of environmental activism in China” (p. 171). Numerous activists have followed 
and expanded the path Liao forged by not only turning to television and documentaries, 
but also radio stations and regular press conferences with reporters. In the following 
chapters, we will further discuss how the use of various forms of media is central to 
China’s environmental movement. As the situation has become more complicated, the 






The Yangtze River Flood and Subsequent Environmental Initiatives 
The increased environmental awareness promoted by people like Liao Xiaoyi, Wang 
Yongchen (the director of Green Earth volunteers), and Liang Congjie (founder of 
Friends of Nature) helped to move away from the monoculture of thought Mao promoted. 
Rather than issuing single unilateral edicts, the government was welcoming a more 
diverse array of voices. Citizen leaders were valued for their ability to conduct research 
and spread information. Scientists were, again, regarded as a respected resource, 
especially for addressing environmental issues. Thus, when the Yangtze River flooded in 
1998, killing more than 3,000 people and destroying five million homes, the government 
called in experts to examine the disaster. This was one of the largest floods on record, and 
there were numerous reasons beyond heavy rain that contributed to the flood’s intensity 
(Chen & Li, 2005). First, the flooding caused 61 breaches of dykes, dams, and levees that 
had been built along the river. Second, the massive depletion of lakes as well as the 
construction of floodgates between tributaries and lakes gave the floodwaters nowhere 
else to go but downstream, worsening the flood. Third, the straightening of rivers caused 
silt to build up much more quickly than it did when the river took a more meandering 
path, which led to higher water levels. Fourth, over the years, the surrounding areas 
underwent massive deforestation that led to further erosion in a river already heavy with 
silt. This last reason—deforestation—was the first to be discovered and prompted the 
government to act quickly. 
The very same year of the floods, the State Forestry Administration launched the 
Natural Forest Conservation Project, which was aimed at restoring forests and further 
prohibiting logging over 18 provinces and autonomous regions around the Yellow and 
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Yangtze Rivers. This extensive effort included conservation efforts, the retraining of 
those in the logging industry for other jobs, the conversion of farmland to forests, and the 
development of sustainable farming of mushrooms and ferns within the forests (Ma, 
2008). As a result of these efforts, timber harvests from China’s natural forests dropped 
from 32 million square meters to 14 million between 1997 and 2000 (Ma, 2008). 
Environmental efforts and rights continued to expand. 1998 also marked the founding 
of the Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims (CLAPV), a nonprofit 
organization that provides legal counsel to pollution victims via a telephone hotline. It 
was founded and is managed by environmental law professors from the China University 
of Political Science and Law. People can call in for initial legal advice and some receive 
direct help from the organization in the litigation process. Between 2002 and 2010, the 
hotline received over 10,000 complaints, a number far too great for it to handle. Though 
limited, to date, the organization has been an important resource for those whose lives 
have been adversely affected by pollution, but who do not have the time or financial 
wherewithal to independently bring a lawsuit against companies that have their own 
lawyers and much larger cash reserves. 
Further government initiatives that year included the Zero Hour Operation of 1998, 
which required plants that could not meet discharge standards to shut down. This effort 
was focused on the Huai River and resulted in the shut down of at least 500 paper mills, 
which were notorious for their dumping habits. This campaign also involved the media, 
so as to draw more attention to the issues at hand. According to Becker (2000), “the 
China Youth Daily published a photograph of a desperate 60-year-old peasant kneeling in 
front of Xie Zhenhua, director of the National Environmental Protection Agency, 
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pleading him to save the livelihood of fisherman” imperiled by the dangerous discharge 
factories were releasing into the river in which they fished (p. 84). This moving picture 
portrayed the dire nature of the issue. 
The plan was repeated in 1999, and this time the media also played an important part 
in drawing attention to the persistent pollution and its impact on those who depended 
upon it for water, crops, fish, and livestock. The Southern China Morning Post reported 
that an employee, under the direction of his supervisor, dumped “six tonnes of chemical 
waste containing benzene, napthalene, indolene and pyridine” that formed “a black 
glutinous mixture so corrosive it killed all the fish in nearby streams and burned the latex 
gloves of the investigators” in Zhejiang province (Becker, 1999, para. 4). After a public 
search, the pair was eventually caught and arrested making them the first people in China 
to be brought in front of court in an industrial pollution case. Though the results of the 
Zero Outcome campaign were mixed in terms of stopping wastewater dumping,iii they 
arguably increased public awareness of water pollution via reports of the project as well 
as the lawsuit in state sanctioned newspapers. 
 
Building Discontent: Industrialization and Environmentalism Grow in Tandem 
In 2001, the government received 370,000 environmental complaints from citizens, 
who were aware and upset about what was happening in their homes across the country. 
This is evidence of a growing awareness of environmental issues as well as people’s 
rights. It is also evidence of the ongoing environmental issues. Despite ENGO and 
government efforts, the water pollution issue—and the problem of industrial pollution 
more generally—was not being solved. Part of the reason for this ongoing and expanding 
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problem is tied to China’s rapid industrial growth, which posed (and continues to pose) a 
challenge to even the most well-supported environmental efforts. 
Recognizing the seriousness of the problem as well as China’s rising importance as a 
manufacturing hub, the World Bank signed on in 2002 “to assist in the development of 
several municipal and enterprise wastewater treatment plants in Anhui and Shandong 
Provinces to reduce water pollution in the Huai River Basin,” which was just one year 
after China’s accession into the WTO (Economy, 2010, p. 8). What had started as a local 
issue turned into a global matter as people began to realize how important the networks 
between the east and west were in sustaining the global economy. Increasingly, U.S. and 
European companies were outsourcing their manufacturing to China, resulting in the 
increase of Chinese exports to Western countries. To offer an idea of the massive trade 
imbalance that developed, I offer the following information: in 2001 the value of Chinese 
imports outweighed U.S. exports to China by $83,096,100,000,000, and the number was 
growing exponentially (US Census Bureau Foreign Trade Division, 2015). By 2002, the 
difference had already increased to $103,064,900,000,000 and continued to rise by the 
billions subsequent years (US Census Bureau Foreign Trade Division, 2015). In 2008, it 
had risen to $268,039,800,000,000 and then $343,078,800,000,000 in 2014.iv This 
combined outsourcing and dependence on China for goods made a strong case for the 
World Bank to help China, especially since foreign investors often funded the polluting 
industries via the supply chain. 
With the spread of industrialization came the spread of environmental efforts. In 
2003, the central government launched the Environmental Impact Assessment Act, which 
requires all projects to be assessed for safety and for the project to go up for a period of 
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public comment before the company is granted permission to commence construction. 
This law was and is intended to solicit feedback from residents and prevent dangerous 
projects from being built too close to residential property. Unfortunately, it would take 
time for the law to spread far enough for people to demand that their officials enact it. 
Official laws were complemented by civilian efforts. In 2003, Huo Diashan, a 
photographer, also established his own NGO to protect the Huai River in the wake of the 
Zero Hour Operation by making public the impacts pollution was wreaking on the local 
peoples’ health. Other people directed their efforts at preventing dams from being built. 
For example, Wang Yongchen launched a campaign to stop the construction of the 
Yangliuhu Dam on the Min River in Sichuan. Environmental disputes were on the rise, 
with an annual percentage increase that dwarfed China’s impressive GDP growth.  
In 2004, another law meant to complement the Environmental Impact Assessment 
Act was launched called the Environmental Protection Administrative Licensing 
Hearings Provisional Measures. That same year, the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection reported 51,000 “environmental disputes,” and just a year later, the number 
had grown by 250% to 128,000. 
This rapid increase in environmental disputes was creating a sort of social unrest with 
which the government was deeply uncomfortable. They reacted by attempting to reign in 
the movement. In 2005, the government launched a crackdown on foreign NGOs 
ostensibly because they were advancing some sort of Western agenda, but I argue that the 
reason was more likely tied to an effort to subdue the movement without entirely 
quashing it. The government simultaneously recognized the importance of the people in 
environmental efforts, but did not want it to turn into widespread social unrest. That year, 
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510,000 cases of “public conflict” related to environmental issues occurred—a number 
that increased at an annual rate of 29% (van Rooij, 2010).  
One of the public conflicts that occurred was reason enough to take precautions to 
tamp down the enthusiasm of the environmental movement. In 2005, Zhejiang Province, 
which is one of the wealthiest provinces in China, experienced four consecutive large 
scale environmental protests. One was particularly violent and disruptive.  
 
Mass Uprisings in Zhejiang 
Beginning in 1999, the local government began establishing a chemical industrial 
zone near two small villages in Zhejiang province by providing incentives for companies 
to build there. As a result, many chemical companies did decide to relocate in the area 
and by 2005, the industrial zone had flourished; so too had the pollution. The impacts it 
had on residents was severe and direct. Despite laws against it, some residential villages 
were located within a mere 1,000 meters of the industrial zone (Ma, 2009). Local 
officials were prioritizing profit over people.v And the people were paying. Their crops 
were failing, their air was poisoned, and the villagers were tired of being ignored. They 
had attempted to create change via sanctioned methods—petitions to local officials—but 
with no success. 
Exasperated by officials unwilling to listen to their pleas for over a year, a group of 
villagers went to meet the mayor directly on Dongyang Mayor Reception Day in March 
2005, but were refused. The Mayor did not understand how serious this group was until 
they erected bamboo tents right in the middle of the road leading to the industrial zone, 
blocking traffic. Stalwartly, they stood united, unwilling to move for weeks despite 
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numerous police raids and arrests. In an organized attempt to dismantle the opposition, 
the government sent 3,500 local police and employees to break up the blockade.  
This tactic backfired. In response to the raid, the mass of villagers grew 
exponentially. An estimated 20,000 to 40,000 villagers gathered, and the protest turned 
from peaceful to aggressive. Rather than sitting in the streets, they swarmed the nearby 
chemical plants, leaving behind overturned cars, burning police vehicles, damaged 
buildings, and government employees fleeing from the scene in their wake. Protestors 
carried provocative signs expressing their distrust and resentment regarding the situation 
that read: “Corrupt officials have their pockets full of money, people have their lives full 
of pain” and “Rich people can buy houses outside the villages, poor people can only wait 
here for death!” (Ma, 2009, p. 46). Dozens were seriously injured in the aftermath of their 
anger and the government’s resistance. 
 News of the event spread via mass media and a team of officials from the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection (MEP) came to investigate the industrial zone. After assessing 
the situation, the MEP shut down 13 factories including the Dongnong Pesticide factory 
and punished several local officials. Villagers wary of their officials and their follow 
through on the MEP’s orders refused to take down their tent blockades until they 
witnessed the machinery being removed from the factories (Ma, 2009). Thanks to the 
laws in place, the protestors were able not only to hold officials accountable, but also to 
shut down polluting factories through force.  
The event generated a substantial amount of attention from the press. The Donyang 
Daily newspaper reported that over 30 government employees were hospitalized over the 
course of the protests (Yardley, 2005). The paper also, however, stated that the police 
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were attempting to break up the protests because “the coming of cold air and dramatic 
temperature drops threatened the health of feeble old women” (quoted in Yardley, 2005, 
para. 17). Few locals likely believed this narrative, especially after protest organizers 
were arrested and jailed for their involvement. International media picked up the story 
including the South China Morning Post and The New York Times, reporting the details 
of the event outside state controlled media outlets. The group, Human Rights in China 
(HRIC), found that the prosecution of participants went on well after the protests ended. 
Six members of a local environmental group were detained by officials post protests for 
their involvement. This attention via mainstream media prompted officials and academics 
to make and release statements about the protests, which, according to Ma (2009), was 
very uncommon. The new networks linking environmental laws, mass media, awareness, 
ENGOs, and outraged people culminated in an act of environmental justice. 
 
Environmental Catastrophes Hit Home for Officials 
The laws in place were finally providing the support and traction necessary to punish 
and shut down polluting industries. However, this was not the only issue the Chinese 
people confronted. In 2006, an environmental catastrophe hit China’s capitol that was the 
culmination of decades of unchecked deforestation, unsustainable water usage, and rapid 
desertification. Eight sandstorms hit Beijing, with the one on April 17th dumping 330,000 
tons of sand in a single day. NASA images show a band of brown extending far across 
China and into the adjacent oceans from the Korean peninsula to the Yellow Sea (NASA, 
2006).  
Despite action to undo the degradation that plagued the nation, problems were 
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multiplying. The total number of environmental complaints that year exceeded 616,000 
(up from 128,000 the prior year). People’s awareness was increasing and catastrophes 
were drawing attention to the direness of the issues at hand. That year, the government 
introduced yet another complement to the Environmental Impact Statement Act called the 
Provisional Measures for Public Participation in Environmental Impact Assessment, 
thereby providing more concrete procedures for citizen involvement and to recruit them 
in the movement to prevent unchecked industrialization. 
Though policies were improving, their implementation was oftentimes not meeting 
the goals they set out to accomplish. The resulting failures can be attributed to the always 
increasing conflict between the simultaneous push for GDP growth and an end to 
environmental degradation. For example, government policies such as the Zero Hour 
Operation were revealed to be ineffective at improving water quality in the Huai River. In 
2008, after years of work and numerous initiatives by ENGOs, government officials, 
international organizations, and local villagers, the MEP found that over 60% of the river 
was grade IV or worse, which means it was “unsuitable for drinking, fishing, or, in the 
worst cases, industry and agriculture” (Economy, 2010, p. 9). The environmental effort in 
some areas was no match for the industrial factories taking over China in the name of 
economic growth. Policies were being made, but not implemented, which would 
eventually lead to further discontent because awareness was spreading. Before long, 
people’s desires for clean resources combined with a love of their home, financial 
investments in property, and a strong sense of civic duty would emerge to become a force 





To this point, I have provided an overview of environmental protests in China that 
occurred during a massive transition to a more capitalist economy, remarkable GDP 
growth, a movement of authority from the central government to local officials, a rise in 
civic organizations such as NGOs, an increased openness in mass media in regard to 
environmental reporting, the development of environmental policies, the return of 
science, and a widespread distrust of local officials. This complex network, which was 
constantly becoming increasingly diverse, made possible protests that changed local 
landscapes. The Xiamen 2007 anti PX protests would prove to become a force so strong 
that it reshaped China’s environmentalist topography. The major difference would be that 
these protests occurred on a terrain that included Bulletin Board Systems (BBSs), text 
messaging, and QQ (a Chinese social media platform), thereby increasing the speed and 
distance news of the events travelled and allowing it to do so largely unfettered by the 
restrictions placed on state sanctioned mass media. 
In February 2004, the Taiwanese Xianglu Group initiated plans to build a PX plant in 
the tropical coastal city of Xiamen. Officials, who stood to make a great deal of money 
from the 10.8 billion RMB project through kickbacks and bonuses, welcomed the plant. 
This plant was one of seven large scale PX projects to be built in China as part of China’s 
11th Five Year Plan (2006-2010) (Hung, 2013). Plans for the project were not widely 
circulated and received no attention until the summer of 2007 when a professor in the 
Chinese Academy of Science at Xiamen University, Zhao Yufen, who was also a 
member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), began a 
campaign against the project. She gathered 105 signatures of fellow committee members 
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on a petition demanding that the project not be built and brought it to the March 2007 
meeting of the CPPCC. The justification for the opposition was that the PX plant was 
being built too close to residential land and, in the event of an accident, could cause 
major health risks, including cancer and birth defects. 
While the petition was under consideration, word of its contents did not appear in any 
local Xiamen news outlets. However, a story was published in China Business (a Beijing 
based publication), and after being picked up and posted by the well-respected and 
prolific blogger, Lian Yue, who had seen the story released, news of the plans for the 
plant began spreading across blogs and forums. This quick spread was possible because 
Xiamen is in an area of China where many people owned cell phones, had QQ accounts, 
and had access to computers connected to the Internet in 2007. According to one 
interviewee, “All of the news concerning PX was online” (personal correspondence, 
2015). Since the papers were not covering the issue and local officials had disclosed 
neither plans nor an Environmental Impact Statement per regulations, people skeptical of 
their government turned to these forums as their primary source of information. As one 
interviewee stated, Zhao Yufen was a well-respected professor at Xiamen University and 
was responsible for the research, so he found the data trustworthy—more trustworthy 
than their government officials (personal correspondence, 2015).  
The blogger Lian Yue showed unflagging devotion to disseminating information 
about the plant, its impact on the people, the dangers it posed to the town, its opposition, 
and so forth. By the end of March, Lian Yue was urging residents to “break the 
information blockade and to save themselves” using a series of measures (Hung, 2013, p. 
46). In his 12-item list, he repeatedly urged people to actively spread information about 
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the plant and the dangers it posed to Xiamen. As the opposition grew in strength, 
numbers, and fearlessness, local officials began launching a counterattack that involved a 
series of reports and news releases on mass media that touted the benefits the PX plant 
would bring to the town. This campaign did little to quell residents’ fears and, instead, 
fomented intense debates. Widespread distrust in local officials meant that people were 
more likely to trust word of mouth and online forums than state-sanctioned reports. 
The PX plant went from complete obscurity to the center of conversations on blogs, 
chat groups, and neighborhoods in the span of weeks. Online forums were, according to 
multiple interviewees, very lively and full of debates. This is where people found out 
about the project, the threats it posed, and information about the scheduled protest. The 
online discussion groups were also full of fear, outside news reports, rumors, 
misinformation, and exaggerated scientific assessments. They were by no means the most 
accurate source of information, but they addressed issues the mass media conveniently 
left out of their reports.  
Woven throughout the discussion was a clear love of Xiamen residents for the place 
they called home. This was true for those who had lived there their whole life as well as 
those who moved there from other locations. Interviewees said over and over again that 
they wanted to protect the place they called home and identified with on a deep level. 
One interviewee who has lived in Xiamen for almost two decades felt that the PX plant 
threatened to ruin the life she had in Xiamen. She had already witnessed encroaching 
pollution and the PX plant seemed like the nail in the coffin that would spoil Xiamen’s 
environment. 
In addition to the information found on blogs, an anonymous text message was sent 
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out and forwarded, making its way to three quarters of Xiamen residents in a remarkably 
short span of time. This message declared the PX project to be “like an atomic bomb.” It 
also called for a demonstration in the streets on June 1st, 2007. This method of 
dissemination ensured that those who were not online still received the call to duty. This 
text message also would become part of a larger online effort that would exemplify  
the utilization of modern information technology in challenging and revising (local) 
governments’ policy agendas, boosting grassroots participation in civic affairs, and  
holding the government to be more responsive, transparent and accountable. (Hung, 
2013, p. 42) 
 
Threat of protest quickly spurred local officials to act. The government was well aware 
that a mass incident could lead to major problems, and it announced on May 30th—before 
the protests—that plans for the PX plant would be postponed. The protestors, however, 
did not disband. In spite of censorship, propaganda, and other related government efforts 
to disperse the impending movement, people by the thousands showed up in the streets to 
march for the place where they all lived and were unwilling to back down.  
The vast majority of reports of the protest claim that the 10,000 people who gathered 
were largely peaceful.vi People marched with banners, shouted slogans, and wore yellow 
ribbons. Those standing on the sidelines offered bread and water to those marching in a 
sign of tacit support. Local police and security officers were very present at the march, 
directing traffic and standing on the sidelines. One interviewee recounted a story about 
protestors who were passing around yellow ribbons and also offered them to the police 
officers who accepted them but said they could not wear them because they were on duty. 
Some speculate that because the police officers were native Xiameners, they were more 
sympathetic to the cause. After all, their home was also on the line.  
Another interviewee remarked on the heavy police presence, believing it to be part of 
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the reason why the protest was so peaceful. In addition to the many uniformed officers, 
plainclothes police officers were also present in the thick of the demonstration. As the 
march continued from the Lundu Ferry Terminal to Xiamen University, from Si Ming 
Road to Zhongshan Road, police permitted the thousands of protestors to pass through 
every intersection. However, many locations where new protestors could join in were 
sealed. For one interviewee, this level of order made “[t]he government’s attitude toward 
the event...very clear: They were allowing us to express our views, but they didn’t want 
too many people to join the parade” (personal correspondence, 2015). This is 
corroborated by another interviewee who said that several institutions forbid their 
employees to join in the protest and Xiamen University warned their students against 
protesting. 
Protests continued from June 1 to June 2. News of the unauthorized uprising spread 
largely via text messages and online forums with some video streaming, which meant that 
Beijing officials quickly found out what was happening on China’s southeast coast. The 
opposition ensued online in forums even after bodies left the streets. After weeks of 
discontent, Xiamen officials declared that plans for the plant would be reassessed and that 
they would conduct an environmental impact statement (EIS) that would be shared with 
the people.  
When the report finally came out in December of that year, the results were clear: the 
plant site was too close to residential areas to be considered safe. Either the plant must be 
moved to a more remote area or the entire residential district had to be relocated. Per the 
laws on the books, a period of public comment followed and residents were given a 
chance to voice their concerns and vote on the project. After an overwhelming majority 
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of citizens and local officials voted against the plant in person and via polls, officials 
decided the plant would be relocated to the city of Zhangzhou, a smaller town in the same 
province of Fujian, thereby allowing the province to still benefit from the revenue the 
plant would bring.  
The space of time between the release of the EIS and the decision to relocate the plant 
was a mere 10 days. In this way, an authoritarian government has the potential to act as 
an asset to environmentalism, as it can issue directives and carry them out quickly. The 
lack of deliberation makes changes easier to make. This stands in stark contrast to 
protests such as the Keystone XL protests, which went on for several years before 
President Obama signed the act to stop construction.  
 
Disseminating Hope and Propagating an Allegiance to Civic Duty 
In the years following, the Xiamen success story spread across the country, inciting 
others to unite in the tens of thousands against similar projects proposed for their homes. 
News of it travelled on blogs, forums, and eventually social media beyond QQ like 
Weibo and Weixin. Though the “media’s political role [in China] has long been that of an 
agent of stability, charged with the political task of helping to preserve sociopolitical 
order, particularly during times of crisis,” social media were not charged with such an 
agenda; instead, social media were capable of taking on the role of “an alternative source 
of information and opinion that is readily available online rather than through the 
mainstream or traditional media outlets” (Hung, 2013, p. 43). People across the country 
became increasingly informed about their rights as well as the procedures local 
governments were required to follow. They felt empowered by these laws and took 
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action. Over the course of reviewing Chinese blogs about the protests, most included 
detailed discussions of peoples’ rights and relevant laws. With the expansion of new 
forms of social media to connect people across the country as well as the proliferation of 
a more diverse ecology of information, opinions, and ideas, so too came the expansion of 
outrage and protest.  
According to interviewees as well as data collected from social media, the 2011 anti-
PX protests in Dalian were inspired by the 2007 Xiamen protests. The same can be said 
for the three 2013 anti PX protests in Ningbo, Chengdu, and Kunming. The people of 
Maoming also found the same encouragement from the Xiamen “success,” and in 2014 
violently protested against the proposed PX projects for over a week (Lee & Ho, 2014). 
In 2015, Shanghai residents gathered in the streets in response to murmurings that a PX 
plant was going to move into their industrial park. The victory in Xiamen, as well as the 
perceived successes of the cities that followed in Xiamen’s footsteps, provided 
inspiration for Shanghai protestors’ illegal gathering (Wen, 2015). As a result of this 
resistance, China is facing a PX shortage because it simply cannot find places to build the 
plants due to the massive resistance by people in cities across the country.  
The impact of Xiamen’s success does not stop with PX plants, but has also inspired 
others to protest against waste incinerators, wastewater pipelines, and other dangerous 
chemical factories.vii These protests are one component of a growing body of evidence 
that “[c]ollective action and protests have been quite successful....even when the 
protestors themselves were beaten up, arrested or prosecuted, [their actions] did create 
stronger law enforcement and direct pressure on polluting companies to meet the 
protestors’ demands” (van Rooij, 2010, p. 75). These protests were more palatable than, 
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for example, antigovernment demonstrations because people were not attacking the state 
and demanding a replacement—they were demanding that the rules on the books be 
followed, that the policies put forward by the central government be obeyed, and that the 
procedures in place be carried out as directed. In the process, the people were creating 
pockets of pure democracy in which the people spoke and leaders listened.  
The difference between the Xiamen protest (and those that followed it) and protests 
that came before a widespread adoption of the Internet and mobile communication 
technologies is the speed with which they erupted and speed of local officials in 
addressing citizen concerns. In Xiamen, officials announced before the protests even 
started that they would reconsider the project. In Dalian, the mayor stood on top of a car 
and told the people the PX plant operating in the area would be shut down hours after 
people gathered. In Qidong, people protesting against a wastewater pipeline were able to 
convince officials to cancel the project within 5 hours. Rather than investing months, 
years, or decades of petitions and protests as was the case in prior protests, these 
movements materialize quickly into a force that compels many officials to bend to the 
tsunami of anger, outrage, and attention almost immediately.  
The distance news of each outburst traverses also impacts the success of the protest. 
For example, in the case of Xiamen, news of Zhao Yufen’s opposition was reported in a 
Beijing-based newspaper but not any local outlets. The blogger, Lian Yue, was able to 
move news from Beijing to Xiamen with just a few clicks and share it with an entire 
online population who then moved the information from BBSs to QQ, cell phones, and 
streetside conversations. As people checked their cell phones and conversed with 
neighbors, the information spread quickly. Once the outrage over the dangers of the PX 
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plant was organized into an assemblage of protestors, the news ricocheted back to 
Beijing, where officials put pressure on the Xiamen government to follow procedures and 
address the issue. Social media and online forums gave people a network by which to 
share information and support from afar that was essential in putting enough pressure on 
local officials to act.  
As the ability to share information across vast tracts of space quickly increases, the 
environmental movement is given the space to grow. People are quickly acquiring new 
tools, methods, and rights to confront the pollution that arrives at their front doors and 
threatens the place they call home. As the number of environmental offenses continues to 
grow, so too does the movement; the more widespread the pollution, the more 
widespread the protests, which are only exacerbated by corrupt officials who attempt to 
ignore the requests of the people. As van Rooij (2010) points out, “when government 
institutions fail to respond to citizen demands, the situation can [and often does] escalate 
to a point where citizens take matters into their own hands” (p. 67) and create a public 
spectacle over far reaching and fast moving networks that demands democratic processes. 
 
Obstacles and Grounds for Hope 
The environmental movement in China is quite complex and in a constant state of 
movement and change. At the same time policies are made to help people prevent the 
relocation of polluting factories to their homes, they are also undermining others. For 
example, in 2005, after several successful class action suits were brought against careless 
and irresponsible factories, China’s Supreme Court gave courts the ability to break up 
class action suits into smaller lawsuits. This move placed further financial burden on 
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those making the claim (who are often of a lower socioeconomic status), thereby making 
it less likely that the case is either brought or seen through to an end (van Rooij, 2010). 
Other actions have been taken in response to the growing number of protests, which 
have piqued the government’s concern over the possibility of widespread social unrest. 
Although environmental activism is the most tolerated form of activism in the country, 
the government does not want to lose control and, as a result, will use different measures 
to reign in the unrest including censorship, propaganda campaigns, and even physical 
violence.  
This move to control also extends to the work of ENGOs. Just as officials attempted 
to restrict the power of foreign NGOs in 2005, in 2014, the world witnessed a similar 
tactic being enacted once again. The central government began considering policies that 
would “regulate” foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) by “step[ping] up 
supervision of the fast-growing sector” (Blanchard, 2014, para. 1). This happened in 
response to the protests in Hong Kong, “which Beijing attributed to hostile foreign 
forces” (Panda, 2014, para. 4).  
However, at the same time, the government is also encouraging government/ENGO 
collaboration. Among other initiatives, in late 2014, the government held a conference 
with local and regional ENGOs in Beijing to solicit input for policies they were 
developing. This meeting included both registered and unregistered ENGOs. According 
to one interviewee who attended the conference, the government wants to work with 
ENGOs because they can help to analyze data on a variety of topics ranging from 
industrial pollution output to public interest. The government then uses this data to 
develop more effective policies at the national and international level.  
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At the same time the government is making legal action more difficult for some, the 
record of wins for citizens in environmental cases gives grounds for hope. According the 
van Rooij’s (2010) study, “of the 66 court cases about pollution found in the legal 
database consulted [for the study], 43 were won by citizens, showing that courts have 
ruled in favor of pollution victims and against polluters” (p. 66). In addition, in January 
of 2015, the central government passed a law granting ENGOs the ability to sue polluting 
factories. Since many ENGOs have staff members who are scientists, lawyers, and 
engineers or have access to such experts, they have the ability to collect and analyze data 
that hold industries accountable for their emissions and dumping.  
Perhaps the most promising new report is the one the State Council released in 2015, 
which states that “officials whose decisions are found to have caused ecological 
damage....would be held responsible for their ‘lifetime’” (Li, 2015, para. 1–2). This 
signals a major shift in local politics. Whereas previously, local officials were given 
bonuses and promotions for increasing industry and local GDP, this law privileges the 
environment, stating that no officials known to have caused environmental degradation 
would receive promotions. This move, according to “People’s Daily, the Communist 
Party’s official mouthpiece” was intended to encourage “‘ecological civilisation’ [as] a 
political task for party cadres and government officials” (Li, 2015, para. 7). 
 
Lines of Flight 
As these seemingly contradictory moves illustrate, China’s environmental movement, 
like all social movements, is not taking a simple linear course in which one step logically 
leads to the next on a road with a definitive end. Rather, China’s path is clearly erratic 
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and each event that appears to be a “success”—the signing of a law or closing down of a 
factory—is tainted with “failures”—the lack of enforcement or the movement of said 
factory to a smaller and more vulnerable city. However, events considered to be 
“failures” are also often great “successes” in terms of raising awareness, spreading 
information, inciting people to form new ENGOs, and so forth.  
In this dissertation, I do not want to treat social movement in terms of successes or 
failures, for any event is both at once. What I want to do is trace the lines of flight of a 
movement via Deleuze and Guattari (1987). This is a not about a linear progression, but, 
like the path of a butterfly, erratic movement. The lines of flight I follow will not be 
straight and one cannot think of movements as progressions, but networks of trade, 
ecosystems, politics, pollution, cancers, fish, PX, environmental impact statements, 
housing prices, and localisms that pull and tug the network into an ever-moving mass of 
connections that make certain things possible and others hopeless. For example, BBSs, 
QQ, and text messaging made the Xiamen anti-PX protests possible, which in turn shifted 
the configuration of the network to create flows of legal and scientific information that 
empowered those in Maoming to fight against the PX plant proposed for their town, but 
cancelling the PX plant in Xiamen meant that Zhangzhou became its new home against 
residents’ wishes. Each case study in this dissertation examines the impact of social 
media by tracing shifting networks that make use of the tools at hand to twist, expand, 
and subvert various networks and what I am most interested in is tracing the movements 
that result.  
                                                





                                                                                                                                            
ii This was especially true for Britain, who had invested a great deal of capitol into East 
India with little return. 
 
iii For example, though the National Environmental Protection Agency’s Xie Zhenhua, 
proclaimed the Huai River cleanup a success, Worker’s Daily refuted this assessment, 
claiming the river was still severely polluted (E. C. Economy, 2010, p. 7) 
 
iv For the sake of comparison, in 1995, the trade imbalance was at $6,000,000,000.  
 
v This trend was not, however, unilateral. In 2001, the party secretary, Wang Wei, refused 
to sign a land use contract with the Dongnong Pesticide Company because the company 
had already developed a reputation for such bad pollution that it drove other villages to 
relocate. 
 
vi According to one protestor, after the march ended, pictures of violence appeared online, 
but they were only rumors that were ultimately deleted. 
 
vii Social media has played a crucial role as it is a means by which people can act as 
decentered knots of news-making that are not state-sanctioned or controlled. China’s 
elaborate censorship system is mind-boggling at best, with multiple levels of censoring 
that sometimes seem to evade common sense logic. For example, King et al. (2013) 
found that while sensitive topics including critiques of government officials are often 
banned, many are still allowed to exist. According to their finds, a post’s propensity to 
stir a mass uprising is one of the main criteria for deciding whether something should be 
censored, not just the content. Yes, many words are automatically censored, as is 
pornography and hate-speech, but creative users are often able to circumvent these more 
simplistic devices using homonyms, images, and walkie-talkie functions, which are 
remarkably more difficult to delete with automatic devices. With well over 650 million 
online users, the sheer number of posts and the speed at which they travel create a 










THEORIZING SOCIAL MOVEMENTS  
 
Scholars from across disciplines have been studying social movements from different 
perspectives for decades and each has made important contributions to the larger body of 
scholarship by working to consider different persuasive forces in sociology, expand 
definitions of what constitutes a social movement in communication, provide broader 
frameworks for analyses in history, and trace them alongside systems of governance, 
economies, and social systems in political science. I ground my studies in communication 
and the rhetoric of social movements because communication is the medium by which 
networks are formed, maintained, and extended. The rhetorical exchanges that occur 
within networks animate people, organizations, groups, and governments, which is why I 
define social movements as the complex coalescing of collective networks that, through 
various forms of communication, open up alternative ways of being in the world.  
Focusing on these networks is especially relevant in an era in which complex linkages 
are extending further, traversing transnational borders, and leaping across cultural 
boundaries via the paths forged by social media. Within these congested and 
crisscrossing pathways, (mis)information, anger, images, and appeals travel at an 
unprecedented speed, allowing space for flash mobs, riots, and protests seemingly to 
erupt spontaneously. Moreover, since their widespread adoption and use, social media 
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have played a key role in social movements across the world including the Arab Spring, 
Occupy Wall Street, and thousands of environmental protests across China. The 
landscape of protests and social movements has, once again, changed and so too must the 
methods scholars use to study them.  
Contemporary mediascapes are now subject to different speeds and trajectories of 
information flows made possible by smartphones, laptops, iPads, and apps that form a 
cacophonous jumble of panmediated networks (DeLuca, Lawson, & Sun, 2012). The 
world in which people reside today is not one in which online and offline worlds are 
separate, but a panmediated environment in which Google searches and conversations, 
dating and websites, and drones and war are messy, tangled, and indistinguishable from 
one another (Brunner, 2014; DeLuca et al., 2012).  
Most people are connected to this complex web of networks. The United Nations 
reported in 2014 that there are 6.8 billion mobile phone subscriptions in a world of seven 
billion people, meaning that most of the world’s population has access to a mobile phone 
(United Nations Division for Public Administration and Development Management, 
2014). Research has shown that Internet users are highly likely to engage in some form of 
social media. In a 2014 study, the Pew Research Center reported that 74% of online 
adults in the U.S. use social networking sites (2014) and that, as of 2012, 66% of those 
users had participated in civic or political activities using social media (Rainie, Smith, 
Schlozman, Brady, & Verba, 2012). Chinese people, too, have adopted social media on a 
large scale, with three quarters of the population regularly active on some type of social 
media platform, making them the most socially engaged country in the world in 2012, 
with some studies showing 99% of Internet users in China using some kind of social 
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media by 2015 (GlobalWebIndex, 2012; Kemp, 2015). Between 2000 and 2014, Chinese 
Internet users grew from 22.5 million to in excess of 640 million; this number more than 
doubles the 280 million Internet users in the U.S. In 2015, Weibo reported 198 million 
monthly active users, a number that Weixin (or WeChat) dwarfs with 500 million active 
monthly users (Bischoff, 2015; Millward, 2015). 
This level of panmediation provides fertile ground for the proliferation of 
communication across networks as well as the extension and collision of networks. 
Within these collisions and extensions in which people are connecting to one another 
more easily and quickly lie new spaces for the emergence of grassroots movements. 
Take, for example, the networks of onlookers, family members, government officials, and 
fellow fraught citizens that collided after a desperate Tunisian fruit vendor by the name of 
Mohammed Bouazizi self-immolated in front of a government building in the city of Sidi 
Bouzid and sparked protests across the country and then the Arab world. Information 
spread rapidly via text messages, image messages, and social media platforms, 
documenting the violence and anger. Outrage again incited movement across intertwined 
networks in the U.S. after violence occurred during the Occupy Wall Street movements. 
Social media platforms made possible a new flow of images and video of Anthony 
Bologna’s violent pepper spraying of innocent protestors in New York spread proof of 
the incident from multiple angles. This event helped to launch the Occupy Wall Street 
protests into the media spotlight, which helped turn political discussions toward issues of 
income inequality in the U.S. Several years later in Hong Kong, protestors thwarted 
censorship (though not surveillance) attempts by moving their communication to 
FireChat, an application that allows users in close physical proximity to communicate 
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using Bluetooth rather than Internet connections. Within these new spaces have erupted 
new forms of protest and the explosion of networks begs a different approach to social 
movements—a networked approach. 
Moving to a more networked approach in the study of social movements provides 
scholars with important advantages over more traditional methods that emphasize formal 
organizations and hierarchies. First, network inspired theories offer a means by which to 
incorporate social media in a more seamless fashion, as one of the many networks that 
links people rather than treating it as a separate world that stands in contrast to “real life.” 
Second, a network-centered perspective offers a productive approach to grassroots efforts 
and mass protests that are not organized by formal organizations. Increasingly, people 
across the globe are mobilizing the masses from the middle and choosing to move away 
from hierarchical models. This is very apparent in the Occupy movement, which refused 
to appoint a leader or a cohesive list of demands. Rather, people emphasized inclusivity, 
which was evident in the choice to label protestors as part of the 99%. This is not to say 
that organizations do not take part, but that they are not the leaders of many 
contemporary movements. Third, networked approaches supply the space to 
acknowledge organizations and other hierarchies within the larger network. Importantly, 
moving to a networked approach does not preclude the existence of hierarchies. There are 
always “knots of arborescence in rhizomes, and rhizomatic offshoots in roots” (Deleuze 
& Guattari, 1987, p. 20). ENGOs such as 350.org and Global Village, for example, which 
tend to have more formal and hierarchical configurations, are microstructures within 
larger moving networks. 
Social media give a means by which to maintain, extend, and strengthen global media 
  
61 
networks outside official discourses, which overlap, extend, and augment local and 
national networks, connecting protestors in Tunisia to journalists in the U.S., 
peppersprayed women in New York to students at the University of California Davis, and 
protestors in Xiamen to national officials in Beijing. As a result, the routes and flows of 
information are changing in dramatic and important ways and now people in Maoming, 
China are able to reach officials in Beijing and angry citizens in Tunisia are able to reach 
reporters in New York. Local officials who once operated in relative privacy are being 
exposed on national and international levels, creating a situation wherein an immense 
amount of pressure is placed on local officials to act in accordance with a new set of 
standards as the whole world watches. 
 
Moving Social Movements 
What factors help shape these protests? For one, the decaying architecture of various 
systems. Most countries have developed systems to prevent and handle citizen 
grievances. In the U.S., people unhappy with proposed policies are able to submit 
petitions, make phone calls to government officials, and apply for a permit for peaceful 
protest. In China, many of the same apparatuses exist—people can apply for a permit to 
protest, submit petitions and grievances, and call hotlines to report environmental abuses. 
These systems, however, which are designed to control dissent and enforce civility, often 
do not succeed, and citizens from all countries who are infuriated with the failure of the 
existing processes end up resorting to uncivil behavior in the form of unsanctioned 
protests often punctuated with anger and violence.  
Witness the 1999 Seattle protests in which protestors took to the streets en masse and 
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punctured storefronts to punctuate their protests or the more recent protests in Ferguson, 
Missouri, where stores were set ablaze and gunshots fired. The Arab Spring protests were 
ignited by a fruit vendor’s self immolation and violence continued to characterize 
demonstrations, including one in Egypt during which a woman was dragged across the 
pavement, partially disrobed to reveal her blue bra, and then beaten by police officers, 
which provoked more outrage. Protests in China also often become violent as desperate 
residents fight with everything they have against the construction of dangerous chemical 
factories and wastewater pipelines. Images and videos of people fighting physically back 
against police ran rampant during protests in Hangzhou against a waste incinerator. The 
failure of systems begets responses steeped in a stew of frustration and anger. 
The prevalence of violence, creative resistances, and seemingly irrational behavior in 
protests necessitates that they be considered in studies of social movements, which 
cannot be understood otherwise. The group that calls themselves Anonymous, for 
instance, cannot be understood within a strictly rational paradigm. How they choose 
whom to hack, expose, and DDoS does not always align neatly with ethical and moral 
standards, and the legal and security systems in place are ill-equipped to deal with their 
tactics. Groups like Femen use topless activists to disseminate their feminist messages, 
which are challenging to understand within a rational model. The force of nonrational 
arguments are also apparent in the 2007 Xiamen protests, during which residents 
gathered to oppose the construction of a chemical plant after a message alleging that the 
plant would have the same consequences on the town as dropping an atomic bomb—a 
sensationalist and unsupported appeal—was disseminated. Research in communication 
and sociology has been struggling with how and to what degree nonrational forms of 
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protest should be considered since the Civil Rights, Women’s, and environmental 
movements in the 1960s and 70s. These movements, which often employed violence, 
nudity, and angry uprisings, spurred scholars to begin considering affective appeals. 
Though great strides were made, the resurgence of affectively charged movements 
occurring alongside the proliferation of social media demands a return to affect that be 
conducted outside the rational/irrational binary. 
The rational/irrational binary has stimulated both lengthy debates and crises in 
communication and sociology alike. For decades, rhetorical scholars defined persuasion 
as a wholly rational process in which people changed their minds in response to carefully 
crafted persuasive speeches and logical debates (Gross, 2012; Habermas, 1989). Social 
movement studies challenged this notion, provoking scholars to think outside of 
rationality for answers as to why people were moved and how protest functioned to 
persuade people. In sociology, the study of social movements began with theories of 
angry crowds as irrational players besieged by a contagion. This perspective led to the 
near demise of social movement studies until scholars began arguing that protestors were 
moved by rational reasons as well. In both communication and sociology, the dangerous 
rational/irrational binary and the concomitant biases against behavior deemed to be 
irrational has directed what scholars can and should study as well as how. In the next 
section, I will explore the impact of this binary and explain why we need to leave it 







Rhetoric has struggled with limitations imposed by theories predicated on the 
rational/irrational binary. During the 1960s and 70s, protest practices, media 
environments, and political and economic landscapes were changing dramatically and, as 
a result, scholars were forced to alter and rework their theories of social movements to 
accommodate changing activist practices, tools, and rhetorics as well as changing media. 
They did so with varying degrees of success. The civil rights movement, the anti-
Vietnam War movement, the women’s movement, and the environmental movement 
challenged the very basis of communication as rational discourses generated by rational 
actors, thereby inciting a crisis.  
It is important to note that these social movements grew in tandem with televisioni 
and the proliferation of images in newspapers. Mass media images captured and 
disseminated images that incited opposition during numerous social movements. For 
example, the Vietnam War appeared on newspapers and TV screens as uncensored blunt 
images including “Accidental Napalm,” “Burning Monk,” and the hundreds of photos of 
damaged bleeding American and Vietnamese bodies. During the Civil Rights 
movements, photos of police officers using fire hoses to disperse crowds and pin people 
to walls appeared alongside images of police dogs attacking black bodies. These images 
moved the marches in Birmingham around the country. The Women’s Strike for Equality 
was captured via images showing white and black female bodies marching with arms 
connected in vast numbers. Media attention helped to disperse not only the messages they 
were carrying via signs, but also the scale of the protests. The gravity of the U.S.’s 
environmental crisis became evident via visual evidence of the burning Cuyahoga River, 
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which helped spark the U.S. environmental movement. The images from these various 
movements landed in peoples’ living rooms. As a result, awareness about the events that 
transpired multiplied, and the violence, protests, riots, and fires were recognized as 
having persuasive force. The spread of media, images, and protests laden with terror, 
fear, anger, and outrage provoked critics to reconsider what counted as rhetoric.  
This thread can be traced throughout the social movement scholarship at the time. For 
example, Haiman (1967) addresses nonrational rhetoric in his essay by carefully tracing 
the protestors as well as official reactions to a Civil Rights protest in Chicago. In so 
doing, he legitimizes nonrational discourse, but does so within the rational/irrational 
binary. Haiman privileges rational and civil debate, which signals a distinct 
Westerncentrism and Cartesian bias, but is willing to expand the definition of rhetoric 
beyond traditional boundaries. This results in an enlargement of rhetoric to include 
“uncivil disobedience,” which (though he considers it to be unacceptable behavior) 
“within the framework of a democratic society, where only peaceful change can be 
accepted,” can be seen as the “rhetoric of the riot,” which as “mindless and indiscriminate 
as it may be, has its positive function in contemporary America” (Haiman, 1967, p. 105).  
Scott and Smith (1969) also strive to give irrational arguments credibility in their 
study of Black Power rhetoric in the Civil Rights movement. Though the type of 
confrontation witnessed in Malcolm X’s speeches was often disregarded simply as 
disruptive in rhetorical studies circles, Scott and Smith see these forms of confrontation 
as a form of persuasion “because this action, as diverse as its manifestations may be, is 
inherently symbolic. The act carries a message.... it informs us of the essential nature of 
discourse itself as human action” (1969, p. 7). Unable to deny the persuasive power of 
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confrontation, Scott and Smith (1969) demand “[a] rhetorical theory suitable to our age” 
in which “order, civility, reason, decorum, and civil or theocratic law” are recognized as 
“masks for the preservation of injustice” rather than fundamental to argumentation (p. 8). 
The Civil Rights protests unfolding across the U.S. necessitated that theorizing of social 
movements change, expand, and shift to accommodate the changing landscape of social 
protest. This research functions to challenge traditional notions of rhetoric and complicate 
them in productive ways. 
In the wake of the Civil Rights, Women’s rights, and student protests, Simons (1970) 
also calls for a change to social movement studies that can accommodate rhetoric outside 
the rational, but he does so by defining them in opposition to socially sanctioned peaceful 
protests. After looking at both moderate and “militant” rhetorics, Simons comes to the 
hypothesis that “the decisive changes wrought by militant rhetorics in recent years gives 
credence to the view that the traditionally prescribed pattern is not the only viable 
alternative” (1970, p. 8). What has long been considered “irrational” communication is, 
indeed, effective in persuading people.ii Windt Jr. (1972) continues to push scholars 
further to include slogans, moral arguments, and uncivil behavior as part of the rhetoric 
of social movements by studying protestors against the Vietnam War. These protestors 
abandoned these sanctioned forms of resistance and created a whole new language of 
protest that could “express new ideas, new perspectives, new attitudes” (Windt Jr., 1972, 
p. 10). Thus, they shifted from what scholars considered to be rational appeals to 
irrational acts including profanity, public nudity, and slogans laden with moral 
imperatives. For them, shock was a tool that could be used to move people because 
“[b]eyond attracting attention, shock also functions as the first step toward rearranging 
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perspectives. People seldom become concerned about problems until they are shocked” 
(Windt Jr., 1972, p. 8).  
This expansion of rhetoric to include nonrational arguments and appeals eventually 
led to a redefinition of rhetoric to include studies of place and space,iii the visual,iv and 
affect.v This move was pivotal for communication scholars and the future of the study of 
social movements, which were increasingly employing images, image events (DeLuca, 
1999), and affect (Bruce, 2015; Gruber, 2014; McHendry, Middleton, Endres, Senda-
Cook, & O’Byrne, 2014).vi 
These changes in what communication scholars consider to be rhetoric were essential 
to being able to consider the force of violence, anger, rumors, images, and affective 
appeals in the study of social movements. It also changed how scholars study movements 
and added a new degree of complexity to communication studies that challenged the 
more simplistic definition of social movements put forward by Stewart, Smith, and 
Denton (1984, 2012).vii For example, Soderlund’s (2005) study takes on the insidious 
perspective that morally sanctioned social movements are inherently positive when she 
carefully explores the impacts of the binaries created by U.S. discourses of sex trafficking 
and the role the media play in perpetuating these oversimplifications. This study 
complicates the issues at hand by more carefully considering the networks in which the 
events are unfolding. 
Acknowledging and exploring complexities is of great import in the study of social 
movements that occur in tandem with new media. Ganesh and Stohl (2013) further this 
work of moving away from binaries in their study of not only technologies, but “the 
broad dynamics of protests themselves” in the Occupy Wellington protests in New 
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Zealand (p. 426). They argue “that it is an emerging technological environment, not a 
particular technology that has profound implications for contemporary protest” (Ganesh 
and Stohl, 2013, p. 428, italics in original). Moreover, they help to challenge the idea that 
protests are all organized, instead furthering the point that decentralized protests are 
increasingly common in the age of digital ubiquity. DeLuca, Lawson, and Sun (2012) 
also turn to Occupy Wall Street to address explicitly the role of social media in social 
movements by arguing that the “ideal dichotomy that does not exist.... For [them], there 
is no possible demarcation between the mediated and the real. Mediated worlds are real 
and reality is always mediated (by media, language, culture, ideologies, and perceptual 
practices)” (p. 485). This research helps to preserve complexities amid bifurcating 
binaries that hinder social movements studies. However, there is more work to be done to 
move past the rational/irrational, democracy/communism, good/evil, and success/failure 
binaries that obviate important aspects of social movements, especially as scholars move 
across political and physical borders. 
 
The Swinging Sociological Pendulum 
Communication scholars were not alone in their struggles with the rational/irrational 
divide. In sociology, irrational discourse was the focus of social movement studies, which 
was spurred, in part, by analyses of the 1930s workers movements that viewed crowds as 
irrational actors sieged by a contagion that disrupted their logic and sense. The protestors 
were no longer lucid coherent actors and acted as if a switch had been flipped. The 
distinct separation of rational and irrational behavior would prove to threaten the study of 
social movements within sociology. In a society in which logic and rationality are 
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elevated as ideal human behavior, protestors were dismissed as “irrational or immature,” 
and thus not a worthy field of study using this perspective (Jasper, 2011, p. 287)  
With the influx of protest in the 1960s across the U.S. and Europe, sociologists turned 
once again to protest in a concerted effort to revive social movement studies, which they 
did with success. By the 1970s, collective action research became “one of the most 
vigorous areas of sociology” (Marx & Wood, 1975, p. 363). New forms of protest and 
social movements begat new theories, including resource mobilization, interactionist 
collective behavior, political process, and “new” social movement theories (Della Porta 
& Diani, 2006). Each theory contributed to expanding the borders of research by turning 
away from contagion theories and stressing the role of rationality in social movements. 
As the pendulum swung from one extreme to the other, however, it precipitated new 
problems. 
Smelser’s (1963/2011) theory of collective behavior was a deliberate move away 
from the madness of contagion theory and stressed the interaction between collective 
behavior and social structures. He viewed collective action as a result of rational 
responses to socialstructural factors, thereby offering legitimacy to collective behavior, 
taking it back from the angry irrational mobs that had delegitimized protest.  
Resource mobilization theory also emphasized rationality by theorizing social 
movements as a collection of reasonable actors who mobilize resources in a calculated 
way. Zald and Ash (1966), for example, use organizational and incentive analysis to 
examine the transformations of social movement organizations. By focusing on 
organizations, they highlighted systems associated with rational decision making and also 
sidestepped the messiness of unorganized and violent protests. This shift of focus was no 
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accident and was followed by others, including Oberschall (1973), whose book overtly 
rejects contagion theory and adopts instead Olson’s privileging of rational self interest in 
his study of collective action. This theory errs in its construction of participants as wholly 
rational actors, but for an important reason—eschewing irrationality was necessary to 
legitimize collective action. This, however, was occurring within a stultifying binary. 
Political process theory, too, strove to bring about new lines of questioning for social 
movement scholars, including analyses of strategic tactics and the life cycle of protests, 
but this move foreclosed other important questions (Gould, 2004). Owing to its focus on 
political and institutional environments, political process theory helped expand social 
movements beyond conceptualizing actors as marginalized anti-establishment groups and 
instead focused on the interactions between actors and political systems. For example, 
Eisenger’s work explicitly seeks to “define protest technically and to differentiate it from 
political violence” by measuring environmental factors including “openings, weak spots, 
barriers, and resources of the political system itself” (Eisinger, 1971, p. 1; 1973, p. 12). 
Along the same lines, Piven and Cloward (1979) focus on how political structures limit 
the success of poor people’s movements in the U.S., including the electoral system, using 
four case studies. Again, taking a highly rational approach, political process theory was 
able to expand movement studies from oversimplified mob theories to a more complex 
analysis that included political structures, policies, and interactions between the people 
and their government.  
The term “new social movements” stems from the work of European scholars, who, 
at the time, were witnessing movements similar to their counterparts in the U.S., but 
within a different setting. Feeling restricted by the Marxist model popularly used in 
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Europe, which could not account for the complexity and multiplicity of conflicts and 
actors, new social movement scholars sought to look outside the tight binarisms of 
economic based models. Touraine (1981), for example, argued that the shift from an 
“industrial society” to a “programmed society” would, necessarily, beget a different type 
of social movement and required new theories. Aside from the more complex and 
detailed aspects of his argument, Touraine’s overarching takeaway was doing work 
similar to his colleagues across the Atlantic. Touraine was giving credence and 
legitimacy to social movement studies by emphasizing the rational and insisting that 
understanding social movements is integral to comprehending how a society makes itself.   
Claus Offe’s (1985) theory of social movements also functions to complicate the 
hierarchies inherent in Marxist analyses. He writes: “the politics of new social 
movements... seeks to politicize the institutions of civil society in ways that are not 
constrained by the channels of representative-bureaucratic political institutions,” thereby 
blurring the once neatly striated private and institutional binary (p. 820). As society and 
political institutions change and continually negotiate their roles, Offe insists that the 
methods with which scholars examine social movements must change. But Offe’s work is 
multiple in its objectives, for he is also distinguishing “new social movements” from the 
social movements previously studied and then dismissed. “New social movements” are 
valid objects of study because they are composed of “participants, campaigns, 
spokespeople, networks, voluntary helpers, and donations,” which are distinctly different 
from the highly informal “multitudes of individuals” on which sociology previously 
focused (p. 829). Again, both in the U.S. and Europe, scholars were moving away from 
the irrational mobs to a focus on components of social movements they could use to 
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stress rational and logical planning as well as thoughtful intent, thereby strengthening the 
binary in the process. 
While the repeated emphasis on rational actors and organizations did function to 
legitimate protests in sociology, it placed very rigid restrictions on the understanding of 
protest that numerous scholars have critiqued (Della Porta & Diani, 2006; Gould, 2004; 
Jasper, 1998, 2011). Thus, beginning in the 1990s, a group of sociologists turned more 
deliberately to affect and argued for a serious study of emotions as a legitimate and 
important force in protests. 
It must be noted at this point that, in general, sociologists refer to these reactions as 
emotional responses, not affect, as I do. While I do not want to conflate emotion and 
affect, a closer look at how emotions are being defined reveals that some sociologists are 
talking them about in much the same way I define affect through Deleuze and Guattari 
(1987), Masssumi (1987, 1995), and Whitehead (1979). Massumi explains affect as “a 
prepersonal intensity corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the body 
to another” that impacts a “body's capacity to act” (1987, p. xiii). For him, affect is that 
which comes before emotion, as emotion is the interpretation of affect. Whitehead (1979) 
posited that we do not think and therefore exist; rather, we become via feeling the world: 
“the primitive experience is emotional feeling, felt in its relevance to a world beyond” 
(p.163). Feeling precedes thinking. Whitehead’s definition seeks to dismantle hierarchical 
binaries. As Shaviro (2009) summarizes Whitehead, “the questions of how we feel, and 
what we feel, [which] are more fundamental than the epistemological and hermeneutical 
questions that are the focus of most philosophy and criticism” (Shaviro, 2009, p. 47). 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) agree, emphasizing movement when they state that “Flows 
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of intensity, their fluids, their fibers, their continuums and conjunctions of affects, the 
wind, fine segmentation, microperceptions, have replaced the world of the subject” (p. 
162). In so doing, they move scholars from static nodes of singular autonomous subjects 
to take an approach that considers movement in the form of affects.  
Within sociology, emotion is often defined similarly. For example, Jaspers (2011) 
defines emotions as “a form of information processing, often faster than our conscious 
minds operate” (p. 289). Gould (2009) seems to agree when she writes “Affect. Being 
affected, being moved. Emotion. Motion. Movement, from the post-classical Latin 
movementum, meaning ‘emotion,’ and then later, ‘rebellion,’ or ‘uprising’” (pp. 2-3). For 
Gould (and I agree), “the movement in ‘social movements’ gestures toward the realm of 
affect; bodily intensities; emotions, feelings, and passions; and toward uprising” (2009, p. 
3). Thus, in many cases, the study of emotion in sociology is intertwined with the study 
of affect as I define it—the force that moves people to act. 
Eventually, sociologists were able to resurrect emotions as important factors to 
consider in social movements because so many facets of social movements remain 
unaccounted for without them. For example, by going back and looking at World War II 
(Scheff, 2000), the ACT UP protests (Gould, 2004), and the women’s movement 
(Mansbridge, 1986), scholars were able to draw important connections between emotions 
and movement including its role in building a sense of the collective, destroying harmful 
binaries, generating support, and culling opposition.   
By considering communication and sociology side by side, one can see that both 
disciplines grappled a great deal with the rational/irrational binary that defined what types 
of human behavior are considered legitimate. Because rationality was and continues to be 
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privileged in our society as the ideal form of communication and irrationality (or affect) 
is defined as its opposite, scholars who retain this binary within their study of social 
movements remain vulnerable to developing enormous blind spots. Jasper (2011) points 
out that the welcoming of affect back into the study of social movements made evident 
several issues, the first of which was “that the traditional but untenable contrast of 
emotions with rationality persists in the form of other dualisms such as body versus mind, 
[and] individual versus social” (p. 286). He goes on to argue for a shift to considering 
feeling and thinking as parallel, not opposites. In communication, scholars struggled with 
how to account for the simultaneous existence of both feeling and thinking, and 
(sometimes begrudgingly) acknowledged the importance of nonrational arguments in 
rhetorical studies of social movements.  
Binaries are incredibly dangerous to scholars, especially those of social movements. 
As Derrida (2008) makes evident in one of his last essays, binaries that divide the world 
into two opposing hemispheres are immensely destructive. They cause inertia by fixing 
two points in contrast to one another as single and indivisible, thereby obfuscating detail, 
nuance, and, more importantly, discussion (see also Derrida 1978, 1983, 1998). Binaries 
impose immobility where movement is occurring and thus stagnate studies of social 
movements. Thus, the rational/irrational binary—as well as the real/online world binaries 
that too often accompany studies involving social media and the democracy/communism 
binaries that accompany studies of China—end up diverting attention away from the 
networks that carry rational arguments, emotional appeals, and divergent rationales in 
favor of more simplistic explanations, models, or indicators of social movement. We 
need to explore outside these restrictive poles. Examining theoretical approaches that 
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help to evade the dangerous rational/irrational bias that disguised the depth and breadth 
of social movement studies is in order. 
 
Moving Theories on Moving the Social 
“we have the social theory of our datascape. If you change this datascape,  
you have to change the social theory” 
(Latour, 2011, p. 802). 
Why turn to theory here? Theories offer new lenses by which to examine the world 
and can help us see and think differently. Theories can challenge rutted ways of thinking 
and they can create ruts in thinking when they are repeatedly used despite changing 
contexts. In this section, in order to argue for the necessity of a new theoretical 
framework, I turn to environmental protests in China, which make up the majority of the 
180,000 protests erupting each year (Fisher, 2012).viii 
Protest in China provides a fruitful contemporary case study for communication 
scholars for four major reasons. First, China is an important global superpower with the 
world’s largest population, second largest economy, and largest online community. 
Second, protests are occurring across the country on an average of 500 per day, making it 
a very active country in terms of social movements. Third, freedom of speech and the 
right to protest are not institutionally protected in China as they are, ostensibly, in the 
U.S.ix and other democratic countries. Thus, China’s political terrain provides an 
alternative context in which to study protest. Fourth, the protests in China are transpiring 
on a panmediated landscapes saturated with a variety of social media and other online 
networks—a change that has allowed people to publicly hold their officials accountable 
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for carrying out laws meant to protect the people and the environment in which they live. 
For these four reasons—its presence as a global superpower, an active protest 
environment, an alternative political terrain, and a panmediated landscape—China’s 
social movements call for sustained inquiry. 
At this point, I would like to turn again to the Xiamen protests, during which over ten 
thousand people gathered and marched through the streets of the scenic city on the 
southeast coast of China. A variety of people came together carrying signs and shouting 
slogans to keep a PX factory from being built in a residential area. Why was this protest 
special? 
This protest is just one of tens of thousands of subsequent protests that demands a 
change in thinking about social movements for three major reasons. First, it eludes 
theories privileging organizations (Simons, 1970) because no one organizing body sent 
out announcements or called for people to gather in the streets. Second, it defies 
rational/irrational and offline/online binaries. Finally, the Xiamen protests also make 
evident the danger in applying an overly moralistic lens to protest.  
First, let us examine the lack of organization, which ties directly to the parallel nature 
of mediated forms of communication as well as the intermingling of affective and 
rational arguments. Before the protest began, the only ENGO in town—Xiamen Green 
Cross—issued only neutral statements about the proposed PX plant, for fear that taking 
sides would jeopardize their nonprofit status (Ma, personal communication, 2014). Thus, 
they did not take a leadership role in organizing the opposition. People learned about the 
plans for the PX plant slated for their town not in newspapers or on TV, but on blogs, 
BBSs, and chat rooms. During the late 2000s, Internet platforms were becoming more 
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widely used, especially in more affluent cities such as Xiamen, and people were using 
them outside of work to have discussions and spread information that was censored or 
left undiscussed in local and national publication outlets, which are heavily regulated by 
the government.  
As dialogues unfolded and stories extended, anger erupted, fear festered, and 
information morphed into rumors. The people who showed up in the streets were each 
part of overlapping networks that linked citizen journalists, respected bloggers, fearful 
residents, knowledgeable academics, and concerned property owners. Information 
crawled from computer screens to cell phones to street corners to classrooms to office 
cubicles, splintering at every juncture in a way that shatter illusions of neat organization 
or linearity. There is no way of separating or striating online and offline worlds in this 
protest; there was only dense overlap. 
The networks that formed were simultaneously forged and expanded via affective 
appeals and pleas to national environmental laws. Affective appeals alongside rational 
arguments forged new paths with their rhetorical force. Message boards carried 
information about environmental impact statements and requests to fellow citizens to 
stand up against the plant and encourage friends and family to do the same. One blog post 
from one of Xiamen’s most well-known and respected bloggers warned the citizens of 
Xiamen not to be cowards. Text messages disseminated both information about the 
protest location as well as allegations that building a PX plant in Xiamen would be akin 
to dropping an atomic bomb on it. Homeowners were motivated to join the protest 
because they feared the PX plant would lower their property values. Some joined because 
they felt it was their civic duty to their home and their neighbors. Others reportedly 
  
78 
joined in because they were paid by real estate agencies (Xiamen interviewee 1, personal 
communication, 2015). Still others united for fear that the PX plant built in their backyard 
would cause cancer. Affective appeals were mixed with fact-driven arguments in a 
powerful concoction that dissolved spatial boundaries and cultivated networks; affect and 
logic were never separate, but entangled to create a momentous force that moved people. 
Action (here in the form of protests) discloses information about the nature of 
relationships (Bateson, 2000). The action of people sharing information and participating 
in protest revealed to the people a great deal about the nature of their relationship with 
their government. Whether or not they were driven by rational, irrational, or calculated 
appeals is far less important than the fact that the people learned that they could speak 
and their government would listen. Here, language acts as a “force which goes far toward 
determining how man will conceive of himself and of his world” (Ehninger, 1992, p. 22). 
The movement did not start or stop with the protests in the streets though. Before bodies 
gathered, the immense amount of communication between all social classes and age 
groups helped to reveal the power of the relationships, or guanxi, between Xiameners as 
well as a budding sense of civic duty. After the crowds dispersed, public forums, 
connections to the central government, and media coverage perpetuated the movement, 
which revealed a great deal about how these intertwined networks could help change the 
relationship between local officials and those they were charged with representing.  
Beyond this, as will be elaborated upon in the case studies, the outcomes of the 
Xiamen protests would reverberate across China in a type of movement with immense 
force that can only be understood within the larger context of China’s environmentally 
focused movement. After the 2007 Xiamen protests, people in cities across China took to 
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the streets in opposition. While accounts of these protest events as separate and distinct 
can be helpful, without being situated within a larger context, they prematurely curtail the 
tracing of movement necessary to study a social movement as large as China’s 
environmentally driven one. Evidence for this claim lies in the fact that the greatest force 
of the Xiamen protests lies not in the relocation of the plant to Zhangzhou, but the spark 
it ignited as the winds began to blow news of the event like wildfire across China.x  
The last way in which this case makes evident that analyses of protests must change 
is through a necessary shedding of moralistic overtones. Protests are not pure. The 
Xiamen protests were not composed of purely unselfish individuals uniting simply to 
save a city from a chemical plant. The reasons for uniting in protest are varied. Some can 
be characterized as remarkably selfish or oversimplified. Others can be seen as corrupt or 
self-serving. To become fixated on pure intentions stifles the ability to see protests as 
integral to comprehending how a society makes itself (Touraine, 1981).   
The second reason to shed moralism in the study of social movements is that scholars 
who glorify social movements as unilaterally positive phenomena that definitively 
signifies the health of the democratic process are operating within a Western paradigm 
that assumes a certain idealized style of democracy is appropriate for all nations when it 
is not. In making this statement, I am not alleging that China’s current governmental 
system is the best system for them or that democracy is bad. What I am saying is that 
China’s unique history, social system, political lineage, land, and population necessitate a 
form of government that may not yet have been thought of and China must forge its own 
path in composing a system appropriate to its (changing) circumstances. To assume that 
China will or needs to turn to the West’s problematic version of democracy is 
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shortsighted and Westerncentric and has functioned to limit scholarship on China (as is 
the case with Hartnett 2011, 2013). 
Third, moralism is a barrier to thinking because it allows us to too easily retreat to 
good/bad binaries that then limit conversations (Abel, 1999; Biesecker, 2013; Brown, 
2001; DeLuca, 2011; Foucault, 1990, 1995; Nietzsche, 1990, 1999). As Latour (1993) 
states, if we are studying force, we should come to the table without any “a-priori ideas 
about what makes a force, for it comes in all shapes and sizes” (p. 154). To do otherwise 
would lead us to decide if the Xiamen protest was “good” based on factors including the 
relocation of the plant to a more vulnerable city instead of tracing its impact. In other 
instances, moralism encourages thinking of the installation of a waste incinerator in 
Hangzhou as “bad” because the government is forcing it on the people when trash is 
piling up at an unsustainable rate due to the perpetuation of environmentally unfriendly 
practices such as the widespread use of disposable plasticware and wooden chopsticks. 
Rather than arming oneself with this moralistic approach that privileges only certain 
trajectories of movement, I propose moving beyond these binaries to more carefully 
examine movement on a larger scale. 
Within communication, McGee (1980) explicitly argued that social movement 
scholarship too often implies positive linear development despite the fact that social 
movements are not inherently positive. McGee (1980) writes, “...the term ‘social 
movement(s)’ causes us to order social and historical facts such that we can maintain the 
illusion of ‘morality,’ ‘purpose,’ and ‘destiny’ in largely self-aggrandizing collective 
behavior” (p. 128). Thus, McGee (1980) is alleging that labeling certain behaviors as 
“social movements” evidences scholars’ desires for linear progression toward a better 
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society when plenty of “social movements” including, as he lists, fascism, are not 
portraits of society moving in a positive linear trajectory.  
For McGee (1980), the adherence to linearity that Sillars (1980) also points out is 
steeped in the desire to consider life as “more than a cosmic joke” (McGee, 1980, p. 131). 
This leads him to argue that  
“movement” is our fondest wish, our dream, a reason to continue living in human 
society, for it contains an affirmation of human significance. A consciousness is 
presumed by the concept ‘movement’ which requires meaning, order and pattern in 
human experience even when these regularities must be manufactured. (McGee, 
1980, p. 131)  
 
McGee is critiquing scholars for imposing a certain consciousness and set of desires onto 
the concept of a social movement. He is not, however, dismissing social movements. 
Rather, he is pushing scholars toward a focus on movement unbridled by moralism and 
linearity.  
The moves that I have outlined—a networked approach, a rejection of binaries, an 
embrace of nonlinearity, and an eschewing of moralism—are critical for understanding 
contemporary social movements. Developing a new theory and perspective requires that 
we move past common sense practices and perform “a radical critique” of what 
everybody knows (Deleuze, 1994, p. 132). Now we must begin the work of thinking 
anew.  
 
Stirring Winds of Change 
To begin to think anew, I turn to poststructuralist philosophy including the (net)work 
of Latour, Deleuze and Guattari, and Bateson to supplement existing theories put forward 
by McGee and Jasper in communication and sociology, respectively. This turn to French 
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poststructuralism is a deliberate one and appropriate for a study of China because many 
of the poststructural thinkers were deeply influenced by a collision with China. Foucault 
(1994), for example, in The Order of Things begins with an entry from a Chinese 
dictionary that sets the stage for his argument against the supposed naturalness of 
ordering. This collision challenged deeply embedded cultural assumptions. Deleuze and 
Guattari’s (1987) embrace of rhizomatic structures as an important supplement to the 
hierarchy of the tree is taken directly from Eastern horticulture (p. 18). This supplement 
to the hierarchy of the tree undergirds many of their groundbreaking concepts including 
assemblages, nomads, and nonlinearity. These thinkers greatly influenced the work of 
Latour, whose network theory is inspired by the rhizome and assemblage. 
Thus, it is in the space opened up by these thinkers that I propose a method without 
form that charts movement, pausing at hot spots, to trace the tangled tendrils of the erratic 
wake of social change. I foreground this conversation with Sillars’ (1980) work, which 
pushes social movement scholarship to overcome three major boundaries. The first is the 
oversimplification of social movements as linear progressions with a beginning, middle, 
and end, which can be studied to develop a model to predict future movements.xi The 
second shortcoming Sillars identifies is the use of cause and effect models too simplistic 
for the wide variety of coalescing factors that spur catastrophe, awareness, and action. 
The third issue to which Sillars draws attention is an excessively rigid definition of social 
movements that prevents the flexibility to study movements, or that which is constantly 
changing and adapting to the conditions at hand.  
Sillars defines these problems, but it is McGee (1980) who offers a solution by 
redirecting social movement studies. For McGee, social movements are not objective 
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phenomena, but a set of meanings that critics apply to make sense of events. Though 
scholars treat them as such, social movements are not uniform cohesive entities, and 
therefore, are not phenomena. Thus, McGee proposes not starting from social 
movements, but ending in the conclusion that the social did, indeed, move by tracing 
changing ideographs. If scholars trace these changes, then they can conclude that the 
social has actually moved. In writing this, McGee puts forward a rather large challenge to 
those studying protests, campaigns, rebellions, and other eruptions that requires a 
rethinking of social movements from a phenomenon to a conclusion. He asks scholars to 
“make questions of consciousness ‘come first,’ focusing on the fact of collectivity” 
(1980, p. 133).  
DeLuca (1999) helps to render McGee’s call more concrete when he elaborates on 
McGee’s theory, stating that  
groups as well as individuals or institutions, through their rhetorical tactics and 
strategies create social movements, changes in public consciousness with regards to a 
key issue or issues, measureable through the changes in the meanings of a culture’s 
key terms in public discourse. (p. 36) 
 
DeLuca puts this call into action throughout his work, offering productive case studies. 
For example, he traces nature as a “contested ideograph” in Image Politics and illustrates 
how various environmental groups employ image events and verbal rhetoric to 
“consciously deconstruct the modern conception of nature as a realm apart from 
humanity” (DeLuca, 1999, pp. 69, 78). This commitment to tracing change is also evident 
in his more recent coauthored piece with Lawson and Sun, in which the authors move 
from mass media to social media to trace the influence the Occupy Wall Street protests 
had on discourse and to show how the social did, indeed, move (2012). 
In order to continue the work McGee is asking for in different cultures, scholars can 
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witness the movement of the social not only via McGee’s call to trace the emergence of 
particular ideographs, but also changing networks (using Latour), the growth of certain 
assemblages (Deleuze and Guattari), the redefinition of citizen/government relationships 
(Bateson), and the movement of protest across geographic areas. Thus, this dissertation 
seeks to extend McGee’s work by documenting shifts not only in language use, but also 
networks. 
Some of the research in sociology complements McGee’s directive. Jasper (2010) 
also argues that many of the old paradigms that once guided social movement research 
are no longer useful, given historical and rhetorical changes. Moreover, the static 
frameworks upon which many social movements theories are predicated lead to a lack of 
dynamism in contemporary social movement studies; Jasper (2010) pleads: “we sorely 
need a theory of action” (p. 968, emphasis added).  
Together, McGee and Jasper call for: 1) a consideration of social movements as 
meaning, 2) a tracing of changing meanings, 3) a consideration of affect as force, and 4) 
attention to dynamism and movement. This work is complicated as it travels to different 
cultures and political systems such as China. In order to elaborate on how methods must 
adapt to certain circumstances, I will turn to tracing the concept of nationalism in Chinese 
protest. 
Before tracing changing ideographs, I want to outline some of the troubles that 
abound in China, a country that deals constantly with censorship not only in the form of 
deletion, but also via preemptive directives. For example, the central government will 
issue written commands to media outlets—often after an event—that forbids 
investigating or writing about an issue. The directives will also often include instructions 
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on how to frame the event (see China Digital Times’ Ministry of Truth for copious 
examples).xii These are, however, easily leaked and all to often for the central authorities, 
end up circulated on the Internet. For example, after Chai Jing’s movie, Under the Dome, 
garnered between 200 and 300 million views and was shared over 650 million times on 
Weibo in just one week, the government issued the following command: 
Video websites are to delete “Under the Dome.” Take care to control related 
commentary. As the new reporting period for media personnel Weibo and WeChat 
accounts begins, concerned personnel are kindly asked to proactively submit account 
information to the record keeper. We reiterate that media personnel must not post 
content that violates regulations on either personal or official public platforms, or else 
face severe punishment. (March 6, 2015) (Henochowicz, 2015) 
 
Within days, searches for “Under the Dome” (穹顶之下) and “smog + APEC” 
(雾霾+APEC) were also blocked. This kind of blocking makes tracing the use of certain 
words or phrases difficult at best. Thus, to trace the impact of Under the Dome, one has 
to take a more creative approach. For example, scholars can look within the movie for the 
themes that are discussed such as the impact of pollution on children and then trace the 
discussions that stem from it on Baidu’s tieba or Weibo. Or, scholars can document 
increases in calls to the environmental hotline number offered to viewers at the end of the 
movie. These topics are addressed in the movie and changes should be apparent, but 
searches for “Under the Dome” will deliver data that show little impact.  
 Tracing changes to discourse is also complicated by the fact that the government will 
issue verbal orders that are never documented in writing. The officials responsible for 
keeping harmony are aware that any written directives may be uploaded to social media 
feeds, so they will pass orders along via phone calls that are then passed on to relevant 
persons. For example, one academic with whom I spoke was given the order to not 
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discuss freedom of speech in the classroom. This sort of discussion was strictly forbidden 
and to disobey this directive would certainly have consequences. As a result, tracing 
discussions concerning freedom of speech may not tell scholars much. However, the very 
lack of “freedom of speech” can tell us more than its presence, if we know to look there. 
This requires scholars to immerse themselves in the culture, research the vernacular, and 
look carefully at what is missing. 
These are merely a few examples of the problems one confronts when trying to trace 
terminology in contemporary China.xiii In making this point, I do not mean to say that 
censorship is unilaterally successful and functions to eradicate certain words from 
popular vocabularies, as this is not the case. Internet users in China are remarkably savvy 
about using homonyms, images, and word play to circumvent censors. They are also very 
adept at moving between platforms and functionalities.xiv My point is to say that impacts 
of censorship require new and unconventional means of tracing not just presences, but 
absences. 
 
Civic Duty and the Rhetoric of Nationalism in Crisis 
If, as Tang and Darr (2012) argue, “Nationalism is one of the most powerful forces of 
collective action,” then social movement scholars would be remiss to ignore it (p. 811). 
In studying environmental movements in China, what has become clear through my 
research is that Tang and Darr’s argument is valid. Many of the protestors who march 
down the street fighting against chemical plants do not consider themselves to be 
environmentalists. When asked why they are risking imprisonment, protestors reply that 
it is their “civic duty” to fight against the polluting factory. Likewise, when I asked 
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people working for ENGOs why they chose to become involved and agree to a much 
lower salary than they would otherwise make as college graduates, they reply by saying 
“it is my civic duty.” The term “civic duty” is an ideograph that has come into popular 
usage to mean it is one’s duty to sacrifice for the betterment of China as a whole, and is 
one of many manifestations of Chinese nationalisms. Thus, to understand why these 
people are protesting, we must understand the movement of nationalisms. 
Numerous scholars have studied nationalism and identified different expressions of it, 
which are particular to changing political environments, including Cabestan (2005), who 
discusses official nationalism, revanchist nationalism, primitive nationalism, 
instrumentalist nationalism, modernizing nationalism, and pro-Western nationalism in 
China. These iterations are never separate, but always overlapping and multiple. 
Goodman’s (1995) work, which also traces nationalism, is quite different in that she 
focuses on following a single strain of nationalism, which she grounds in native place ties 
(a form I will argue is reemerging and shaping social movements in China today). Other 
scholars such as Gries (2005) offer a nuanced description of nationalism in China that 
complicates more simplistic approaches.  Rather than characterize nationalism as a 
movement from either the CCP to the people via propaganda (top-down) or mass 
movements that originate with the people (bottom-up), Gries argues they are both and 
that nationalisms are the product of relations and interactions that cannot be understood 
in isolation. To expand upon this, he turns to the concept of face.  
Still other studies have begun to use scholarship about nationalism to map its 
movement across China. For example, Hyun and Kim (2015) turn to cybernationalism to 
explore “how Chinese Internet users’ online political expression and talks relate to 
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nationalistic and system-supportive attitudes” (p. 767). Many other types of nationalism 
have also emerged in studies that look outside China, including ethnic nationalism, 
liberal nationalism, state nationalism, pragmatic nationalism, elite nationalism, and mass 
nationalism (Tang & Darr 2012). For the purposes of this section, I will use Gries’ (2005) 
definition of nationalism—“any behavior designed to restore, maintain, or advance public 
images of [a] national community”— and trace the genesis of civic duty (p. 9).  
Nationalism has a long history in China that stems from China’s era of terror (or 
Century of Humiliation)—when the country was falling apart and then besieged by the 
Opium Wars of 1840—and the subsequent fall of the Qing dynasty. During this period of 
forced contact with the West, China was invaded by numerous countries and dethroned 
from its “almost permanently dominant global position” (Cabestan, 2005, p. 3). Due to 
the large expense it would have cost any country, however, China was never fully 
colonized. Instead, it was forced to sign a series of unequal treaties with almost any 
nation that landed on their shoreline. These treaties forced China to forfeit its access to 
important trading ports, gave foreigners sovereignty over numerous tracts of land, and 
emptied any remaining silver left in the country’s coffers.  
The Chinese people rose up against foreign imperial forces numerous times. The 
Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901) was one of the most notable early uprisings, but the 
Chinese were ultimately defeated by a coalition of foreign forces that left them with 
further fines and unequal treaties as well as a feeling of defeat. In subsequent popular 
resistances to the brutal Japanese invasions of the 1930s, the Chinese were left ruined and 
desperate. These physical defeats threw the country into a deep crisis, and this crisis 
occurred during their emergence into modernity.  
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Over the course of the foreign invasions, small pockets of Chinese people resisted, 
but widespread infighting and corruption made unifying the country to fight together 
difficult. One potential force capable of joining individual and disparate factions was a 
form of nationalism defined by a widespread hatred for imperialist invaders. The 
development of a coalescing form of nationalism able to unite China as a whole, 
however, was slow to evolve. Certain factors in place helped to gradually pull people 
together, beginning at the local level. Native place ties played an important role in uniting 
people from the same area. During this time, “The ideological connection between native 
place identity and Chinese identity was grounded in traditional ideas of concentric circles 
of cultural and territorial identity” (Goodman, 1995, p. 389). One’s native place was 
viewed as a microcosm of the country and, thus, love for one’s native place strengthened 
China writ large. These efforts to mobilize at the local level would prove to be essential 
for organization on a national level. 
Goodman (1995) traces this in her study of native place ties in the early 1900s. At this 
time, people were uniting in local factions in opposition to invading forces, and local 
Chinese newspapers promoted and encouraged such behavior. Confrontations between 
Chinese and outsiders led to a number of legal battles, protests, and boycotts in areas of 
the country such as Shanghai where tensions between Chinese and imperialist forces 
were particularly high. Shanghai was one of the most important trading ports and served 
then, as it does today, as China’s financial center. Invading forces built and managed 
banks along the shores of the Yangtze River in an area called The Bund. Local 
altercations in which the Chinese people were defending their fellow citizens frequently 
erupted and eventually grew outward, moving from local to national levels as word 
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spread of various countries’ further unfair treatment of the Chinese. 
The budding transformation of localism to nationalism is evident in Goodman’s 
description of an incident involving the lenient sentence given to a Russian sailor 
convicted for the death of a Chinese citizen in Shanghai. When the judge let the sailor go 
free despite his guilt, local people were in a furious uproar and demanded the sailor serve 
his time in jail. Unsurprisingly, these pleas were not met with much concern until the 
protestors initiated a boycott of Russian goods that grew from a group of local merchants 
to buyers across the country, in which people from afar united against the Russians as 
invaders. This boycott eventually resulted in the extension of the sailor’s sentence. This is 
but one example of many similar situations.  
Localism slowly transformed into nationalism, and overt expressions of nationalism 
were encouraged. The Chinese peoples’ “[l]ove for the native place and activism in the 
interest of local self-government were conceived as integral to national strengthening, 
creating the local constituent building blocks for a modern constitutionalist state” 
(Goodman, 1995, p. 403). As the Qing fell further into oblivion, the anti-Western 
sentiments that united people persisted. Thus, nationalism developed for the first time in 
China’s history, but it was a very particular breed. Cabestan (2005) argues that “China 
after 1840...could not be other than unanimously nationalist and anti-Western” (p. 4).  
What the people were lacking was a leader who could harness this nationalism to pull 
China out of its defeat. Mao Zedong and the Communist Party would prove to be the 
force that could channel local forms of nationalism during the Long March and unite 
them into a powerful strand of nationalism capable of ousting foreign forces as well as 
the rival Chinese party, the Guomintang. And he did. A deliberate closing off of China to 
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outside forces followed as Mao and his compatriots worked to reestablish China as the 
predominant global power.  
To state that “the Chinese communist movement in the first half of the twentieth 
century is just as much a nationalist movement, and the communist victory in 1949 is just 
as much a victory of Chinese nationalism as a victory of communism” “is not an 
exaggeration” (Tang & Darr, 2012, p. 813). During his early years, “Mao advocated 
provincial ties as fundamental to China’s salvation” acknowledging “the province as the 
microcosm of the nation” (Goodman, 1995, p. 410). As he gained support, Mao would 
change his stance, finding localism to be a threat to the country’s unification. This 
demanded a redefinition of nationalism that eradicated place associations beginning with 
Mao’s official ascent to power in 1949. Saving the nation became the number one 
priority under Mao, and all other issues—including environmentalism and human rights 
issues among others—were subservient to national issues.  
Mao’s form of nationalism was bound up with a series of revolutions and demanded 
everyone believe and act in the name of the nation, which was always above the 
individual. During this time, everything had to be in service to the nation, including art, 
literature, and other creative endeavors. As Mao proclaimed in one of his talks, 
“Literature and art [must] become a component part of the whole revolutionary 
machinery, so they can act as a powerful tool in uniting and educating the people while 
attacking and annihilating the enemy” (quoted in Andrews & Shen, 2012, p. 151). The 
environment, too, was sacrificed in the name of the nation’s development under Mao’s 
directive that to conquer nature (Shapiro, 2001). Anyone who did not engage in and 
promote this intense form of nationalism was considered suspect and open to public 
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scrutiny, shame, humiliation, and excommunication from society.  
While nationalism in one particular manifestation helped to lift China out of ruin and 
unite the people, under Mao, it ultimately became a force that transformed China into a 
dangerous and unstable monoculture lacking diversity in regard to scientific opinions, 
environmental concerns, religious beliefs, and philosophical imperatives. Nationalism 
was the only belief system to which people were permitted to subscribe. One after 
another, Mao’s initiatives and revolutions continued to tap into the fear and shame of 
China’s fall from power at the hands of the West (including Japan) and insist that the 
people conform in order to catch up to and surpass the very countries responsible for 
China’s fall. This breed of nationalism could only be sustained by a series of revolutions, 
which left the country reeling from mass initiative after mass initiative such as the 
Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward. 
The people were given reprieve from Mao’s unsustainable strain of nationalism with 
his death in 1976. With the appointment of Deng Xiaoping came the opening up of China 
and the proliferation of different forms of nationalism. China’s enormous population and 
landmass provided space for nationalism to be cultivated in diverse social, religious, 
patriotic, and economic networks. This flourishing of local networks resulted from Deng 
Xiaoping’s shifting of governance from central authorities to local levels, giving 
provinces and cities more autonomy in an effort to strengthen China. Local authorities 
became the overseers of local economies and the enforcers (or neglectors) of national 
laws. Nationalism, necessarily, shifted as the central government opened up China’s 
borders.  
Deng’s transition to the local redefined relationships and served as the impetus for the 
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reemergence of native place ties, which had been disrupted by Mao’s decision to divide 
families and relocate many city dwellers to the countryside during the Cultural 
Revolution. Deng’s reform remade cities and provinces into microcosms of the nation. 
Each locality was responsible for generating its own GDP and enforcing the laws put 
forth by the central government. The tax system put into place relied heavily on 
corporations to generate revenue and compelled many local leaders to solicit companies 
to build within their city and provincial limits. This was the primary means by which they 
could meet local GDP growth goals, as revenue from income tax was extremely low, 
especially in rural farming communities. Giving local officials the burden of generating 
the revenue necessary for their town to flourish resulted in widespread corruption at local 
levels as officials welcomed dangerous industries into their jurisdictions with tax 
exemptions and a promise to turn a blind eye to environmental regulations. Thus, 
soliciting companies to one’s town became a lucrative, competitive, and widespread 
practice for officials. If one city insisted upon going through the proper channels to 
ensure a safe environment that would assuredly cost the company more money, 
businesses could easily find another town that would help it forego the hassle and 
expenses. 
Local GDP growth led to national GDP growth, which would ultimately impact the 
trajectory of Chinese nationalisms and warrants a brief discussion of the rising middle 
class, the influx of Western ideas, and changes to media. China’s opening up ushered in a 
breathtaking level of economic expansion, industrialization, and movement that would 
fundamentally alter ways of life at the local level. For instance, people in the coastal town 
of Xiamen witnessed their properties skyrocket in value as tourism grew and the nouveau 
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riche came to visit their beaches. The port city of Dalian welcomed new industries to its 
docks and experienced a massive increase in local revenue. With the rise in car culture 
came the growth of the oil industry that boosted the city where Sinopec was 
headquartered, Maoming, to having one of the highest GDPs in the province. People’s 
lives were changing rapidly as more and more people were lifted out of poverty.  
On the national level, people across the country were being exposed for the first time 
in years to Western makeup, fashion, art, literature, religion, and science, which 
diversified the monoculture Mao had left. The growth of ideas, intellectualism, creativity, 
and ambition matched the remarkable market growth. People were eager to try on new 
clothes and ideas, experiment with oil paints and Christianity, and read about foreign 
news and Huck Finn’s adventures. This contact with the West led to what some scholars 
call the second great intellectual revolution in modern China, during which scholars 
began mixing Chinese traditions and ideas with Western systems and thoughts.xv  
At the same time, the Chinese media was undergoing major changes and the 
economic reforms “led to the proliferation of media at the local level” while 
“decentralization made the media more difficult for the Party to control” (Gries & Rosen, 
2004, p. 8). This increased freedom gave Chinese reporters inspired by Western style 
objectivity and investigative reporting a platform by which they could disseminate 
information. Southern Weekend, which is known as China’s most liberal newspaper still 
today, was established in 1984. Though overseen by Guangdong provincial authorities, 
the paper became a forerunner in China’s media reform and was established to offer 
readers more objective reports on current events, unimpeded by the strict government 
oversight and control of the CCP’s official mouthpiece, People’s Daily. 
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Diverse networks of ideas and practices were springing forth at the same time 
communication technologies were proliferating. In 1994, the Internet was introduced in 
China. A nationwide wireless phone network was established four years later. Access to 
telephones and fax machines was increasing and connecting people in new and 
overlapping networks. Over the next several years, as telephone and fax lines emerged to 
conduct business, connect with people from afar, and share information overseas, people 
were connecting with one another in new ways and forging channels of communication 
by which they could share news, images, literature, research, and rumors.  
These expansions and extensions of overlapping networks created a new 
configuration of conduits for excitement, ideas, outrage, resistance, and organization. 
Yes, the media were still state controlled and much of that which came from the West 
was filtered, but these controls could not entirely control communication networks armed 
with speed and vast in scale. The flow of new ideas, especially among the educated, was 
a threat to the central government, as is evident in China’s most violent protest in recent 
record—the Tiananmen Square protests. In 1989, nearly a million students, intellectuals, 
and frustrated citizens who had been thinking, reading, and digesting new ideas and 
information staged a protest during which they asked their government for political 
change in the world’s largest public plaza, Tiananmen Square. The protests were timed to 
coincide with the anniversary of the May 4th movement, but persisted for weeks 
afterwards. As the movement grew in Beijing, so too did it grow in other cities, garnering 
groups of supporters in city and town plazas across China.  
Despite efforts to disperse the crowds, including visits from government officials, 
protestors remained steadfast in the square. The government sent troops in on May 20. It 
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was not until the night of June 3, after government officials approved the military 
offensive, that violence erupted. Military tanks moved in and military personnel opened 
fire on the unarmed crowd, killing an unknown number of protestors and injuring 
hundreds of others. This decision to use force “marked a resort to coercion” (Gries & 
Rosen, 2004, p. 8). Silence followed for days. On June 9, Deng Xiaoping made a public 
statement praising the military officers for their work to quash the attempt to overthrow 
communism. 
Left with a fractured and frightened public, the government was in dire need of 
reuniting the people in the wake of the tragedies, so central leaders turned, once again, to 
an anti-imperialist form of nationalism. Since the Tiananmen movement was viewed as a 
prodemocracy and pro-West movement, this shift back to anti-imperialist discourses that 
fueled China’s nationalism a century prior was intended to “boost the nation’s spirit, 
enhance cohesion, foster national pride, consolidate and develop a patriotic united front, 
and rally the masses’ patriotic passions” (Callahan, 2006, p. 186). The campaign was a 
multimedia one that mobilized schools, television, popular magazines, and newspapers. A 
new textbook was compiled and released in schools nationwide shortly after the protests 
in 1990, the year of the 150th anniversary of the Opium Wars. Stories intended to stoke 
anti imperialist sentiments proliferated in every form of media, and National Humiliation 
Day—a day of remembering the atrocities brought about by Western and Japanese 
forces—was brought back as a national holiday and celebrated nationwide (Callahan, 
2006).  
This very calculated and widespread effort was successful in that it reunited the 
country toward a common goal of overcoming oppression and stoked anti-Western 
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sentiments. School children were being taught from a young age that China should define 
itself in opposition to those who had conquered it. It also functioned to frame pro-
Western ideas as traitorous and, as a result, many people who advocated for democracy 
were ostracized or jailed. However, as Callahan (2006) points out in his case study, “the 
state is never totally successful; nationalism and humiliation both keep crossing the 
official boundaries to go in unexpected directions to produce unorthodox identities” 
because nationalism is a continual and dynamic performance (pp. 201, 203). Gries (2005) 
concurs: “Clearly, even when [the CCP] chooses a strategy of suppression, the Chinese 
State does not have the monopoly over nationalism” (p. 125). The dynamic performance 
of nationalism is what Latour calls a black box.  
 
The Black Box of Nationalism 
The term black box is one Latour (2003) imported from cybernetics where it stands 
for a “piece of machinery or a set of commands [that] is too complex” to philosophy, 
where it means anything wherein we take the interior, composition, or networks that hold 
it in place for granted (pp. 2-3). Latour illustrates the black box through science by 
exploring the impending discovery of the double helix. Rather than focusing solely on the 
science, Latour turns to the surrounding circumstances that helped shape the discovery of 
the double helix, including faculty fellowships, scientific uncertainties, faulty computers, 
competition between researchers, power plays, funding, and professional hierarchies. The 
neat and tidy double helix that we accept today is a black box that, if unpacked, surges 
with tangled messes of relations and dynamics absent from its neat scientific position.  
Nationalism in China, too, is a black box in that many different components, 
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including war, trade, the collision of Western ideas and Eastern practices, protests, 
economies, political figures, face, embarrassment, and socialism with Chinese 
characteristics compose it. To understand it, we must unpack it. Thus, following Latour 
(2003), who insists on an entry into his area of study—science and technology studies—
“through the back door of science in the making, not through the more grandiose entrance 
of ready made science,” I argue for an approach to social movements not through the 
grandiose package of a successful social movement, but the making of the movement 
(after movement has been deemed to happen, of course) (p. 4).  
To explore nationalism through this lens is to know that nationalism is unpredictable. 
Though government officials can work to amp up and direct nationalism, they cannot 
harness it completely. As a result, we see nationalism functioning in a variety of ways 
simultaneously. In the next subsection, I will discuss the nationalisms evident in the 
environmental campaigns across China before moving backwards to trace civic duty.  
 
Civic Duty and Environmentalism 
The issue of nationalism is threaded throughout China’s environmental crisis 
movement. Rather than aligning over anti-Western sentiments, many are gathering 
together over anti-environmental degradation sentiments, an activity that the government 
promoted and encouraged in the early years of its environmental efforts. When Deng 
Xiaoping shifted fiscal responsibility and environmental oversight from central to local 
governments, he also forfeited a certain level of control over and awareness of the 
devastation occurring. Thus, while the central government was conscious of the 
proliferation of polluting industries, they were likely unaware of the terms of these 
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agreements or the extent of their dumping and unsafe practices.  
When environmental degradation began crossing local borders and tainted fish 
appeared in markets in Beijing while rivers in Southern China were turning black, the 
central government was forced to pay attention and take measures to stop this (Economy, 
2010). Due to the new decentralized governance structure, it made sense to call on the 
local people to hold their governments accountable. This was a way of employing the 
people to do work for the central government. They did not, however, foresee the unrest 
that would eventually erupt in the form of mass protests across the country decades later. 
Nor could they have predicted that, with the introduction of social media and the ability 
to build networks outside state controlled media outlets, these protests would spread 
across vast distances via images and outrage, inciting localism and nationalism in cities 
all over the country.  
Many things motivate people to protest, but one common theme in the interviews, 
reports, slogans, and signs is native place ties. These ties to place play an important part 
in these protests, as do the networks that connect Xiamen to Dalian to Maoming to 
Shanghai. Protestors and ENGO employees alike with whom I have spoken again and 
again cite a love of the place they live as a reason for their involvement. On Weibo, 
images of anti PX protestors holding signs declaring their love for their town abound, as 
is illustrated in the Figures 1, 2, and 3 below.  
Traces of localism also abound in the messages that move fastest and furthest. Take, 
for example, the aforementioned text message sent flying around Xiamen during the 2007 
anti PX protests that brought bodies to the streets. It was effective, in part, because it 





Figure 1. A Dalian protestor holds up a shirt that reads “I [heart] Dalian” and stands 





Figure 2. A Maoming protestor carries a sign reading “Maoming, I just love you! 









Dalian, when typhoon Muifa breached the walls of the PX plant on their coast, fear of 
their town’s demise swelled up into a force majeure that gathered thousands of residents 
in front of the government buildings at the People’s Square. In Maoming, a city no 
stranger to industry, one protestor’s concern for future generations that would live in 
Maoming was apparent when he remarked, “I think we already live in pollution, so I 
want our next generation not to have to live under the influence of pollution” (Maoming 
interviewee 2, personal communication, 2015). These people all want to stay and they 
want to be safe in their home. 
When people unite to protest against polluting industries, they are uniting in a form of 
localism that extends nationally via social media networks, inspiring others to fight for 
the place they live. This localism, or native place ties, echoes the type of nationalism 
evident in the aforementioned study by Goodman. The people united because of local 
issues, which in Goodman’s case study, provided the base for the expansion of 
nationalism to a national level.  
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Each of the protests featured in this dissertation were in defense of a group of 
peoples’ hometown. When the protestors voiced their demand, it was that the plant not be 
built in their town. If enough towns fight, the plant will have no home, but some cities are 
better equipped to protest and win than others. What happened in the case of Xiamen was 
that the plant was moved to another smaller city in Fujian province, Zhangzhou. 
Officials, anticipating protests after the announcement of the move, warned Zhangzhou 
residents not to participate in the uprisings and immediately quashed the few that did 
occur. Thus, this native place form of nationalism is limited in the face of big business 
and government officials desperate for increased revenue. The brand of native place 
nationalism that united Xiameners did not produce the same success for the people of 
Zhangzhou. Successful protests cannot be reduced to a formula. However, since Xiamen, 
protests have spread to other areas, and with each manifestation, posed a growing threat 
to central authorities. 
The current fragmentation of the environmental movement in China evidences 
people’s desperation to do as much as they can with the tools at hand as well as a lack of 
organization between cities to create a united nationwide front against pollution. At the 
same time, their options are limited in the face of corruption. The central government’s 
systems that localize GDP provide fertile ground for environmental violations to occur 
either by ignoring and sidestepping environmental regulations or by allowing shoddy 
costcutting construction. The localized systems also promote a more localized form of 
nationalism, which has not yet completely transcended to a form of nationalism capable 
of eradicating environmental abuses and safety violations across the country. However, 
within the rising notion of civic duty lies potential for the unification necessary to topple 
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environmental abuses on a greater scale. And this concept is growing quickly. To 
understand this concept, we must first trace its etymology. 
 
Tracing Words  
Let us look more closely at the word civic duty or gongmin yiwu (公民义务). The 
first part of the term, gongmin, means citizen or civic. This is also a term used to describe 
the collective. Chinese culture has very strong ties to the collective and community. 
According to the Hofstede scale, China, which scores a 20 out of 100 in individualism, 
“is a highly collectivist culture where people act in the interests of the group and not 
necessarily of themselves” (Geert Hofsteded, 2013, para. 5). This means that people tend 
to feel a type of responsibility for others, including family, friends, and other groups that 
is far less prevalent in highly individualistic cultures such as the U.S., which scores a 91 
on the same scale.  
The second half of the term yiwu can be translated as your service or work is a kind of 
justice. The first character, 义, in its traditional form 義, is a combination of the 
characters 我 and 羊, which mean I/me and goat, respectively. According to 
etymologists, this combination of characters speaks to the generosity of “giving a goat as 
a sacrifice each year to the poor,” which highlights the act of giving to benefit others in 
the community (Sears, 2013, para. 1). This also speaks to Confucian philosophy, which 
calls for one to sacrifice to those who rank above you in the Confucian hierarchy, 
including the father of a family, government officials, and, of course, the emperor. Over 
the years, the character has taken on additional meanings, including obligation, 
commitment, right conduct, justice, volunteer duty, mandatory, and voluntary.  
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The second part of the word, wu, means business, affair, matter, must, should. 
Together, yi and wu come to mean that people have a duty and obligation to conduct their 
affairs rightly. Combined with gongmin, the four characters direct this obligation toward 
serving the public—a way of thinking that is growing among certain circles in China, 
especially the intellectuals and educated youth. Research shows that collectivist behavior 
of the ilk promoted by gongmin yiwu is often associated with periods of difficulty when a 
collectivist mentality is necessary to overcome widespread problems (Vliert, Yang, 
Wang, & Ren, 2013). Indeed, the air, water, and soil pollution has caused widespread 
crises in virtually every corner of China and locals are uniting to hold their officials 
accountable for the pollution they have welcomed or are welcoming into their cities. 
These localized uprisings have the potential to unite into a nationwide assault on 
environmental degradation, as was the case with the nationalism that grew in response to 
imperialist invasions. 
The term civic duty also speaks to a change in peoples’ notion of citizenship from the 
days of Mao when the Chinese people were told what to do and think and expected to 
follow their leaders without much questioning. Many Chinese citizens today see it as 
their duty and obligation to question their leaders when they and their families are at risk. 
They are charged with the same duty of the literati in traditional China—as “interpreters 
of the political classics and custodians of the ‘Mandate of Heaven’...[who] could and 
often did challenge the emperor’s legitimacy claims” (Gries & Rosen, 2004, p. 6). With 
the influx of pollution and pollution related illnesses and deaths, the cosmic order, so to 
speak, is in disarray and the people must participate in the restoration of society. This is 
evident to those researching China’s changing political landscape. For instance, Gries and 
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Rosen (2004) argue that the “Chinese people—peasants, workers, students—are 
increasingly contesting the legitimacy of the current regime; analysts would be wise not 
to ignore them” (p. 5). In 2004, Gries (2005) was already seeing popular networks 
“challenging the state’s hegemony over nationalism” (p. 134). Peoples’ relationship with 
their government was changing attitudes about what a citizen could and should do.  
According to Professor Li Hui, the term civic duty has grown in popularity because 
“the word represents [that] most of our people are being awakened, enlightened” to their 
obligation to participate in the decisions impacting their homes, families, and livelihoods 
(personal communication, 2015). The increasing unrest regarding environmental issues in 
China has amplified this call to duty and engaged tens of thousands of people who do not 
consider themselves environmentalists necessarily, but do know they have an obligation 
to their fellow citizens to oppose dangerous wastewater pipelines, chemical factories, and 
garbage incinerators that will pollute their resources, bodies, and networks. It is their 
civic duty to take on the potential consequences of protest—including beatings, jail time, 
humiliation, or worse—and sacrifice for the betterment of society.  
 
Civic Duty Eruptions and Disruptions 
As was previously established, though the government often uses nationalism as a 
tool to unite and mobilize the people, they cannot control it. The notion of “civic duty” 
discussed above is just one of nationalism’s unpredictable manifestations that “shed[s] 
light on the deeply emotional character of Chinese nationalism..., [which] manifests itself 
through moments of intense mobilisation” (Cabestan, 2005, p. 10). People are fighting for 
one another, for their homeland, and against corruption, but the level of commitment to 
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civic duty and the fearlessness that often accompanies it are, more and more, leading to 
mass riots—a sign of instability that makes officials cringe. As Shirk (2008) makes 
evident in her work, “what the Chinese leaders fear most is a national movement that 
fuses various discontented groups—such as unemployed workers, farmers, and 
students—under the banner of nationalism,” which I argue is a very real potential of civic 
duty (p. 821). If these diverse groups unite against the state and protest, they threaten 
China’s political stability in a very real and tangible way. 
This is likely why discussions of civic duty, like freedom of speech, have been banned 
in college classrooms per government orders. Civic duty has a very real potential to 
create revolution and though it cannot be talked about in public forums over which the 
government has oversight, signs of its presence appear in places like Southern Weekend. 
Specifically, one can witness calls to civic duty within the scandal that besieged China’s 
most widely read and liberal newspaper in January of 2013.  
To usher in the New Year, Southern Weekend’s Dai Zhiyong wrote an editorial he 
titled “China’s dream, the dream of constitutionalism,” but it was never published. The 
Guangdong provincial Propaganda chief, Tuo Zhen, rewrote the editorial without 
notifying any of the staff or asking consent from the editors—a clear violation of 
propaganda protocol. The new title Tuo gave the piece was “Dreams are our promise of 
what ought to be done.”  
The original piece played off Xi Jinping’s “China Dream,” which had recently begun 
to circulate widely and gain popularity. Dai’s dream called “for a bold realization of the 
‘dream of constitutionalism in China’, so that civil rights could be protected and power 
effectively checked” (Bandurski, 2013, para. 4). Dai goes on to explain that China’s 
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success as a country is related to civic engagement in political processes. The editorial 
states: 
Only if constitutionalism is realized and power effectively checked can citizens voice 
their criticisms of power loudly and confidently, and only then can every person 
believe in their hearts that they are free to live their own lives. Only then can we build 
a truly free and strong nation. (as cited in Bandurski, 2013, para. 4) 
 
In this quote lies evidence of Dai’s call for people to take seriously their civic duty. He is 
asking his fellow citizens to do what is right and criticize their leaders when necessary in 
a collective effort to improve the government, a government that has been proven to be 
rife with corruption and in need of repair.  
The version Tuo wrote differed greatly in that it was devoid of any calls to action, 
focusing instead on the peoples’ achievements to date: 
Dreams are our own expectations. Dreams are our promise of what ought to be done. 
This is the 1,057th time we have seen you [i.e., the 1,057th edition of the paper], and 
it is the first time we have seen you this year. In the past, now and in the future, you 
have defended your lives and we have defended this newspaper. Here we extend our 
blessing and hope that in this new year we can all come a step closer to our dreams.... 
We are now closer than we have ever been to this dream, thanks to livelihood 
promises (民生承诺)... every person’s destiny is closely tied to the destiny of our 
nation and its people. (as cited in Bandurski, 2013, para. 14) 
 
This new version stresses the connection between the people and the nation, but does not 
mention speaking out, voicing criticisms, or creating change. Rather, it seems to caution 
that  “every person’s destiny is closely tied to the destiny of our nation and its people” 
and thus, the people must be cautious and obedient rather than outspoken and critical.  
In response to this egregious disregard for policy, 35 former Southern Weekend 
employees and 50 interns wrote two open letters demanding Tuo’s resign for his breach 
of protocol. The first open letter, like the original editorial, evoked a similar call to civic 
duty by proclaiming love for one’s country as well as the desire to make it better: “This 
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newspaper has for many years been a paper that sincerely loves its country and its people. 
The people [who work] there hope, in a spirit of goodwill, that their country can be 
better” (Elgot, 2013, para. 10). Students from Sun Yat-sen University also wrote an open 
letter stressing the need for the people of China to stop being passive and obedient. They 
called on fellow students and citizens to do something. In their view, “It is because we 
have yielded to power that it has become unbridled and wanton; it is because we have 
been silent that the Constitution has become a rubber stamp” (H. Gao, 2013, para. 13). It 
is because they have not risen to fulfill their civic duty that China’s government is rife 
with corruption and the cosmic order is in disarray. Eighteen prominent intellectuals, too, 
wrote their own strongly worded open letter of support of Southern Weekend. 
The support for the paper was also very visible on the streets and social media 
screens. Citizens gathered outside the Southern Weekend offices carrying signs and 
standing together in a show of support. Images of the demonstrators and the signs they 
carried were shared widely on Weibo. Many signs echoed Dai’s call to civic duty by 
stressing the need to be critical and face the dangers inherent in protest in China. One 
sign read: “If I don’t stand up today, I won’t be able to stand up tomorrow” (H. Gao, 
2013, para. 12). Action is necessary if the people are to keep their rights. One 
demonstrator remarked in an interview with the Associated Press, “I feel the ordinary 
people must awaken... The people are starting to realise [sic] that their rights have been 
taken away by the Communist party and they are feeling that they are being constantly 
oppressed” (Kaiman, 2013a, para. 3).  
At the same time, people crowded in front of the newspaper’s offices, two admired 
actresses, Yao Chen and Li Bingbing, showed their support of Southern Weekend’s 
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journalists on the Sina Weibo microblogs. Yao posted the following quote from a Russian 
dissident author that read “One word of truth outweighs the whole world” alongside the 
paper’s nameplate to her 31.7 million followers, and within 2 hours, it was reposted more 
than 30,000 times (Ramzy, 2013). On Weibo, discussions, comments, and images of what 
was happening had flourished until, of course, they were censored.  
The government responded to the online activity by taking over Southern Weekend’s 
official Weibo account and posting messages that claimed Tuo’s editorial that appeared 
was actually written by Dai. What followed is an example of a small huo or fire on the 
Internet in China. A Southern Weekend employee quickly posted on another account that 
the organization’s Weibo account had been taken away. In a mere 13 minutes, this 
statement was retweeted 21,372 times before it was removed (Elgot, 2013). Soon 
thereafter, searches for Southern Weekend returned this message: “According to relevant 
laws, regulations and policies the search results for ‘Southern Weekend’ cannot be 
shown” (Elgot, 2013, para. 18). But this did not stop people from talking nor did it stop 
people from fulfilling their civic duty. 
As Gao (2013) put it, the people protesting displayed “a rising level of civil 
consciousness in their words and actions. They perceive themselves as members of an 
organic society to which they bear responsibility, and one in which each will be affected 
by the actions they collectively take or fail to take” (para. 12). In other words, they have a 
sense of civic duty that necessitates they answer the growing call to the collective. 
At this time, Xi Jinping had only served approximately 1 year in office. In December 
2012 (just prior to the Southern Weekend incident), Xi gave a speech commemorating the 
30th anniversary of China’s 1982 Constitution, extolling its virtues. This caught the 
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attention of a number of Chinese people including, of course, Dai from Southern 
Weekend (who wrote his column less than a month later) because the Constitution 
guarantees free speech as well as freedom of assembly. Xi himself stated in that speech 
that the Constitution must be used to keep the government in check, and that “[n]o 
organization or individual has the privilege to overstep the Constitution and the law” 
(quoted in Lynch, 2014). This speech came in the wake of a number of corruption 
scandals and was accompanied by Xi’s declaration of a “war against corruption.” People 
around the country were inspired by Xi’s commitment restore the cosmic order.  
This evocation of the Constitution as a means of keeping the government in check, 
however, slowly and suspiciously faded away as calls to the collective, to civic duty, 
increased. By mid-2014, when a collected volume of Xi’s speeches was released, his 
speech on the Constitution was omitted. I argue that one of the reasons this speech was 
excluded and further references to the Constitution fell away from official discourses is 
because it could be used to substantiate the call to civic duty being advanced by liberals, 
students, intellectuals, and others who were growing increasingly aware of the impacts of 
corruption on their lives, the land on which they lived, and future generations. This type 
of civic duty and love of one’s nation is dangerous to an authoritarian regime intent on 
maintaining harmony. The lack of its inclusion in the collection of Xi’s speeches is 
telling. 
The threat of civic duty is also apparent in Xi Jinping’s recent campaign to redefine 
nationalism in a manner distinctly different from civic duty. This is a bold and potentially 
dangerous move given past lessons on promoting nationalism. However, Xi pushes on via 
a variety of tactics. Xi’s “politicized anticorruption purges of rivals, centralization of 
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power in his own hands, cultivation of a populist image, and an ideological turn toward 
nationalism and cultural identity” are, for Xi, “absolutely fundamental shifts necessary to 
address the crisis he sees facing China” (Minzer, 2015, para. 9).  Moreover, since many 
elite attribute China’s past decline “to the weakening of the state authority,” the 
strengthening of the nation through a unified nationalism is seen as an antidote to another 
decline (Zhao, 2015, para. 4).  
Thus, Xi has put forward such unifying ideas as the “China Dream,” in which China 
becomes prosperous and culturally rejuvenated. However, as French (2015) points out, 
“Unintended, even undesirable consequences are the name of the game in matters of state 
and...it is a safe bet that [Xi’s] drive to realize a Chinese dream will produce many things 
he could never have dreamed of—or desired” (para. 4). One may be civic duty—a 
nationwide call to the collective. 
Xi has also increased the level of anti-Western sentiments in official discourses as 
well as policies. For example, in 2014, Xi praised blogger Zhou Xiaoping for his critique 
of American culture as a negative influence on the Chinese people (Wong, 2014) and, “in 
his efforts to promote ideological unity, Xi has also labeled ideas from abroad that 
challenge China’s political system as unpatriotic and even dangerous” (Economy, 2014, 
para. 10). In terms of policy, anti-Western sentiments are apparent in his recent proposal 
to crackdown on international NGOs in China, which could restrict foreign donations and 
subject the organizations to heavy surveillance, making operations increasingly difficult, 
especially with limited funding. Many scholars see his vigilance against Western 
influence as “a guiding component of his policies toward the Internet, traditional media, 
culture and entertainment, universities, think tanks, and non-governmental organizations” 
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(Zhang & Pho, 2015, para. 4). I would be remiss to not point out here that these displays 
of anti-Western nationalisms, when examined closely, can also be seen to contain pro-
Western themes as well, as China looks to the West to borrow certain capitalist practices, 
adapting certain ones for China while rejecting others (Zhang & Pho, 2015). To see the 
regime as simply anti-Western pulls scholars back into dangerous binaries that obliterate 
the subtleties of these sentiments and campaigns. However, these themes are important to 
analyze. 
A mutation of anti-imperialist nationalism is also apparent in the military parade that 
occurred in Beijing in September of 2015. In the weeks and months prior to the event, 
memorials to commemorate the fallen were erected while “[p]ublishing houses and 
studios [were] churning out books, documentaries and even cartoons on the period, with 
names such as Lies Written by Bayonet, Tunnel Warfare and Great Victory, [and] 
Historic Contribution” (Phillips, 2015a, para. 10). The military parade commemorated 
the 70th anniversary of China’s victory in its war of resistance against Japan, which is a 
way of constructing China simultaneously as victor and victim—as victim of Japan’s 
invasion and as victor over Japan (not just militarily, but economically).  
In his speech during the parade, Xi stressed both China as victor and China as victim 
when he told the people: 
The victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression 
is the first complete victory won by China in its resistance against foreign aggression 
in modern times. This great triumph crushed the plot of the Japanese militarists to 
colonize and enslave China and put an end to China’s national humiliation of 
suffering successive defeats at the hands of foreign aggressors in modern times. This 
great triumph re-established China as a major country in the world and won the 
Chinese people respect of all peace-loving people around the world. (“Full text of 
Chinese president’s speech” 2015) 
 
People from around the country watched the broadcast live and conversed with one 
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another over social media as the ceremony unfolded. Of course, the posts spanned the 
gamut from expressions of nationalism to cheap jokes about former president Jiang 
Zemin looking like a toad, but there was a strong presence of what appeared to be 
genuine nationalism (Fergus, 2015). 
According to Professor Li Hui, many people, “especially those among the older 
generation and lower classes, have been highly inspired by this type of nationalism, and 
expressed their love of their strong country” (personal correspondence, 2015). In some 
cases, those who did not emphasize nationalism were ridiculed. For example, a popular 
Taiwanese star posted a photo of her son on her personal Weibo account on the day of the 
parade and was criticized by followers for not talking about China’s “great achievement” 
and choosing to focus on herself and her family instead.  
These appeals to various forms of nationalism, I argue, more than expressing anti-
Western sentiments or pride, evidence a growing fear of losing control over the masses. 
This also explains Xi’s various social media policies intended to prevent huo, or fires, 
from spreading evident in the 2014 rule stating that users whose posts were considered to 
be “rumors” and reposted over 500 times could serve punishments of up to 3 years in jail 
(Economy, 2014). Users in China (including myself) have also experienced difficulties 
connecting to censorship circumventing apparatuses such as Virtual Private Networks 
(VPNs) for long periods of time. In January of 2015, Gmail users could no longer access 
their accounts on smartphones because China was blocking IMAP and POP servers. 
Information controls are shifting and tightening in new ways at the same time orders are 
being passed down that forbid discussions of certain topics in educational institutions. 
Xi is facing monumental problems alongside a swelling popular awareness of 
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national issues, and environmental challenges are one of the most pressing. Many 
Chinese people have chosen to approach environmental challenges and the corruption 
that enables it via a commitment to civic duty. Whether or not Xi can direct civic duty to 
become a productive form of nationalism that unites the country while at the same time  
solving environmental issues without risking the stability of the country remains to be 
seen. 
 
Supplementing Network Theory 
Two dominant forms of contemporary nationalism I have discussed here are 1) the 
brand of nationalism promoted by the central party and 2) civic duty. Xi’s version of 
nationalism requires the formation of numerous committees to define and promote 
nationalism, an anticorruption campaign to restore China to its right place, the 
collaboration of the government with businesses to change censorship practices that 
delete unsanctioned expressions of nationalism, and the creation and promotion of media 
that promotes the Chinese dream such as the movie Zhongguo Hehuo Ren (中国合伙人) 
released in 2013 (which has been translated in English to American Dreams in China or 
China Dreamxix).  
At the same time that Xi is investing in these massive efforts, the people are 
developing their own forms of nationalism and are maintaining and promoting civic duty 
by establishing (E)NGOs, participating in illegal protests, going to jail, spreading 
information, stoking the fire of hope, becoming more educated about environmental laws, 
and reprioritizing environmental safety over GDP growth. Both are intended to stabilize 
and improve China, so to cast the clashing nationalisms in a binaristic and moralistic light 
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is unproductive. They are parallel and tangled, just as social movements are. 
By examining civic duty and tracing its movement in Chinese culture as well as the 
tensions evident with its rise today, the importance of movement is foregrounded along 
with the networks by which movement travels. In other words, the black box has been 
opened and some of the relationships that compose, sway, and create nationalisms have 
been brought to the fore. One can witness how changes in flows of communication and 
governance, in particular, impacted the development, spread, and manifestations of 
nationalisms.  
By avoiding binaries in this discussion, we have circumvented the forces that often 
prevent the black box from being opened. Eschewing rational/irrational binaries allows 
scholars studying Chinese protests to move away from a discussion concerning which 
forms of nationalism are legitimate and, instead, trace their force. By avoiding the 
democracy/communism binary, those studying social movements can move away from 
discussing whether or not a certain variation of nationalism will bring China democracy 
and, instead, study the changes China is undergoing on its own terms. By deflating the 
claim that contemporary nationalism is only anti-Western, we see how anti-Western 
statements work in parallel with an admiration of the West and a desire to learn from 
one’s counterparts.  Finally, moving away from depictions of China as a fully effective 
totalitarian hierarchy, the uncertainties of Xi’s nationalistic agenda begin to surface and 
the interactions between these ideas, governance structures, the people, and networks 
begin to appear.  
Answering McGee’s call to trace force through ideographs, I have offered a tracing of 
civic duty within the Chinese culture that helps to foreground movement, networks, and 
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flows of information. Using Latour’s notion of the black box to supplement McGee, I 
have illustrated how nationalism and civic duty are both unstable performances in 
constant flux, moved by relationships. This motion is what offers the appearance of the 
black box’s constancy despite nationalism’s many iterations.  
In light of this, I argue for an ontological shift to more diligently tracing interwoven 
networks in motion. Rather than studying isolated events, I want to move scholars to 
follow the shifts, turns, and winds that reshape relationships and to see contradictory 
approaches occurring simultaneously. This ontological shift requires that we let go of 
linearity, hierarchies, rationality, and cohesion—the very ideas that have framed social 
movement scholarship for decades. If we look carefully, the consciousness of “the 
collective” is both disparate and divided. This new way of knowing requires that when 
we study social movements, we focus not solely on the event itself, but the winds that 
alter environmental landscapes, that shift networks, that propel movement. 
                                                
i	According to the Paley Center for media, 90% of American households owned a TV by 
1960 http://www.paleycenter.org/the-civil-rights-movement-and-television. 
	
ii The fundamental flaw with Simons’ piece is his leader-centered approach, which not 
only simplifies social movements, but also assumes that they are all leader-driven. By 
presupposing a hierarchical structure to social movements, his model can neither account 
for our contemporary mediated environment in which people are organizing and sharing 
over social media nor the multiplicity of leaderless movements that function more as a 
dynamic network than a neat striated structure, including Occupy Wall Street and the 
countless environmental protests in China. In the end, though Simons calls for new 
thinking on social movements, he falls back into the rut of looking to individuals giving 
speeches. 
 
iii As can be witnessed in the work of Balthrop, Blair, & Michel, 2010; Blair, Balthrop, & 
Michel, 2011; Blair, Jeppeson, & Pucci, 1991; Dickinson, 2006; Dickinson, Ott, & Aoki, 





                                                                                                                                            
iv As can be seen in the following scholarship: Arnheim, 2004; Delicath & DeLuca, 2003; 
DeLuca, 1999, 2006; DeLuca & Demo, 2000; DeLuca & Peeples, 2002; Dunaway, 2008; 
Finnegan, 2005, 2006; Finnegan & Kang, 2004; Hariman & Lucaites, 2003, 2008, 2011; 
Hasian, 2012; Hill & Helmers, 2004; Mirzoeff, 2012; and Ott & Marie Keeling, 2011 
 
v As is apparent in the following: Abel, 2008; DeChaine, 2002; Massumi, 1995; Ott, 
2010; Seigworth & Gregg, 2010. 
 
vi For example, scholars began looking at incidents such as the Young Lords 
Organization’s (YLO) 1969 Garbage Offensive in which members, upset with the lack of 
trash pick up in their lower class neighborhood, protested by moving their marginalized 
trash to more highly trafficked areas to force officials to pay attention to the numerous 
requests that had been ignored (Enck-Wanzer, 2006). Bruce (2015) turns to Pussy Riot’s 
staged protest at Moscow’s Christ the Savior Church in 2012. Her paper takes this image 
event and then traces the affective impact of the use of the balaclava in subsequent 
demonstrations, ultimately gaining international iconicity. Gruber (2014), too, turns to the 
visual and affect in his analysis of the terracotta warriors exhibit in Hong Kong in which 
he explains how the multimedia display “appeals to the body and builds up a ‘political 
affect,’ a sensation or disposition toward Mainland China that is structured and enhanced 
by a larger narrative” (p. 163).  
 
vii Stewart, Smith, and Denton define social movements as “organized, un-
institutionalized, large in scope, promotes or opposes changes in societal norms and 
values, encounters opposition in a moral struggle, and it relies primarily on persuasion to 
bring about or resist change” (p. 23). 
 
viii The number of protests per year (180,000) is based on 2010 numbers. Though current 
numbers are unavailable, most experts agree that the number has grown. 
 
ix I use the word “ostensibly” because, as the Occupy Wall Street protests illustrate, local 
governments have repeatedly used various zoning laws to quash protests and force them 
out of public spaces. 
 
x And, even with this more meta approach, I am leaving out many protest movements 
including those related to dams, trash, and numerous other environmental protests. 
Furthermore, the environmental movement cannot be restricted to protests alone, but also 
must include the work of ENGOs and individuals such as Chai Jing who produced the 
documentary, Under the Dome, which garnered a great deal of attention and made 
important waves in discussions of pollution and its impacts. 
 
xi However, as can be learned from rash of race-related protests in 2015, the civil rights 
movement was not a simple linear progression and arguably is still occurring, long after 




                                                                                                                                            





xiii Certainly, history scholars also confront this problem when they the materials with 
which they have to work with are mostly from a certain literate class in particular areas of 
the country.  
 
xiv For example, when words and images were censored, protestors in Jiangmen in 2013 
turned to the walkie-talkie function of Weixin, which allowed people to communicate via 
short recorded messages that were difficult to censor, as they would require that human 
censors listen to each message. 
 
xv This return to intellectualism was exactly that—a return—and the literati had long had 
a role in keeping the government under check. According to Gries and Rosen (2004), “In 
traditional China, it was the literati who legitimated or de-legitimated the regime.... As 
interpreters of the political classics and custodians of the ‘Mandate of Heaven,’ the 
literati could and often did challenge the emperor’s legitimacy claims” (p. 7). This is part 
of the reason why Mao attacked this class of scholars when he came to power and 
banishing some, while at the same time making use of others. The first intellectual 
revolution was the May 4th movement in 1919, which was led by students and 
intellectuals who challenged Confucianism and many tenets of traditional Chinese culture 
in the aftermath of China’s downfall. These activists, looking for a way to pick China up 
out if ruin, believed that bringing in Western democracy and science would help China to 
rebuild and once again become a strong nation. The second intellectual movement began 
with China’s opening up and reform and is still continuing today. 
 
xvi Retrieved from: https://pubs.acs.org/cen/_img/89/i34/8934notw8protest.jpg 
 
xvii Retrieved from: http://i.ytimg.com/vi/_Z1WPSv1_r0/0.jpg 
 
xviii Retrieved from: http://globalvoicesonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/apx6.jpg 
 
xix The movie tells the story of how three Chinese classmates were able to work the 
American college entrance exam system to help Chinese students gain entry in colleges 










SORTING CHAOS: WILD PUBLIC NETWORKS 
 
“the more attachments it has, the more it exists”  
(Latour, 2007, p. 217) 
The rational/irrational binary has, since Aristotle’s division of the soul into rational 
and irrational elements, guided and structured much of Western thought. It is the binary 
used to elevate humans as separate and distinct from other animals, to separate rational 
man from emotional woman, mind from body, and to distinguish “hard” sciences from 
the “softer” humanities among a host of others. This binary has been reinforced over and 
over again in vernacular discourses as well as academic disciplines from philosophy to 
science.  
Though Descartes broke with Aristotelian thought in the 17th century in favor of a 
more scientific way of knowing the world, his famous “I think therefore I am,” in ways, 
reinforced a similar rational/irrational binary. Again, this division established humans as 
the unique thinking animal.i This binaristic model also had other repercussions. 
According to Descartes (and many that followed), rational reasoning and logic were 
separate from and superior to any bodily feelings or reactions. The world was best known 
through science. Thus, the disciplines that were seen as employing only rational 
principles—science and math—were considered superior to the humanities. The 
  
120 
perpetuation of this hierarchy is evident in, among other places, contemporary funding 
distribution in the U.S. for research and scholarship, in particular. In 2014, total federal 
support for humanities focused programs was $594 million while the National Science 
Foundation (NSF) alone was given $7.17 billion for the same year (Mervis, 2014; 
National Endowment for the Humanities, 2014). 
Formal definitions of the word rational help to elaborate on the ways in which it 
structures discourses within Western culture, which is important to understand before 
moving the analysis into China, where Cartesian dualisms have not been ingrained for 
centuries. The distinctions that undergird Western thinking need to be recognized as 
distinctly Western and not universal. The Oxford English Dictionary defines rational as 
“sensible, sane, lucid” and “characterized by reasoning, as opposed to emotion, intuition, 
etc.” Here, emotion and intuition are posited as the very opposite of reason and sanity, the 
latter of which clearly sit on the privileged end of the binary. This trend is evident in a 
variety of Western texts. Gross (2006) is just one scholar who illustrates the long history 
of privileging rational thought by going back to the 17th century and tracing the treatment 
of affect. He finds that reason and the brain are characterized as superior to passions, 
which cloud judgment and cause confusion between right and wrong. The duty of 
humans is to overcome irrational tendencies (which are rooted in the body) through the 
rational power of the brain. Thus, the body and the mind became very separate and 
distinct entities in both scholarship and common parlance. Gries (2005) points out this 
distinctly Western line of thinking when he writes, 
despite compelling neurological evidence to the contrary, there is a strong tendency in 
the liberal West to view emotion and reason as locked into a zero-sum relationship in 
which any gain for one is a loss for the other. In other words, becoming more 
emotional entails becoming less rational and vice versa. (p. 88)  
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 This privileging of rationality had diverse consequences, many of them as a direct 
outcome of positioning emotions, intuition, affect, and feelings as irrational. 
Structuralism, which emerged in the early 20th century, was a line of thinking that 
stemmed from  a favoring of rationality and influenced the development of many 
disciplines, including communication (as is evident in the turn towards semiotics). 
Semiotics represented a very rational and scientific way of dealing with words by 
dividing them into different components (sign as signifier and signified). Structural 
thinking also proliferated across disciplines. Mainstream scientific scholars “appear to 
believe that cold rationality, fearless objectivity, and a bit of technology” are sufficient, 
whereas “excessive emotion about the object of one’s study is a sufficient reason to 
banish miscreants ...on the grounds that good science and emotion of any sort are 
incompatible” (Orr, 2004, p. 43). In short, structuralism “represented a great revolution” 
in which “the whole world becomes more rational” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 130). 
As we saw in the previous chapter, a commitment to and belief in the power of rationality 
deeply influenced how communication scholars defined rhetoric and, thus, how they 
studied it. Those scholars who saw persuasion as the result of reasoned arguments 
focused their scholarly endeavors on speeches given by great rhetors, including Abraham 
Lincoln, Martin Luther King Jr., Barack Obama, and other high-ranking political and 
social figures.  
Social movement scholars were responsible, in part, for pushing against this rigid 
definition to open up the study of rhetoric to include emotions, violence, image events, 
and the visual—all of which lay outside the purview of pure reason and rationality. 
Media scholars such as McLuhan fought against the dominance of rationality. McLuhan 
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(1964) attributes the privileging of linear thought to the emergence of print culture, which 
neatly aligns words on a page in distinct rows that are read from left to right, top to 
bottom. This is why McLuhan (1964) asserts that “‘Rational,’ of course, has for the West 
long meant ‘uniform and continuous and sequential’” (p. 30). He goes on to argue that, 
within our print culture, we have “confused reason with literacy and rationalism with a 
single technology” (McLuhan, 1964, p. 30).  This mode of reasoning, at the time of his 
writing (and more so now), thus considers inhabitants of the digital age to be irrational as 
we jump from link to link, image to image, and bounce around through search results, 
Twitter feeds, and Weibo blog entries.ii Thus, as scholars of social media, instead of 
clinging to ideal of linear rational thought, we should follow the erratic paths and lines of 
thinking. This turn is supported by recent developments in several academic arenas. 
In recent years, disciplines including science and philosophy have come to argue that 
splitting the rational and irrational into two separate and distinct categories is misleading 
and inaccurate. Neuroscience has found that “reason may not be as pure as most of us 
think it is or wish it were, that emotions and feelings may not be intruders in the bastion 
of reason at all: they may be enmeshed in its networks, for worse and for better” 
(Damasio, 2005, p. xii). In his study of brain function in patients, Damasio (2005) finds 
that without feelings or emotions decision making, becomes virtually impossible, that 
“certain aspects of the process of emotion and feeling are indispensable for 
rationality....feelings point us in the proper direction, take us to the appropriate place in a 
decision making space, where we may put the instruments of logic to good use” (p. xiii). 
In so doing, Damasio helps to dissolve the rational/irrational binary that has limited 
scientific analyses of decision making and introduces a more ecological perspective in 
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which feelings are tangled together with systems of logic. 
Philosophers such as Deleuze and Guattari (1987) also question the neat division 
between rational and irrational thought in A Thousand Plateaus, and make clear the 
intricate intertwining of the two:  
A new form of slavery is invented, namely, being slave to oneself, or to pure ‘reason,’ 
the Cogito. Is there anything more passional than pure reason? Is there a colder, more 
extreme, more self-interested passion than the Cogito? (p. 130) 
 
For them, rationality and passion are neither separate nor opposite, but entangled. 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) make this clear again when they argue, “The rationality, the 
efficiency, of an assemblage does not exist without the passions the assemblage brings 
into play, without the desires that constitute it as much as it constitutes them” (p. 399). 
The belief that the rational can be easily divided from the irrational offers space and 
justification for people to make quick and simplified judgments as to the validity or force 
of information and dismiss that which is irrational. For example, in sociology, the study 
of social movements almost dissolved when researchers deemed protestors as irrational 
and, thus, irrelevant and unable to be studied. In communication, protestors’ lack of 
rationality also posed problems for the field. This is true as well in popular culture where 
many political commentators recently dismissed the possibility that Donald Trump could 
be a successful presidential candidate because his arguments lacked a particular type of 
logic and rationality. Much to their surprise, Trump has fared remarkably well in most 
polls, leading the competition by over 10 percentage points in October 2014, and it is not 
because rationality rules supreme. To trace the force of rhetoric, then, we must abandon 
arguments that privilege rationality. 
We can witness the failure of rational arguments during the days and weeks 
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surrounding anti-PX protests in China. In Maoming, for example, the government 
anticipated popular discontent when plans for the PX plant were announced. In 
preparation, government officials launched a media campaign composed of a series of 
very rational arguments—a strategy that had some success in other towns. They passed 
out brochures explaining what PX is and how safe it can be. They invited experts from 
top universities on television news programs to explain the relative safety of the plant and 
held press conferences during which officials touted the economic benefits of the 
proposed plant. They used every communication channel possible to disseminate 
reasonable and rational information. These efforts to construct a very reasoned and 
rational argument fell flat because citizens were still stewing in anger and disgust about 
the rampant corruption that plagued the town, including the recent graft investigation that 
found widespread corruption within their local government a year prior. The force of 
anger and distrust trumped traditional rational rhetorical appeals. The people did not 
respond to these campaigns with rational rebuttals; they responded with protest and, in 
some instances, violence. To focus on only the rational arguments advanced would 
overlook the protests themselves. Furthermore, the Chinese people do not have the same 
adherence to rationality as the West. The Chinese people, those in Maoming included, are 
far more concerned with ethics. This is why corruption became a predominant discourse 
within the anti-PX protests.  
A concern with ethics is evident in the interviews with protestors. Over and over 
again, interviewees from Maoming said they did not believe their government officials 
and, in some cases, that they did not pay attention to the government’s campaign because 
there was no need; they already knew exactly what the officials would say and their trust 
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in them was lost. The carefully constructed campaign went unheard. People did not want 
to get their information from brochures or press conferences. Instead, they followed 
information that was spread via relationships over social media in the form of group chats 
with former classmates and coworkers, blog posts by local trusted experts, and forums 
that compiled snippets of information gleaned from reports out of Xiamen and Dalian 
about their PX protests. In short, they would only accept information from people they 
trusted and who were also looking outside state controlled mainstream media for 
information. Within this mass of data, sorting out rational and irrational arguments is 
impossible. Tracing movement and relationships, however, can help to make networks 
visible.  
And this is the challenge: to move scholarship out of the rational/irrational binary that 
promotes a focus on pieces of information (which could be characterized as points) and 
stay focused on movement and relationships. Points are of less use in a networked study, 
as they allow us to fall back into arborescent models. According to Deleuze and Guattari 
(1987),  
What constitutes arborescence is the submission of the line to the point.... A line of 
becoming is not defined by points that it connects, or by points that compose it; on 
the contrary, it passes between points, it comes up through the middle, it runs 
perpendicular to the points first perceived, transversally to the localizable relation to 
distant or contiguous points. (p. 293) 
  
To follow the lines of becoming, of movement, I will first identify and explore tangles of 
activity. In this dissertation, I focus on the anti-PX protests that took place in Xiamen, 
Dalian, and Maoming, dedicating a chapter to each and also weaving them together. In 
these chapters, I carefully describe what I term wild public networks that coalesced to 
incite massive disruptions that changed relationships between actors, which includes not 
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only citizens and their officials but also ideographs, social media networks, websites, and 
land. Let us do away with the neatness of these binaries and begin to sort through the 
chaos. 
 
Moving Past Binaries to Sort Chaos 
In addition to structuring common, or vernacular discourses (Ono & Sloop, 1995), the 
rational/irrational binary has influenced how social movement scholars approach the 
question of how people are moved. This has resulted in a binary very similar to the 
rational/irrational binary—the rational/affect binary. However, this binary that privileges 
either affect or reason is problematic because it is not through one or the other that people 
are moved in a pure sort of way.iii It is, rather, through the intertwining of the two into a 
complex ecology that changes occur.  
However, the turn to affect in studies of rhetoric (and all the other aforementioned 
areas) is quite distinct. Why is the turn to affect happening again and why is it happening 
now? One reason is that it was, for a long period of time, largely neglected in favor of 
reason. As scholars from across disciplines began to further explore how people came to 
change their minds, they came to find that rational reasoning oftentimes did not work. 
Leys (2011) draws the same conclusion in her review of the literature on affect, stating 
that,  
what motivates these scholars is the desire to contest a certain account of how, in their 
view, political argument and rationality have been thought to operate. These theorists 
are gripped by the notion that most philosophers and critics in the past (Kantians, 
neo-Kantians, Habermasians) have overvalued the role of reason and rationality in 
politics, ethics, and aesthetics, with the result that they have given too flat or 
“unlayered” or disembodied an account of the ways in which people actually form 




More simply, despite much research and literature that push scholars away from binaries, 
the world in which we live is still deeply influenced by such structures. Thus, turning to 
the opposite of reason—affect—is a “natural” turn and one that has been immensely 
useful in expanding communication studies. However, if it persists as one end of a 
binary, it risks creating an artificial playing field that precludes adventuring outside the 
two ends of the binary where movement creates whirrs and buzzes that wildly extend, 
tangle, and clash. Affect would be more productively conceptualized not as a pseudonym 
for irrational or the opposite of reason, but merely one thread in a larger network that 
begs to be examined, or, as Leys (2011) argues, as that which precedes, but works in 
tandem with, cognition. To view affect as part of a network acknowledges that networks 
are “not made of nylon thread, words or any durable substance but...the trace left behind 
by some moving agent” (Latour, 2007, p. 132). Reason, in whatever form it takes, is 
always influenced by affect just as affective reactions are often channeled through the 
paths forged by reason. 
Turning to networks, ecologies, forces, engagements, and relations can unshackle 
social movement scholars from yet another binary. The entreaty to move away from a 
reliance on binaries is evident in the network of poststructuralist scholars that upset the 
neat configurations imagined by semiotics, including Derrida, Deleuze and Guattari, 
Latour, Foucault, and an emerging extension of newer scholars, including Massumi, 
Hathaway, Gould, Jasper, DeLuca, Ahmed, van Dijck, Poell, and others. These moving 
theories offer a new ontology that expands the ideas put forth by the aforementioned 
authors that I term wild public networks. Within these wild public networks arise certain 
patterns and formations that provoke forces majeure capable of reconfiguring 
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relationships that I will further explore below as well as in subsequent chapters. 
 
Wild Public Networks 
The phrase wild public networks layers together a set of terms that, most basically, 
help to acknowledge the inconsistency of networks as well as their connection to most 
everything. Wild public networks connect scientists with real estate agents, students with 
ENGOs, polluting companies with cancer patients, PX plants with anxious mothers, and 
the fishing industry with the oil industry. Wild public networks emphasize growing, 
shifting, and messy relationships that crisscross through screens and streets. 
 
Wild Traces 
These configurations are wild in the sense that they are, by definition, “not tame, not 
domesticated” and are in a constant state of flux (OED). These wild configurations are 
similar to the wild public networks of protestors in that they are “resisting control or 
restraint, unruly”; they are “passionately vehement or impetuous” and “violently 
excited”; they are “excitedly desirous to do something” and may be considered to be 
“extremely foolish or unreasonable” or even “rashly or inconsiderately venturesome” by 
those who privilege a certain strain of logic (OED, emphasis in original).iv The Maoming 
protestors threw bottles of urine at the police and lit structures on fire. They were not 
acting rationally, but as people resisting, as people that were violently excited, as 
necessarily inconsiderately venturesome protestors. 
The protestors discussed in this dissertation are often working outside the neat 
dimensions of organized arguments and approved legal processes in a desperate attempt 
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to do something. As this wild movement occurs, it extends the citizens’ demands into 
new spaces, including officials’ offices, journalists’ smartphone screens, and QZone chat 
groups. The rhizomatic nature of protests invades the rhizomatic systems set up by 
corrupt officials creating conflict and opening up new spaces of possibility. 
Wild becomes an important modifier because it stresses the lack of domestication, the 
deliberate turn away from neat systems of rules and laws, the many forms of violence that 
often accompany social change, and movement. In so doing, wild also encourages 
scholars to pursue that which lies outside domesticated binaries, and to embrace things 
overlapping in messy, moving arrangements. It provides an opportunity to see the 
disorder of the world, the chaos, and then to sort through it. It is what Latour might call a 
move from thinking like Crusoe to experiencing the world like Friday. He describes the 
difference between the two in “Irreductions”: 
Friday is less certain about what is strong and what is ordered. Crusoe thinks he can 
distinguish between force and reason. As the only being on his island, he weeps from 
loneliness, while Friday finds himself among rivals, allies, traitors, friends, 
confidants, a whole mass of brothers and chums, of whom only one carries the name 
of man. Crusoe senses only one type of force, whereas Friday has many more up his 
sleeve. Instead of beginning my philosophical tract with a Copernican revolution—
reducing the island to Crusoe’s will—I therefore start from Friday's point of view and 
set things irreduced and free. (Latour, 1993, p. 156) 
 
I, too, want to set the networks free and rather than focus solely on organizations or 
governmental authority, to trace this wildness—a movement DeLuca (1999) encourages 
in Image Politics.  
 
Extending Publics 
Wild public networks extend DeLuca’s (1999; DeLuca et al., 2016; DeLuca & 
Peeples, 2002; DeLuca, Sun, & Peeples, 2011) concept of (wild) public screens and 
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Ewalt, Ohl, and Pfister’s (2013) networked public screens by highlighting networks and 
relationships within a wild and unpredictable accumulation of forces. In taking DeLuca’s 
concept of wild public screens and melding it with the networked public screens of Ewalt 
et al. I am not suggesting that wildness excludes what Ewalt, Ohl, and Pfister (2013) label 
(binaristically) as “tame” public screens (described as “the commonplaces of protest” and 
the circulation of “gentler images”) (p. 187). Rather, I am acknowledging that wild public 
networks are often forged and maintained by banal communication including selfies, cat 
videos, and memes while also highlighting the movement and volatility of networks as 
they shift, change, and sometimes erupt. I am extending DeLuca’s work by moving even 
further toward an emphasis on networks, which more explicitly privilege relationships 
rather than nodes, or screens. 
In extending the work of this group of scholars, I am also furthering the argument that 
Twitter, Weibo, and other social media platforms trouble the rationality characteristic of 
the Habermasian public sphere, by displacing it with affective networks of panmediation 
that acknowledge the coexistence of rationality and affect (DeLuca, Brunner, & Sun, 
2016; Ewalt, Ohl, & Pfister, 2013). China is a vibrant example of wild public networks 
because the spread of networked technologies, especially smartphones, force 
contemporary actors, including corporations, governments, and politicians, as well as 
citizens and activists, to engage with each other on public platforms and confront 
arguments that contain rational reasoning and affective appeals. Local government 
officials must confront and deal with the rumors that run rampantly across social media 
networks and often use their own official Weibo accounts to dispel them. When crises 
occur such as the protests discussed in this dissertation, networks of social media expand 
  
131 
exponentially and draw in both participants and onlookers. People confronted with the 
prospect of a chemical plant being built in their backyard turn to wild public networks to 
find information. The relationships they have built with others outside of crises often 
carry more weight than the ones they have with government officials. Rational arguments 
from local leaders fall on deaf ears while affective appeals run rampant across wild public 
networks. 
Wild public networks, in turning away from a privileging of rationality, also highlight 
the creativity of Chinese citizens who use images, homonyms, and word play to 
circumvent censors and organize outrage. Chinese activists, having spent years deploying 
social media weapons in a surveillance society, provide models for citizens around the 
world. They meet surveillance measures the government takes to curtail conversations 
with a type of wildness that leaves censors scrambling. When words are censored, they 
use images; when images are censored, they deploy walkie talkie functions; when a 
certain phrase is censored, they replace it with one of the Chinese language’s 
multitudinous phononyms. Networks of activated citizens overwhelm armies of censors, 
making spaces for successful activist efforts and offering hope through incessant 
creativity. Wild public networks highlight the pathways and relationships that link so 
many citizens together as contingent activists.  Wild public networks offer scholars a 
concept that affords space to follow the unpredictable lines of flight that reverberate out 
during and in the wake of protests. 
Wild public networks also, as previously stated, move from an emphasis on nodes to 
relationships. Within the spaces in between lies the potential for forces to move. 
According to Latour, networks are traces left by interactions and relationships, and 
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wildness animates these relationships, reminding us that they are constantly changing, 
moving, being redefined, being threatened, and exerting resiliency. Certain information 
and ideas—including the one that PX is a dangerous polluting chemical—run rampant 
like pests, appearing in places like Xiamen, Dalian, Kunming, Maoming, and more 
recently Shanghai, only to be attacked by government officials with a wide variety of pest 
control practices, including locally led media campaigns, expert testimony, censorship, 
press conferences, and empty promises. They can run rampant because pathways formed 
by relationships exist in composite conformations. Wild public networks emphasize that 
this study is one that focuses on relationships—between people and their air, local 
officials and the people they ostensibly serve, GDP and life.  
 
Networks as Traces 
Networks undergird the data collection, format, and analysis of this research. Though 
the rise of communication technologies have helped to advance the idea of networks as 
neat systems, I am advancing an idea of networks as messy, jumbled, and always moving. 
Furthermore, rather than emphasizing the computer or smartphone, I use networks to 
emphasize traces of interconnected events, or relationships.  
Thinking of networks as traces requires an important shift from stability to movement 
and ephemerality. One can only trace after movement has occurred, and these traces are 
neither always obvious nor permanent. This falls in line with Derrida’s (1988) 
theorization of traces as marking both presence and absence, as something which changes 
over time and never remains the same. To think of networks as traces is to insist upon 
acknowledging movement. Wild public networks are full of chaotic movements of 
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relationships and connections that are difficult to follow. These wild public networks 
include people marching, information being forwarded on QQ Zone and Weibo, 
Environmental Impact Statements, pressure on local officials to increase GDP, guanxi 
networks that make saying “no” to plans for a PX plant more difficult, and the affectively 
rational and rationally affective reactions that follow. This turn to webs of relations is 
consistent in poststructuralism and is apparent in Foucault’s work, which argues that 
governments should be concerned with people, yes, but more so 
men in their relations, their links, their imbrication with those things that are wealth 
resources, means of subsistence, the territory with its specific qualities, climate, 
irrigation, fertility and so on; men in their relation to those other things that are 
customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking, and so on; and finally men in their 
relations to other things... (Foucault, 1991, p. 93)    
 
These relationships connect all sorts of things in a variety of ways that acknowledge the 
complexity and messiness of their interconnectivity across multiple planes. 
If we treat networks as traces, we find that rhizomatic extensions from the Xiamen 
protests crop up in Dalian and Maoming, producing offshoots of environmental 
awareness, civic duty, and misinformation that alter relationships between friends, 
officials, residents, oil executives, and environmental protection authorities. As they 
move, these new rhizomatic extensions confront the hierarchy of government officials 
who are connected with oil industries under a canopy of corruption. Wildly, these 
configurations clash and chaos ensues, systems that once worked are disrupted, networks 
that are carrying selfies are flooded with videos of riots and clashing bodies, and the 
rational decision to protest against a potentially dangerous chemical plant is 
overwhelmed by the affective reaction of watching police beat a fellow resident with a 
police baton (as was the case in interviewee Maoming 4, 2015).  
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What remains from the wild conflicts are traces—in the form of a reconfiguration and 
extension of connections often visible over social media in the form of demands, tirades, 
and accusations. The words, emoticons, and giffs popping up on mobile devices render 
visible inordinate amounts of data. As Latour argues, “information technologies allow us 
to trace the associations in a way that was impossible before. Not because they subvert 
the old concrete ‘humane’ society...[but because] they make visible what before was only 
present virtually” (Latour, 2007, p. 207, emphasis in original). We can now trace 
movement. We can watch the social move, jump, dissipate, and explode, throwing pieces 
of information in multiple directions. 
If we turn to the protests in Dalian and Maoming, we have the ability to sort through 
fragments of video that were shared on QQ and Weibo that either were overlooked by 
censors, saved before they were deleted and reposted later, or which were picked up by 
local and national news outlets. We can read the handmade and computer printed signs 
and banners that proclaimed residents’ love of their city, their opposition to the plant, and 
their awareness that pollution is threatening their lives and the lives of future generations. 
We also witness spikes in both activity on QQ, Weibo, and Weixin (though censorship 
makes collecting posts afterward difficult at best). Reports show that “although 
eventually censored, posts of the Maoming protests became one of the most discussed 
topics on social media” at the time (Shea & Reinsch, 2014). Both the central and 
provincial propaganda departments issued directives to the media to not cover the event. 
However, word still got out. Conversations about Maoming spread like huo (火), or fire 
across the Internet. In the 3 months before the protests, a Baidu search for “Maoming 
PX” produced 12 results. In the month after the protest (3/29/14-4/30/14), there were 
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over 760 results). Just over a year later on October 5, 2014, the same search produces 
over 3.35 million results. Wild public networks can carry information via a variety of 
paths and provide pathways to circumvent censorship. 
 
Force Majeure 
If McGee is right and the work of scholars is to trace changing ideographs and, to 
extend this, changing relationships, then these changes should be able to illustrate the 
movement of the social. If the social does not move, “it will leave no trace, it won’t be 
recorded in any sort of document” (Latour, 2007, p. 53). In the case of protest events in 
China, the movement of the social can be located in the development of concepts such as 
civic duty, the proliferation of censorship evasion tactics like using sanbu (stroll) in place 
of kangyi (protest), changing relationships between the people and officials marked by 
increased interactions and new laws, and the development of further censorship and other 
tactics to tamp down activists’ outbursts. Link and Qiang (2013) document these changes 
in their analysis of netizen slang, asserting that the  
Internet has become a quasi-public space where the dominance of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) is constantly being exposed, ridiculed, and criticized by 
waves of jokes, videos, songs, poems, jingles, fiction, sci-fi, code words, satire, and 
euphemisms. As a result, Chinese cyberspace has seen the emergence of a new 
political discourse. (pp. 79-80) 
 
These changes can be mapped through such new discourses. 
The territory we will enter is marked by chaos and awkwardness because “What is 
acting at the same moment in any place is coming from many other places, many distant 
materials, and many faraway factors” (Latour, 2007, p. 200). This creates a jumble of 
information that is, indeed, tedious to sort through but an appropriate one for studying 
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social movements and initiatives. According to Hathaway (2013), “cultivating an 
attentiveness to divergent strategies and actions” to “explore how social engagements are 
themselves generative of changing social formations” is a more productive route to take 
(p. 87). In his years of work with Chinese villagers in Xishuangbanna, Hathaway found 
that the studies conducted by organizations that relied on more arborescent models and 
methods fell short of explaining WWF’s (World Wildlife Foundation’s) impact on a local 
village (2013). Rather, by paying attention to the relationships and encounters between 
the people of the village, government officials, Westerners, and the WWF 
representatives, Hathaway (2013) finds that WWF’s project plans were not simply a 
matter of implementation in which the organization forced its will on local villagers, but 
rather “transformed through repeated encounters” with a variety of actants, including 
government officials, crops, and elephants in ways WWF reports could not assess (p. 
113). 
By the very nature of taking a networked approach, social movements come to be 
recognized as “complex social systems” (Diani, 2011, p. 351) that are the “product of the 
connection and interplay of all the agencies and structures implicated in the movement” 
(Sullivan & Xie, 2009, p. 427). In examining the environmental movements that are 
weaving new connections across China, what becomes apparent is that these movements 
are not linear, they are neither successes nor failures, they are not led by any one 
individual or organization. Rather, they are amorphous networks that grow and transform 
while also transforming political processes, physical spaces, and ecologies—of thought, 
method, societies, and movement. Social movements are, necessarily, composed of a 
series of success and failures that shift, enhance, and redirect the movement. 
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It is important to note that, within this networked perspective, individual agency does 
not exist as “the deliberate use of individual will toward specific aims” (Hathaway, 2013, 
p. 156). Rather, as Latour puts it, a whole concatenation of actors, events, and “things 
might authorize, allow, afford, encourage, permit, suggest, block, render possible, forbid, 
and so on” certain configurations to emerge, but not others (Latour, 2007, p. 72). 
Presthold (2008) describes this as cumulative agency, which theorizes agency in a more 
dispersed way that considers it not to be solely relegated to humans. Hathaway (2013) 
turns to cumulative agency as a “way of understanding change” because it “is reciprocal 
and does not assume a fixed sensibility or goal but...can nonetheless have powerful 
consequences, as the combination of a thousand small, seemingly insignificant acts” (p. 
157). The confluence of these seemingly insignificant acts is what I term force majeure. 
Force majeure refers to an “irresistible force or overwhelming power” (OED) or 
literally, in French, “superior strength.” It can also be translated as “force to be reckoned 
with,” and carries with it a sense of helplessness against such force. While I do not want 
to suggest helplessness is inherent in social movements of this nature, I do argue that the 
protests that occurred in Xiamen, Dalian, Maoming, and elsewhere can best be traced if 
treated as a force majeure in which human agency is flattened to be on par with the force 
of other events and objects. Force majeure becomes an apt term to use for several 
reasons. First, as was previously stated, human agency is deemphasized—a move also 
apparent in Latour’s (2007) adoption of a flat ontology, which is his way of “ensur[ing] 
that the establishment of any new link is clearly visible” by refusing to privilege human-
to-human relationships over other relationships between things (p. 16). Force majeure 
also precludes the idea that there is a higher force at play, for as it reads in an 
  
138 
Encyclopedia Britannica entry from 1902: “The expression ‘act of God’...is not 
synonymous with force majeure; but it includes every loss by force majeure in which 
human agency, by act or negligence, has had no [or little] part” (OED). Force majeure 
subverts the idea of autonomous human agency as the primary motivator of change. 
Second, force majeure when examined in context is often used to invoke that which 
causes contracts to become null and void. For example, a war, earthquake, civil war, or 
radioactive explosion may render a contract between two countries regarding the usage of 
a particular plot of land nullified. As a result, the parties would have to renegotiate any 
further relations. In cases of the protests erupting across China, the protest-as-force 
majeure also disrupts the relationships and interactions between the people and their 
government and shakes the existing dynamics. People protesting in the street void the 
previous contract of civility between citizens and their government and government 
officials void their contract with the public when they engage in corruption.  
To extend this further, in every case examined in this dissertation, the protests that 
occurred were illegal in that the people who marched in the streets did not obtain a permit 
from the government to hold a demonstration (or were refused it) and were warned not to 
participate by the authorities. The masses of people that flooded the streets and chanted 
were a force that broke numerous laws, but they did so in the face of the government’s 
own violations of legal procedures. In every case, the government did not complete 
required aspects of the sanctioned procedures for building a PX plant that include 
conducting an environmental impact statement (EIS), following requirements that dictate 
the distance such factories must be built from residential areas, and holding a public 
hearing in which residents weigh in on the decision. Thus, the protests themselves are a 
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force majeure that requires a renegotiation of the relationships and practices of the people 
and their officials in its wake. It represents the termination of life as it is and the opening 
up of new ways of civic engagement. 
Let us turn briefly to the 2014 protests in Maoming. The people of Maoming began 
protesting against a PX plant at the end of March. People flooded the town square, 
marched through the street, and the crowds of protestors drew even greater crowds of 
onlookers who flooded overpasses and balconies, bleeding together with demonstrators 
into ever larger masses of people. Video from the event shows the ebb and flow of 
activists as the police shouted through bullhorns and shot teargas into the crowds. People 
coalesced, moved backwards, dispersed, and wildly scattered only to reassemble again 
the next day. Images of the aftermath of one evening show the charred remnants of police 
posts still burning in the darkness.  
Local officials resisted caving to the protestors, the violence, the rumors, the press, 
and the hum and buzz that reverberated from the event for several days. They fought back 
against the protestors with censorship, pepper spray, and commands to “clear the field.” 
This rush to disperse people is typically employed when protests are seen as jeopardizing 
authority. Thus, “clear the field” also means that officials are panicked. However, 
protestors persisted in the face of danger, returning day after day to the streets. 
After an intermittent stream of violence, anger, attention, crowds, and chanting, local 
officials met with a group of citizens. Behind closed doors, officials and citizens 
discussed what would happen next, what would become of the planned PX project. When 
the doors reopened, officials announced that plans for the plant would be halted.  
In the interviews with protestors, evidence that this event altered relationships 
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between a number of actants can be found. For example, one protestor commented that 
after the demonstrations, his relationship with the air changed. Whereas previously he 
“thought it was nothing, if you just walk faster, it will be fine. Now we think: of course 
we should avoid this kind of pollution!” (Maoming interviewee 2, personal 
correspondence, 2015). The air has changed from something he can breathe without 
thinking into something that should be avoided, as something that can hurt all of the 
residents exposed to it.   
The protest also changed the relationship between the people and their government. 
According to another person who joined the event as an onlooker, the protests “awakened 
people so they came to know their rights; they had a civic awakening” (Maoming 
interviewee 3, personal correspondence, 2015). For him specifically, this protest also 
forged a new relationship between him and his surroundings so that he now pays more 
attention to environmental issues and sees the oil tankers on the road as a reminder of 
Maoming’s oil industry and the pollution it is causing. According to yet another witness 
involved in the protests, the events also continue to change the relationship between the 
people and their local and national media outlets. Decreased trust in public officials has 
led people to move from mass media to social media to find information about PX, the 
plans for the project, its level of threat, and what has happened in other places when 
people protested PX. The problem people must cope with is that “the contents of self-
produced-media [social media] always cater to the will and aspirations of ordinary 
people; they stand by the people’s point of view and express the ideas of the masses,” 
which usually consists of their suspicions toward authorities (Maoming interviewee 4, 
personal correspondence, 2015). 
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The local media, which could be seen as having a more objective viewpoint, also 
struggle with coverage because  
all the local media outlets never learned how to deal with reporting these mass 
incidents. So even though the media is very sympathetic to the protests, and they 
sincerely wanted to promote the healthy development of public opinion, [they] have 
no voice in the outside world.... [they] cannot obtain the public’s trust. (Maoming 
interviewee 4, personal correspondence, 2015) 
 
The altering of the relationship between people and the media can be traced through 
numerous threads, which will occur in depth in later chapters. For now, it suffices to say 
that the rampant corruption among local officials rendered any official accounts suspect.  
Through this cursory glance at the Maoming protests via participants, movement can 
be traced via the changes in various relationships. In subsequent chapters, I will more 
closely examine how treating the events in Xiamen, Dalian, and Maoming as a series of 
insignificant acts that coalesced to form a force majeure shifts the focus of the protest 
from deciding if the event was a success or failure to tracing connections and forces that 
mingled to create a schism between the people and their officials. It flattens the events in 
such a way that action is understood as something “not done under the full control of 
consciousness; action should rather be felt as a node, a knot, and a conglomerate of many 
surprising sets of agencies that have to be slowly disentangled” (Latour, 2007, p. 44). I 
turn to the protestors’ and witnesses’ reflections on their changing relationships because 







Wild Public Networks of Protest  
Turning to mass uprisings and their role in generating force that is reshaping the 
landscape of citizen participation and cultivating a whole new ecology of political 
participation can help to advance studies of China’s environmental movements. In tracing 
the movement that occurred after events like the ones that took place in Xiamen, Dalian, 
and Maoming, scholars are faced with the challenge 
to “follow the actors themselves”, that is try to catch up with their often wild 
innovations in order to learn from them what the collective existence has become in 
their hands, which methods they have elaborated to make it fit together, which 
accounts could best define the new associations that they have been forced to 
establish. (Latour, 2007, p. 12)  
 
Instead of “imposing some order beforehand,” per Latour (2007) I trace, and in tracing 
“find order much better after having let the actors deploy the full range of controversies 
in which they are immersed” (p. 23). The pathways and connections that have surfaced as 
the dust settles allow for the mapping of movement, and this is where Latour and McGee 
and DeLuca and Jaspers and others all ask us to turn. We must map the movement. 
This is why I have chosen to look into the deep tangle of traces that compose the 
events in Xiamen, Dalian, and Maoming and then link them together as an even larger 
tangle of events. This study seeks to foreground protests because they represent yet 
another component in China’s environmental movement, which is also tied to economic, 
social, and political reform. Certainly, this study will not be exhaustive, but it will help to 
unravel the force of protest that has made important changes in relationships across the 
country. As I turn to the protests events to examine people with a sign proclaiming their 
nationalism in one hand and an iPhone moving the protests outside their provincial 
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approaching these complex systems and sorting chaos.   
 
                                                
i	As is indicated in the definition for rational provided by the Oxford English Dictionary 
as “A rational being; spec. a human being, as opposed to an animal.” 
	
ii Much like film, public screens portray streams of information and “whatever the camera 
turns to, the audience accepts. We are transported to another world. As Rene Clair 
observed, the screen opens its white door into a harem of beautiful visions and adolescent 
dreams” that stray far from traditional textbook linearity and instead resemble erratic 
markings (McLuhan, 1964, p. 312). 
 
iii Though to privilege affect for the moment is warranted, to a degree, as it has been 
largely neglected in communication for years. 
 
iv Each quote is a separately listed definition of “wild” taken from the Oxford English 
Dictionary, italics in original. 
 









SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AS FORCE MAJEURE:  
XIAMEN’S 2007 PX PROTEST 
 
2007 was a landmark year in China. The coastal city of Xiamen made headlines in 
local, national, and international news outlets for a large-scale environmental protest 
against a proposed PX plant. Fearing their own safety and the safety of their children, 
their homes, and their environment, for 2 days, laborers, academics, farmers, industry 
workers, and students took to the streets en masse to protest plans to build a PX plant a 
mere 1.5 kilometers from the residential area of Haicang. At 8am on June 1 of that year, 
an estimated 10,000 people strolled through downtown Xiamen wearing yellow ribbons, 
holding banners, and some even donning gas masks. They shouted slogans and sang 
songs as they marched. Children walked alongside parents and grandparents. This 
gathering, although largely peaceful, caused leaders to shudder with the anxious fear that 
accompanies mass demonstrations in China. The result: local officials postponed plans 
for the PX plant. This event forced leaders to listen to the people. 
In the weeks and months that followed the protest, officials were forced to follow the 
rules they initially circumvented. “In contrast with their hitherto secretive and aloof 
behavior, the local Party-state moved to actively engage with citizens” by “agreeing to 
consider public complaints and comments via channels including emails, letters and 
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telephone calls” (Johnson, 2010, p. 440). Local officials also conducted an EIS and made 
an abridged version available for public comment. The EIS deemed the plant unsuitable 
for the proposed location. The people participated in the public input processes that 
followed. Within the first 24 hours of the mandatory 10-day consultation period, 
authorities received 691 phone calls and 1,250 emails (Johnson, 2010). An online poll 
launched by local officials made obvious that the majority of people were against the 
plant with 55,376 of the 58,454 votes cast opposing the project (Hung, 2013). The public 
hearing that occurred the December after the protests also exposed a majority opposition. 
Lu Zhangong, the current Party Secretary of Fujian Province at the time, commented “In 
the face of such public opposition, we need to enter into careful consideration of this 
project. We should look at the problem using the principles of the scientific view of 
development, democratic decision-making, and valuing public opinion” (as cited in 
Hung, 2013, p. 50). Officials proposed to move the plant to Zhangzhou shortly after the 
public hearing, which China’s Environment Protection Ministry approved in January 
2009. 
China scholar, Elizabeth Economy (2010), likened this protest to the 1989 Tiananmen 
Square protests in both size and significance. Press in China and the U.S. alike covered 
the event, framing it as a triumph for environmentalists. Chinese news outlets including 
Sina News and Xinhua News proclaimed it a “win-win” for the people of Xiamen and the 
government as well as an example of “cooperation between the people and the 
government” in which the two grew together (Hua, 2008, para. 1). In 2007, the “Xiamen 
people” were collectively named Southern Weekend’s “Person of the Year” (Du, 2013). 
The Xiamen protests were the first highly visible case in China in which the people used 
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social media to organize outrage to shut down plans for a plant and local officials 
acquiesced to the people’s demands. Xiamen’s triumph would eventually inspire other 
cities to oppose PX through protest as well. 
The story of Xiamen has been told and retold in both international and domestic 
newspapers and on blogs, BBSs, and social media. This is evidenced in the sheer volume 
of stories available about the protests. A Baidu search for “Xiamen PX protest” (“Xiamen 
PX kangyi”) in November of 2015 (conducted in China without a VPN) produced 
approximately two million results. The government could censor all of the information 
available online, but they do not. Though all of these results and iterations of Xiamen’s 
story exist, I want to tell the story of Xiamen yet again in a way that traces the wild 
public networks that made possible this uprising. This makes three major contributions to 
social movement scholarship. First, the Xiamen protests help to broaden the notion of 
protests as a composition of people with unified intentions because its participants were 
diversely motivated to engage in risky forms of protest. Instead of turning to discourses 
of unity, I consider them as assemblages so I can trace the complex concatenation of 
actors, events, and things that “might authorize, allow, afford, encourage, permit, suggest, 
block, render possible, forbid, and so on” the force majeure that would coalesce and erupt 
on the screens and streets of Xiamen (Latour, 2007, p. 72). In short, I am moving from 
protest as rational consensus to disorderly polysensus, which I define as disparate 
motivations. This move from consensus to polysensus allows scholars to 1) consider the 
diverse motivations of protestors and 2) include nonhuman actants and systems including 
mobile devices, computers, economics, housing prices, global media outlets, and notions 
of environmentalism and civic duty. These can be traced as concurrent forces that 
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coalesce in a cacophonous uproar. 
Second, I want to move scholars toward more networked analyses of protests that 
consider the various repercussions that follow in the wake of protests. Rather than assess 
protests based upon the goals intended by the assumed unified group of protestors, I 
propose taking a networked approach that considers the various ramifications that 
reverberate out from the event in unpredictable ways. In doing so, I am following 
McGee’s (1980) call to study social movements by tracing the movement of the social in 
many different directions. This is an invitation also taken up by DeLuca (1999), DeLuca, 
Lawson, and Sun (2012), and Enck-Wanzer (2006), who each favors more complex 
analyses of social movement. This method, I contend, is especially well suited for 
studying protest in China, where decentralized protests beget dispersed results.  
Finally, I want to explore the Xiamen protests as a force majeure to further elaborate 
on the concept. Protests as force majeure emphasize change over, through, and to wild 
public networks, which expand, contract, and shift in response to the force of mass 
uprisings. This move expands on Lim’s (2012) call to consider “movements over a broad 
geography and longer space of time” (p. 234). Furthermore, it emphasizes both the 
coalescing and aftermath of protests. This approach contemplates social media as “tools 
and spaces in which various communication networks that make up social movement 
emerge, connect, collapse, and expand” (Lim, 2012, p. 234). At the same time, it 
acknowledges the simultaneous flux of economic networks, expansion of environmental 





Social Movements, Cohesion, and Democracy 
In order to make this first move in which I shift from the treatment of protests as 
uprisings of unified actors to moving assemblages, I argue for a move away from framing 
social movements as 1) largely cohesive phenomenon and 2) always leading to Western 
style democracy. First, let us look at the tendency to emphasize cohesion in social 
movements, when they are often rather fragmented. The mainstream media is accustomed 
to defining a movement by locating its objective and leaders, and then assuming that all 
of the people involved have chosen to participate because they support a particular set of 
goals. For example, the Keystone XL pipeline protests were portrayed in the media as 
united fronts of various disparate groups, including Native American nations and college 
students who wanted to protect a piece of land by stopping the PX pipeline from being 
built. The ENGO 350.org largely led the movement, with an official spokesperson—Bill 
McKibben—at the helm. Organizations used social media to organize people to protest, 
encourage peaceful resistance, and guide participant’s behavior when arrest was likely. 
During the protests, which were held in the nation’s capitol, Washington, DC, McKibben 
and others frequently took to the podium to make speeches and unite the crowd in 
common opposition. In some cases, protestors were arrested, but violence never broke 
out between the participants and police.  
The people were portrayed as unified. This is typical in both mainstream media and 
academic essays. For example, in his essay on the Keystone XL protests, Hestres (2014) 
analyzes the movement through public figures, organizations, and instrumental goals. In 
describing the two groups that eventually merged—350.org and 1Sky—he focuses on 
their stated objectives and those who stood behind them. He then moves to emphasize the 
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group of actors most likely to be active in the movement and their “near-unanimous 
consensus...about the ideal target of both organizations’ communication and mobilization 
efforts” (Hestres, 2014, p. 329). This analysis does not present a complex social system. 
Instead, it focuses on simplified readings of the events without taking into consideration 
the various factors at play that made possible this particular protest at this time. Many 
other questions could help to provide insights into the study of social movements. For 
example, the Keystone XL pipeline was not the only pipeline under construction, so why 
did groups focus on it rather than a different pipeline? What forces outside of 
organizations made possible this movement? Did the social move? If so, how? 
Though McGee (1980) cautioned against assuming a “correspondence between one’s 
membership in an organization and one’s universe of attitudes and beliefs,” there is still 
an assumption made in contemporary social movement studies that participation in a 
movement reveals a particular set of beliefs (p. 235). Furthermore, these sets of beliefs 
are often associated with a particular trajectory of movement often labeled as progress 
toward democracy. This is problematic because, as McGee (1980) puts it, using the term 
“social movement(s)” as a phenomenon “causes us to order social and historical facts 
such that we can maintain the illusion of ‘morality,’ ‘purpose,’ and ‘destiny’” (p. 237), 
which limits scholarship. Certainly, as will become evident below, the 2007 Xiamen 
protests were not pure in terms of morality or purpose. However, there is a continued 
trend in social movement scholarship to focus on ordering social movements as unified 
and pure rather than detailing the polysensus that often characterizes them or the 
complicated coalescing networks that make possible the eruption of protest. 
Lim (2012) emphasizes unity in her definition of social movements “as networks of 
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people brought together by a common goal or interest” (p. 234), which tames the 
wildness of social movements. Similarly, in Chavez’s (2011) piece, she focuses on how 
disparate groups of people “connect issues and minimize divisions where divisions might 
otherwise be expected,” thereby focusing on consensus rather than disparity in 
motivations (p. 14). As Phillips (1996), Ranciere (2010), and others have argued, 
dissensus is an important characteristic of democracy. I extend that to consider 
polysensus and an important component for consideration in moving the social.  
However, polysensus is largely overlooked in protests. Rather, the trend toward 
cohesion can be witnessed in Asenas et al. (2012), wherein the authors do acknowledge 
divergent opinions, but the actors ultimately came to a consensus via in-person group 
meetings and discussions (or deliberative processes). This emphasis on unity and 
reaching consensus, while an important component, overlooks diverse (and sometimes 
self-serving) intentions, which are often discounted components of many social 
movements. Though some analyses do acknowledge disparities in motivation (see 
Brouwer, 1998; Cloud, 2009), they deserve more attention and elaboration.  
Furthermore, I argue that the focus on consensus and unity (unwittingly) transforms 
disparate groups into a collective/individual actor that then creates change, which is 
problematic if we are taking a truly poststructuralist approach wherein the idea of the 
individual human actor as singular change agent is problematic (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1987; Latour, 2007). The notion of humans as individual change agents overlooks the 
amorphous networks that connect humans to the land on which they reside, the changing 
political systems, the cumulative agency of smartphones, social media platforms, and the 
one child policy. This is why I turn to assemblages, which take into consideration 
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nonhuman actants and networks. Tracing social movement—which is what McGee 
(1980) asks us to do—through assemblages opens up space for a more nuanced analysis 
of the competing interests that compose social movement. It also moves scholars away 
from individual agency to Presthold’s (2008) notion of cumulative agency, which 
theorizes agency in a more dispersed way that considers not only diverse motives, but 
also nonhuman actants. 
The second issue at hand is the tendency to implicitly or explicitly assume that social 
movement is always moving toward Western style democracy (Hartnett , 2011, 2013). 
While I do argue that the protests in China are transforming the relationships between the 
people and their government, I do not assume that the changes occurring will result in a 
transition to Western forms of democracy. Rather, I agree with Xin (1993), who argues 
that the public sphere is being “insufficiently operationalized” then applied to “the 
Chinese case,” with little to no explanatory power (pp. 51-52). As such, scholars “run the 
risk of getting involved in an ideological or teleological exercise in which the Western 
model of development is merely projected onto China,” instead of seeing China in terms 
of China (Xin, 1993, pp. 52). Habermas’ (1991) theory of the public sphere, which 
explicitly privileges deliberative democracy, has directed thinking about social change, 
but this framework is not universally applicable. However, numerous contemporary 
studies of social change in China are chained to the development of a public sphere, 
arguing that its emergence signals democracy is imminent (Lagerkvist, 2006; Rankin, 
1993; Yang & Calhoun, 2007). 
I argue that the public sphere is ill suited for social movement studies in China, first, 
because it privileges order and rationality, making accommodating the decentralized 
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networked protests occurring throughout the country difficult. This tendency to privilege 
order is evident in the repeated focus on NGOs in discussions of environmentalism in 
China (Tang & Zhan, 2008; Yang, 2005; Yang & Calhoun, 2007; Zhan & Tang, 2013). 
As a result of this emphasis, protests are left largely understudied and undertheorized, 
despite the fact that they are widespread and influential, with between 250 and 500 
protests occurring each day across China, most of them environmentally driven (Human 
Rights Watch, 2013). To overlook these protests wherein tens of thousands of people take 
to the street without leadership is to neglect the events that are transforming the ways in 
which people are interacting with their government. 
The second reason a Habermasian notion of the public sphere is problematic is that it 
privileges rationality. Assuming a democratic trajectory is problematic for scholars 
studying the movement of the social, but another major issue also emerges. The particular 
form of deliberative democracy proposed by Habermas leaves “aside a central element, 
which is the crucial role, played by passions and emotions” (Mouffe, 2000, p. 10). 
Mouffe takes issue with Habermasian deliberative democracy in numerous publications 
(Laclau & Mouffe, 2001; 2000, 2009, 2013), and its privileging of rational arguments: 
“the prime task of democratic politics is not to eliminate passions from the sphere of the 
public, in order to render a rational consensus possible, but to mobilize those passions 
towards democratic designs” (2000, p. 16). People will never be able to divorce 
themselves from affective allegiances, which is why she puts forward a new model of 
democratic practice she terms “agonistic pluralism.” In so doing, Mouffe (2009) 
highlights the dissent and democratic contestation that is so essential to “the multiplicity 
of voices that contemporary pluralist societies encompass” (p. 105). Her point is well 
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made and necessary to contemplate the transformations occurring in a country like China. 
This dissensus Mouffe speaks of is also inherent in the movement of the social, as 
multiplicities of voices moved by passions, emotions, as well as scientific arguments all 
end up on the same protest route, shout similar slogans, and hold banners.  
The importance of emotion and passions as rhetorical force is apparent in 
communication studies in discussions of violence. As Harold and DeLuca’s (2005) study 
of the images of Emmett Till’s mutilated corpse make evident, violent acts can advance 
“an explicitly rhetorical agenda” (p. 268). In the cases of the protests discussed in this 
dissertation, violence is both the result and cause of affective reactions that draw ever 
increasing numbers of protestors to the streets and stoke further opposition. Violence and 
the anger that it incites is inherently messy and moves people in ways that rational 
arguments cannot. Fan et al. (2014) made this apparent in their research, which found that 
anger was the emotion that spread most rapidly across Weibo.  
Thus, we must map erratic networks teeming with varied voices rather than trace only 
solidarity. We can acknowledge and follow affect and violence as powerful rhetorical 
forces. We can move away from assuming that deliberative democracy is the inevitable 
end goal, thus allowing for other political possibilities. As a number of scholars have 
argued, deliberative democracy may not be the ideal system for environmentalism (Zhang 
& Barr, 2013). Take, for example, the air pollution that strikes Salt Lake City, Utah, 
every year. Though scientific studies have shown that 38% of the dangerous particulate 
matter that collects in the city’s valley comes from cars and trucks, people have not yet 
united to place restrictions on driving during heavily polluted days (Dinha, 2013). The 
democratic system can function to protect individual interests over the common good.  
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This is not to say that socialism is environmentally friendly. China’s brand of 
socialism has also created widespread environmental crises via poorly thought out 
directives such as the ones Mao put in place. China’s turn to capitalist practices has also 
wreaked havoc on the environment. The proliferation of government backed State Owned 
Enterprises (SOE) tied to oil and chemical industries makes opposition to such polluting 
projects increasingly difficult, for people are simultaneously battling the industry and the 
State. Ultimately, neither democracy nor socialism inherently privileges the environment. 
In fact, their dependence on economic growth has made environmental degradation 
profitable in the short term. 
By tracing a more complex movement of the social, I am actively opening up space 
for considering new forms of government emerging in China without trying to name it. 
Though the transformations in government have been theorized by a number of China 
scholars and policy watchers (MacKinnon, 2011; Teets, 2013), I argue these scholars are 
too quick to name a new form of government. This move to name the changes curtails 
possibilities for future movement. Thus, this dissertation does not seek to identify and 
name a new governmental system. Rather, I am tracing movements and changes. In order 
to consider more seriously social movements in China outside of Western ideals, I 
propose examining the protest in terms of assemblages. 
 
Assembling Assemblages and Wild Public Networks 
In this chapter, I explicitly use Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) concept of assemblages 
to guide the analysis. By turning to assemblages, I am tracing amorphous components of 
wild public networks. In analyzing the 2007 Xiamen protests, I looked to historical texts 
  
155 
about Xiamen, news reports in Chinese and U.S. outlets, online blogs, and 
communication with protest participants. These resources consider human and nonhuman 
influences and systems as I trace the movement of the social.  
According to Deleuze and Guattari (1987), assemblages are multiplicities that are 
always connected to other assemblages. They are constituted by “elements (or 
multiplicities) of several kinds: human, social, and technical machines, organized molar 
machines; molecular machines with their particles of becoming-inhuman.... Each of us is 
caught up in an assemblage of this kind” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 36). Humans, 
smartphones, social media platforms, and media outlets all coalesce as assemblages. 
Importantly, such assemblages are also always in motion: “assemblages are in constant 
variation, are themselves constantly subject to transformations” (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1987, p. 82). They do not stand still, but morph and extend, grow and recede, 
crisscrossing to form wild public networks. Looking at events such as protest in terms of 
assemblages allows scholars to map the movement of the social by tracing the composite 
of forces, or assemblages without being tied to cohesive motives or specific democratic 
assumptions. This way of looking, this ontological framework, makes space for 
considering both eruptions (here, in the form of protest) as well as “the combination of a 
thousand small, seemingly insignificant acts” as all contributing to the movement of the 
social (Hathaway, 2013, p. 157). 
For the purposes of this chapter, I trace three overlapping and intermingling 
assemblages: the political/academic/economic assemblage, the global/digital media 
assemblage, and the environmental crisis/civic duty assemblage. I chose these 
assemblages because they were important components linked to fomenting the protest 
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and assemblages that were altered in its wake. Within and among these assemblages, the 
economy, online access, chemical plants, text messages, mobile networks, and 
communist ideals weave together. Before I delve into the assemblages, I first want to 
offer a brief background on Xiamen to help set the stage for the subsequent sections. 
 
Xiamen as an International Network 
Xiamen is a small island on the southern coast of China in Fujian Province. It has an 
international feel to it, which stems from its past. In the early 1800s, Xiamen was an 
important entry point for opium, which brought with it foreign dealers and revenue. After 
opium was made illegal, many traders continued to smuggle the product in through 
Xiamen, which forged new paths of trade along the same lines. Xiamen was an important 
place of convergence.  
In 1842, after the first Opium War, the British forced the Chinese to open Xiamen as 
one of the first five foreign treaty ports in China. As a result, Xiamen remained a place of 
trade for not only international goods, but international culture as well. In the subsequent 
decades, which witnessed a great deal of war and change, Xiamen was invaded and 
occupied, largely due to its location on China’s periphery as well as its importance as a 
place of traffic and trade. After the Communist Party took over in 1949, they invested 
significant resources in Xiamen to make it part of the mainland by building a bridge in 
1956 and connecting it the same year via rail. In 1980, the government designated 
Xiamen as one of four Special Economic Zones. Its coastal location and livability were 
seen as lures for foreign trade and investment (Ansfield, 2013). As a result, tourism, 
trade, and real estate grew to become important components of Xiamen’s economy. 
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Understanding Xiamen’s draw is easy; the town has the air of a tropical paradise.  
Xiamen is a city characterized by massive banyan trees and lush gardens, one where 
the University sits adjacent to a Buddhist temple, where the sounds of chanting monks 
meet the calls of vendors selling plump mangoes from their carts outside the gates, and 
where lush tropical trees thrive in an atmosphere saturated with moisture. Xiamen 
University itself is more like a garden than a campus with fruit trees lining the sidewalks. 
In autumn, the branches hang so heavy with fruit that students can pick their offerings on 
the way to class. Adjacent to the university is the Wanshi Botanical Garden, which is 
home to approximately 6,300 different kinds of tropical and subtropical plants and 20 
different ecological zones. The park is expansive, covering over 2.3 square kilometers 
with winding trails that meander through the dense green foliage. At the edge of the 
skyscrapers that congregate at one area of the coast are expansive stretches of white sand. 
The coastline is combed every evening to remove debris washed up by the waves or left 
by careless tourists so swimmers who arrive the next morning to plunge into the ocean 
are met with a clean beach. The boardwalk that traces the ocean seems to go on forever as 
do the wide bike lanes that flank the roads. Recycling bins are neatly placed along the 
boardwalk and tourists can rent bikes to explore the city. Xiamen has become a popular 
destination for domestic and international travelers and, over the years, it has also 
flourished as a place for destination weddings. During one of my visits to Xiamen, I 
counted no less than two dozen couples having their wedding photos taken along 
Xiamen’s stretches of beach in one afternoon. 
Gulangyu Island, which sits across from Xiamen, is a small island that came to house 
the foreign settlers after Xiamen became an important treaty port. After the first Opium 
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Wars, a dozen different foreign consulates were built on the island and the missionaries 
who settled there built their own churches. Chinese who had made fortunes overseas also 
returned to the island and built British style mansions with walled gardens. According to 
Brown (2005), a U.S. citizen who was stationed at Gulangyu and then made Xiamen his 
home, authors such as Hutchinson “wrote that Gulangyu had more wealthy people than 
anywhere on earth except Pasadena, California” in the 1920s (p. 4).  
As a result, Gulangyu has a very unique feel. As visitors today stroll the streets, they 
will confront vendors selling trinkets outside of European houses and pass by Buddhist 
temples and Christian churches on the same street. Known as the “Garden of the Sea,” 
Gulangyu has become a popular tourist destination renowned for its green space. Visitors 
can take a ferry across the strait to explore the mansions and gardens via meandering 
walkways and quiet streets. The narrow and steep roads that run between the walled 
gardens were never meant for wheeled traffic and, to this day, bikes and cars are not 
allowed on the island.  
The Xiamen that exists today is the result of a concatenation of factors that made the 
emergence of an environmentally minded city possible. The economic priorities 
encouraged by Xiamen’s designation as a Special Economic Zone made housing and 
tourism a priority for the city over industry. The influx of international residents that 
settled over the routes forged via opium, the tea trade, and war created a community in 
which diverse and disparate sets of values flowed and circulated within the boundaries of 
the city. The space created by the protests in 2007 further influenced what Xiamen could 
become. The tumultuous shift in power from officials to an assemblage made of 
academics, migrant workers, investors, environmentalists, citizens, and officials had 
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dramatic and diverse repercussions for the land, people, and policies. The force majeure 
that occurred continues to have repercussions on China’s contemporary environmentally 
driven protests. In the next sections, I will trace the assemblages that coalesced to erupt 
into a mass movement. 
 
Xiamen’s Political/Academic/Economic Assemblage 
 Xiamen University was founded in 1921 by an overseas Chinese businessperson. 
Since then, Xiamen University (XU) has flourished. In the 1990s, XU and was selected to 
participate in the central government’s Project 211 and Project 985. Project 211 is an 
initiative developed in 1995 as part of China’s fifth Nine Year Plan (1996-2000) aimed at 
facilitating the development of higher education alongside social and economic 
developments. As a result of the defunding and delegitimization of science during Mao’s 
regime, a great deal of work was needed to rehabilitate science related fields and higher 
education, especially if China wanted to be competitive internationally. Thus, China 
began investing heavily in higher education. Just a few years later on May 4, 1998 (a 
symbolic date referencing the May 4 Movement), then President Jiang Zemin launched 
Project 985 in order to develop “first-rate universities of international advanced level” 
(“Project 211 and 985,” 2016, para. 5). In 2004, the program expanded to include Xiamen 
University. The influx of money helped fund research centers, upgrade facilities, hold 
international conferences, and attract world renowned scholars to campus with higher 
salaries and better resources. On their website, Xiamen University boasts 2,601 fulltime 
faculty and professional researchers, 10 research institutes and research centers, and a 
number of scholars and former students who have since achieved international accolades. 
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The economic boost to the XU played a major role in its development and trajectory.  
Xiamen University’s presence and status has, in turn, helped to diversify the 
surrounding city by bringing in academics from some of China’s top universities as well 
as well-educated students from across the country. As the school has grown, so too has 
the number of academics, scientists, lawyers, and engineers living in the island city. This 
then impacted the socioeconomic makeup of the city, bringing in ideas, talent, and money 
from surrounding areas and diversifying the city’s intellectual makeup.  
As academics moved to Xiamen in more recent decades, they entered an environment 
in which real estate prices were steadily rising. After Xiamen was designated a Special 
Economic Zone, Deputy Mayor Wang Jinshui’s goal was to develop “industry while 
concurrently managing tourism, trade and real estate,” which he did (Zhang, 1986, para. 
7). In just 5 years (1990-1995), Xiamen doubled the number of tourists to the island, over 
doubled the average local income, attracted important and lucrative international business 
contracts, and developed “390,000 square metres of workshops and luxury living quarters 
for overseas business people” (Zhang, 1986, para. 13). Thus, academics and others 
entering the Xiamen real estate scene had to invest a great deal to afford real estate in this 
up and coming city. For a number of buyers, purchasing a home in Xiamen meant that 
they were investing decades upon decades of family savings. Unlike most U.S. 
homebuyers who take out loans to finance their property acquisitions, Chinese investors 
often pay for homes up front with savings passed down from generation to generation. 
Moreover, the home they do buy is seen as an investment for the their child’s future and 
will remain in the family.  By passing it down to one’s daughter or son, the family is 
helping to secure a better future for their child and grandchild. Furthermore, because 
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China has had a one child policy up until the end of 2015, passing down a substantial 
inheritance that would accrue in value is extraordinarily important. This is imperative to 
understand as I discuss the weeks and months preceding the protests. 
I term these intersecting circumstances the political/academic/economic assemblage 
because, as will come to light over the course of this chapter, the university, political 
circumstances, and the economy overlap in ways that are crucial to the provocation of 
Xiamen’s force majeure. Furthermore, combining these together emphasizes how 
changes in the intellectual makeup of the city impacted the economic circumstances and 
how the political events provided opportunities to garner support, forming an important 
force in the Xiamen protests. This method also helps to provide a foundation for thinking 
of the events that would follow as an accumulation of agency.  
The forces that compose this assemblage are evident in how the protests were 
provoked. First, Dr. Zhao Yufen, a Taiwanese professor of chemical biology at Xiamen 
University who also has an appointment at Tsinghua University (China’s top science 
university), discovered plans for the PX project before they were highly publicized. She 
was privy to the information for certain reasons that will become clear later in this paper. 
Zhao did not want the plant to be built in Xiamen and took the proposal, along with her 
objections, to the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC) in Beijing, China’s top advisory body. This conference coincided 
with the National People’s Congress conference, which is the highest law-making body 
in China. This dual meeting attracted a great deal of media attention in China because 
those watching wanted to know which new laws would be passed.  
Zhao was well aware that, in bringing up this issue, it would gain nationwide 
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attention. She was also aware of her authority as an academic in the sciences as a member 
of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Since most attendees were unaware of what PX 
was, Zhao’s framing of it would carry a great deal of weight. Thus, she was armed with 
important information, and her status as a member guaranteed her voice would be heard. 
Zhao knew that the plans for the PX plant violated federal laws dictating the distance it 
needed to be built from residential areas. According to Zhao, PX has been linked to birth 
defects, nervous system damage, and cancer, and would endanger Xiamen citizens. Her 
case, by appealing to the laws set forth by the central government and backed by her 
scientific standing as a professor of chemical biology, was a strong one. Moreover, she 
had the political and academic standing to bring it to the central authorities by submitting 
a petition that was signed by 105 CPPCC signatures to suspend and relocate the project 
(Hung, 2013). Zhao’s petition, ultimately, was not supported, but the issue had garnered 
media attention. 
This information made headlines in the China Business newspaper via an article titled 
“Dispute over the Safety of the Xiamen PX Plant” on March 18, 2007, but local Xiamen 
news outlets were not able to carry the story. Zhao’s framing of PX as extremely 
dangerous drove the coverage. Eventually, through blogs, BBSs, and word of mouth, 
information trickled into Xiamen. Once word began spreading about the proposed PX 
factory and the potential dangers that accompanied it, word also spread that housing 
prices would drop across the island should the factory be built. This meant that real estate 
agents’ salaries would plummet and those who had bought houses in Xiamen would 
potentially lose a portion or all of their family’s investment. Their children would have 
nothing. This loss also threatened investors from Hong Kong and other surrounding areas 
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who had purchased real estate in Xiamen. Panicked and angered, this new population of 
well educated middle class Xiameners was quick to oppose the plant. Online blogs 
warning of the impending housing market drop fueled their outrage. Homeowners 
gathered together and petitioned the local government to cancel plans for the plant, but 
their request on paper was met with silence (china.org.cn, 2008). The channels intended 
to handle citizens concerns was, for all intents and purposes, nonfunctional in this case.  
Plans for a PX plant drew the attention of Dr. Zhao, who had been recruited to 
Xiamen University to teach and research. Her presentation of her academic assessment of 
the proposal and of PX at a major national conference ignited opposition at the local and 
national levels. The potential impact on the local economy that had been built through 
political initiatives created unrest among those who now depended upon the industries 
created by Xiamen’s designation as a Special Economic Zone. The information flowed 
between and among academics, real estate agents, and politicians via the global/digital 
media assemblage, which I will discuss next. 
 
The Global/Digital Media Assemblage 
Interwoven through the political/academic/economic assemblage is the global/digital 
media assemblage, which had been forming new connections between people for over a 
decade when the protests took place, linking people in Xiamen to one another, media 
outlets, and international reporters. Tracing this assemblage helps to make apparent the 
networks that were forming to carry information and how they moved information within 
the political/academic/economic assemblage.  
In 1994, Chinese Internet users were introduced to Bulletin Board Systems (BBSs), 
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which quickly developed in popularity, in part, because they allowed users to post and 
comment anonymously, which meant “members tend[ed] to be frank on sensitive issues 
and users no longer [relied] on the elite or intelligentsia to represent them, but [tried] to 
make their own voice heard” (Ye, Sarrica, & Fortunati, 2014, p. 890). Unlike English 
language users who largely abandoned BBSs with the advent of social media, BBSs 
continued to be “extremely popular in China, where they have attained a surprising level 
of sophistication” (Kuo, 2009, para. 8). Part of this popularity is driven by commerce. 
Businesses find them to be an important tool in gauging user attitudes toward their 
products. In fact, by the January of 2009, 80% of the 1.5 million commercial websites 
had a BBS attached, and these boards were often the most visited part of the site (Kuo, 
2009). Users also participate on BBSs to air grievances, talk politics, and complain about 
local issues. China’s  
BBS forums go beyond online boundaries and have a profound influence on Chinese 
society by prompting political engagement and challenging traditional social or 
cultural ideologies, as well as creating spaces that nourish civility and social bonding. 
(Ye et al., 2014, p. 890)  
 
BBSs allowed users to connect and share in different ways, which caused an explosion of 
chatter and participation. As Hung (2013) argues, “We are now witnessing citizen 
journalists and bloggers...increasingly providing a prompt and interactive platform for the 
expression of public and elite opinion to be exchanged, disseminated, and debated” (p. 
44). By 2007, Xiamen, which was home to a large number of middle class residents who 
had access to computers, had a healthy contingency of bloggers and users who 
consistently posted and read BBSs, including local boards like “Xiamen House” and 
“Xiamen Fish.” This is where citizens discussed local issues and engaged in debates. 
Lian Yue (the pen name of writer and social critic, Zhong Xiaoyong), one of the most 
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well-known and widely read local Netizens at the time, interacted with other bloggers and 
users and played an important role in stoking the PX controversy online. He brought the 
news that was released in China Business to Xiamen. Lian Yue was clear in his 
opposition to the plant and encouraged his fellow citizens “to break the information 
blockade and to save themselves” (Hung, 2013, p. 46). He penned a list of 12 measures, 
which included the following: “Do not be afraid. Discussing the...[PX] proposal is not a 
crime; you will not get arrested,” “If you have a blog or visit BBS often, please post this 
news by China Business, entitled ‘Dispute over the Safety of the Xiamen PX Plant,’” and 
“This is a chemical plant opposed by 105 CPPCC members, some of whom are 
authorities” (quoted in Hung, 2013, p. 46). He encouraged discussion, provided readers 
with information via the China Business article, and let people know CPPCC members 
supported Xiamen. Lian made information that was unavailable via traditional media 
outlets accessible and the people were reading and engaging with him online. One 
resident was quoted as saying “He is our spiritual support” (china.org.cn, 2008, para. 41). 
At the time of Lian’s post in March 2007, many people had yet to hear of the PX 
plant and the dangers it posed for citizens. After this and many subsequent posts and after 
people shared stories and reports in chat rooms and on message boards, awareness grew 
exponentially. The people of Xiamen did tell their friends and family, who told their 
friends and family. Awareness spilled from blogs to street corners. Opposition grew and 
could grow because the pathways forged by the Internet linked people who would 
otherwise never meet. It also helped spread information that would never have been 
printed in official local newspapers or magazines. It linked people to a story in China 
Business that was not making it into newsstands in Xiamen. The Internet networks were 
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integral to disseminating information in an environment in which the media is state 
controlled. Yes, the government also monitored the Internet, but the people were 
generating the content in an environment in which the laws were ambiguous and users 
were anonymous.  
These networks “provided individual Chinese citizens various horizontal digital 
communication networks, enabling them to initiate discussion and conduct deliberation 
regardless of spatial and temporal limitations” (Liu, 2015, p. 570). Overlapping 
relationships between groups of people helped move the information. According to 
O’Brien and Stern (2008), “In difficult circumstances, prior ties take the place of more 
formal structures and reduce barriers to participation ‘by opening channels for 
uncensored materials to circulate [and] diffusing the risks of association’” (p. 17). 
Information flowed through guanxi networks, linking bloggers, academics, real estate 
agents, students, and government workers. 
In this case, the existence of an infrastructure of Internet users was an important 
component of the assemblage that made possible the circulation of materials and, 
ultimately, social movement. Many of the interviewees emphasized the importance of the 
Internet in spreading information and awareness. According to one interviewee, “On the 
Internet there was a ton of small group discussion about PX, a lot of people left 
comments there” (Xiamen interviewee, personal communication, 2014). Comments as 
such make apparent the fact that people were not only reading expert opinions, but also 
asking questions and participating in the discussions with peers. Another interviewee 
stated simply, “All of the news concerning PX was online” and that is where a lot of 
people went (Xiamen interviewee, personal communication, 2014) while another asserted 
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that “[The Internet] played a leading role... all of the news was posted online and could 
be obtained there” (Xiamen interviewee, personal communication, 2014). 
This high level of participation on BBS is corroborated in official statistics. In 2008, 
just a year after the protests, 98.2 million Chinese citizens visited BBSs, 96% spent at 
least 1 hour a day on BBSs, and 98% of users participated on these platforms (IWOM, 
2008). In this dispersed network, hundreds of nodes were disseminating and connecting 
information simultaneously and rhizomatically, thereby weaving around and through the 
hierarchical government controlled media and creating new networks. 
The lack of information in local media outlets was suspicious. Even if residents did 
want to learn about PX, little information could be obtained via traditional media. Not 
until May 29, 2007, did the Xiamen Evening News publish a report that included 
interviews with the city’s local Environmental Protection Bureau. The gates were then 
opened and local media released a rush of propaganda that touted the PX project as an 
economic windfall for Xiamen residents. This one way propaganda push further moved 
discussions online, where people could communicate freely. The global/digital media 
assemblage expanded and exploded, creating new channels and pathways by which 
information could travel. 
 
Affect Over the Global/Digital Media Assemblage 
As was discussed above via Mouffe, in investigating political arguments, 
communication scholars must consider the force of affective appeals. These can be traced 
on blogs and forums including Lian’s posts, which included important scientific 
information, but also affective pleas. One such example was his warning to residents that 
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if they took no action and allowed the PX plant to be built, they would be “considered 
weak and dim-witted” (Hung, 2013, p. 46). Other affective appeals proliferated in chat 
rooms and on QQ, but the most potent affective appeal was disseminated via text 
message. 
As of 2007, mobile phones had spread widely and the middle class people of Xiamen 
were pulling them out of pockets and purses regularly to call and text. When the 
following text message was sent out on May 25, 2007, it spread like wildfire leaping 
from one flip phone to the next: 
The Taiwan-funded Xianglu Group has begun building a PX plant. It is like an atomic 
bomb in Xiamen. Many people will suffer leukemia and more babies will be born with 
congenital defects. A paraxylene project should be at least 100 kilometers from a 
major urban settlement, but we are only 16 kilometers from the project. For the sake 
of our future generation, please forward the message to all your friends to 
demonstrate in the streets on 1 June 2007. (“Xiamen people vs. chemical plant,” 
2008, emphasis added) 
 
And forward they did. This message was repeated more than one million times via text 
message and echoed on blogs, reaching the majority of Xiamen’s 1.5 million residents 
(Landsberg, 2007). It spread so far so fast that it could not be censored or stopped. This 
inflammatory text message, which was an exaggeration of scientific findings, became a 
force that moved people to gather in the streets on June 1, 2007 and drew the attention of 
government officials, panicked by the threat of a mass movement. 
The conversations about PX and a potential protest, which were effortlessly moving 
across city, provincial, and national borders, drew reporters from Hong Kong, Australia, 
and the U.S. to report on the gathering. Those from other cities in China could follow the 
protests in real time by checking blogs for updates. One post read: “There’s at least over 
10,000 people here, the march is on! People keep joining in along the way, the procession 
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keeps getting longer. More and more people can be seen wearing yellow ribbons” 
(Kennedy, 2007, para. 11). Some U.S. reporters were present at the march, and brought 
news of the event and images to U.S. outlets (Cody, 2007; Landsberg, 2007; Martinsen, 
2007). Unable to ignore it as information spread via blogs and BBSs across the country, 
some state-sanctioned mass media also covered the event.  
As time passed, the story kept extending and multiplying and moved from city to city 
from mouth to mouth and phone to phone. As social media spread, the legend of 
Xiamen’s success began to travel across these new networks via affective intensities, 
helping to incite protests against PX projects as well as garbage incinerators, wastewater 
pipelines, and nuclear power plants in cities far from Xiamen’s shores. Xiamen’s story, 
though it took on many different iterations and details as it traveled, transported one 
fundamental idea: protestors in large numbers could interrupt government plans.   
 
Environmental Crisis/Civic Duty assemblage 
As the political/academic/economic assemblage increasingly overlapped with the 
global/digital media assemblage and began extending its tendrils beyond campus and 
high priced highrises into the neighborhoods of Haicang (the proposed neighborhood for 
the plant), a new awareness began to blossom in Xiamen that connected civic duty to 
environmental protection. Many residents of Xiamen grew up in a society in which the 
Confucian values of working together and providing together were deeply ingrained. 
Chinese culture has long promoted a commitment to the collective, or a sense of civic 
duty (gongmin yiwu) discussed in Chapter Three, which instills the practice and belief 
that one must be willing to sacrifice on the individual level for the greater good. This 
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became connected to environmental protection with the simultaneous rise of the middle 
class and widespread environmental degradation. As people had the resources to pull 
themselves out of poverty, they also cultivated the level of awareness necessary to 
recognize the impacts of industrial pollution. In Xiamen, where there was a larger 
contingency of middle class residents, this level of awareness was particularly high. 
Many of the interviewees gestured to this sense of civic duty, saying that this sense of 
civic duty drove their participation in the protests rather than a more specific variety of 
environmentalism. Environmental protection was seen as necessary for the greater good. 
Blogger Lian Yue pointed this out when he wrote: “Xiamen citizens have a stronger 
sense of environmental protection” (Landsberg, 2007, para. 6). He was right, as is 
evidenced by respondent’s testimony that the people of Xiamen are, generally speaking, 
more highly educated and have a higher degree of civic awareness. The connection 
between a commitment to civic duty and environmental protection is also evidenced by 
the existence and strong presence of a local ENGO—Xiamen Green Cross.  
By 2007, Xiamen had long been home to Xiamen Green Cross (XGC), which is 
recognized today as an important and influential organization led my Ma Tiannan (also 
known as Ma Azure). Though not “official” until 2007, the organization had been 
operating informally since 1999 in response to a typhoon that hit Xiamen’s coasts that 
year. Since then, it has developed to become an organization that coordinates events to 
encourage recycling, discourages driving, and works to keep Xiamen’s waterways clean. 
In addition to engaging the community on the ground, XGC’s mission is to influence 
policymaking that promotes greener lifestyles. XGC has previously launched or 
participated in a number of different environmental and climate protection campaigns and 
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projects, including Island Care Day (2000–2013); Green Commuting and Low Carbon 
Action (2006–2013); the Energy-Saving Campaign (2008); the Climate Change and Low-
Carbon Economy Project; and, the Law-Based Environmental Advocacy Project (2012–
2013) (Kuhn, 2014). XGC has been recognized for its work in the form of grants and 
awards, including a Ford Motor Conservation and Environmental Grant (2006); the China 
Youth Toyota Environmental Protection Award for Excellence (2006); and the Ford 
Motor Conservation Award for Energy Saving and Emission Reduction (2010) (Kuhn, 
2014). 
XGC has done much of this work with just four to five staff members and a handful 
of volunteers. In addition to leading XGC, Ma is also a council member of the Xiamen 
Environmental Science Association and the Fujian Lifelong Education Association as 
well as a consultant to the Shishi Youth Volunteer Association, the Green Commuting 
Network of the Environmental Defense Fund, and coordinator for China’s first ENGO, 
Friends of Nature (Kuhn, 2014). In short, she is very active in the national environmental 
movement, which helps to connect XGC to other ENGOs across China. When asked why 
she engages is work with such long hours and low pay, she responded that it is her duty 
to the people of Xiamen to do this kind of work. 
As the only ENGO in Xiamen at the time of the protests, XGC became an important 
resource for frightened residents unsure of what to believe about PX. However, as a 
registered NGO, XGC could not make an official statement regarding the protest because 
to do so would jeopardize its status as an NGO. This is a problem all NGOs in China 
face, as “it is difficult for Chinese NGOs to strike a balance between upholding the 
environmental concerns of citizens, advocating for climate protection [and other 
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environmental concerns], and not provoking the local government” (Kuhn, 2014, p. 68). 
The fact that hoards of people came to XGC’s doorstep asking for information is 
testament to its importance in the community and the work they had done to raise 
environmental awareness. People were aware that environmental degradation would ruin 
the home they loved. However, XGC was unable to guide public opinion directly, thereby 
redirecting people back to Internet discourses. The most important work they did was in 
raising awareness before the protests, so as to set the stage to rouse high levels of concern 
regarding environmental issues. 
This increasing environmental awareness met a long tradition of civic duty, which 
influenced the tenor of the protests, as is evident in how the protests were framed via 
slogans and songs. When people protested in Xiamen, they did not protest against the 
government as much as the protested for the protection of their city, their land, their 
country, and future generations of Xiameners. Banners did not read “down with the 
government,” but instead “We love Xiamen” and “resist the PX project, protect city 
residents’ health, protect Xiamen’s environment.” Protestors belted out not songs 
condemning China, but the national anthem and other ballads tied to their regional 
identity (Swarthmore College, 2011). A group of seventy senior citizens reportedly were 
chanting “for the next generation, we don’t mind settling accounts this late in life, it’s 
worth it!” (Kennedy, 2007, para. 15). They were willing to sacrifice themselves for the 
greater good. 
Civic duty, or personal sacrifice for the collective good, is also apparent in the fact 
that people protested. By participating in a nonsanctioned protest, many people were 
putting their freedom and livelihoods on the line. Residents were willing to sacrifice this 
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for Xiamen. Interviewees, when asked why they participated, responded with statements 
like the following: 
Because it is the people of Xiamen’s duty and obligation. I am from Xiamen, I have 
lived my whole life in Xiamen... I went to join this protest because of my love for my 
city. I didn’t want my city to have a plant that could be dangerous to the people [who 
live here]. (personal communication, 2014) 
 
Another interviewee echoed this sentiment when he stated, “My own living environment 
is very important. Using action to fight for the environment is worth it” (personal 
communication, 2014). While many diverse factors were at play, for a large group of 
people, this protest was about exercising their duty to one another and their home. 
A commitment to civic duty and a growing environmental awareness were forces 
essential to igniting the protests in Xiamen as well as the community involvement that 
followed. As I will further explain below, the event itself was marked by polysensus that 
was all directed at the same outcome: the PX plant should not be built in Xiamen. Some 
people were in opposition to save their financial investments, others were concerned 
about the impacts of the PX plant on their children, still others were afraid their home 
was going to be destroyed. These dissonant forces worked in tandem with the rising 
middle class, influx of academics, spread of digital networks, and adoption of mobile 
technologies. Together, they coalesced, creating the capacity necessary for the 2007 force 
majeure that would alter China’s environmental trajectory. 
 
Tracing the Polysensus of Protest 
The reasons for protesting in the streets were far from pure and uniform, and must be 
considered in this analysis. As was made evident above, people motivated by the threat of 
plummeting real estate value and rumors of PX being akin to an atomic bomb marched 
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alongside people exercising their civic duty. The divergent reasons for protest extend 
even further. According to Ansfield (2013), the academic from Xiamen University, Dr. 
Zhao Yufen, who spearheaded one of the earliest resistances did so, at least in part, 
because she had a competing interest. Sources in Xiamen report that Zhao’s family 
business had been promised a plot of land on which they planned to construct a 
biopharmaceuticals plant. However, after they had begun investing in the project, the 
government took away their plot of land and gave it to the company proposing the PX 
plant. Angered about this, Zhao used her political standing as a CPPCC member and 
respected scientist to drum up opposition to the plant at the annual CPPCC and NPC 
meetings. Since few, if any, people had the scientific background to understand PX and it 
impacts, her framing of the chemical and her decision to label PX a dangerous chemical 
responsible for cancer and birth defects became a major factor in inciting outrage locally. 
It was, however, an assessment many experts allege was an exaggeration of potential 
hazards. In fact, some local experts allege she misled the public in order to deepen the 
opposition, a move that would help to return the plot of land to her family’s business. 
This framing of PX, which was viewed as credible, was then cited in future uprisings and 
came to shape how people perceived PX in cities across China. 
Another factor often unaccounted for in stories of Xiamen’s success was the fact that 
a private businessman from Taiwan, Chen Yuhao, was funding the plant via his company, 
Xianglu Dragon Group. Though officials did not want to damage their relationship with a 
wealthy entrepreneur like Chen, it was much easier to urge him to move the project than 
it would have been to persuade a state-owned industry to forfeit the money they had 
invested and find another location. Additionally, after officials decided to cancel the 
  
175 
plans in Xiamen, they moved the plant to a Zhangzhou, a city due west. Selecting 
Zhangzhou as the new site for the PX plant meant that the revenue from the project 
would stay in Fujian province, which was extremely important to local officials interested 
in increasing the province’s GDP. Since Zhangzhou was a much smaller city, officials 
knew they likely would not face the same fierce and widespread opposition they did in 
Xiamen where the assemblages of academics, businesses, Internet access, and 
environmental awareness were pregnant with force. Furthermore, according to one 
interviewee originally from Zhangzhou, the government warned residents not to protest 
or they would face severe consequences. Though protests did occur despite this, the plant 
was successfully relocated without much press coverage of the protests or relocation. 
Another important aspect to consider was that the real estate agents who feared losing 
their jobs, according to both news reports and testimony by interviewees, paid some older 
residents of Xiamen to participate in the protests. Their stakes in the movement against 
PX were high enough to warrant a financial investment to increase the numbers of 
protestors and the pressure for local officials to listen. These people marched alongside 
business people and environmentalists. 
These details were not widely circulated on mass media or digital media for a variety 
of reasons. Sympathetic journalists masked Zhao’s selfish motivations (Ansfield, 2013). 
Citizens unfamiliar with environmental practices and policies were not considering why a 
protest against a privately owned factory would be different than one against a state 
owned factory. They were just fighting. And, while awareness about the procedures 
mandated by the central government that played a large role in postponing construction 
of the PX plant spread across Xiamen as citizens involved in the fight battled it out with 
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their officials, these details of the story were largely eclipsed by the perceived success of 
the protests in mass media and online outlets. The force of the event lay (and lies) in its 
ability to disrupt the world as the Chinese people know it, to affectively move people in 
other areas to stand up for their city, and to make room for new enactments of citizenship.  
 
Protest as Force Majeure 
This melding of assemblages, together, fomented this event, which then had its own 
force. To understand the rhetorical significance of the event, we must trace these forces. 
Rhetoric, rather than being concerned with meaning or content, I argue, should be 
focused on “its capacity to exert a compelling force” (Muckelbauer, 2009, p. 17). Or, put 
as Sillars (1964) put it, “rhetorical acts, concerned as they are with effecting change, 
involve in part the use of force” (p. 280). If scholars trace force, we can map 
repercussions of the protests outside of simply whether or not they accomplished their 
goal. We can see that the narratives of Xiamen spread virally across the country, to 
inspire protests not just against PX, but against nuclear power and waste incinerators, and 
how it served as a vehicle to spread information about environmental rights in its wake. 
Many forces reverberated outward in many directions, which is a distinguishing facet of 
social movement. As Massumi argues, “Strains, obstructions, and resistances mark the 
continued formative pressure of the quasi-chaotic manyness” of activist events (Massumi, 
2011, p. 5). Since social movement is characterized by “manyness,” it is important to 
retain this in analyses. 
With this in mind, I look at the Xiamen protests as a force majeure to study this 
movement of the social outside rational arguments and deliberative democracy. Merriam 
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Webster defines force majeure as “1. superior or irresistible force; 2. an event or effect 
that cannot be reasonably anticipated or controlled,” which, in use, may operate to excuse 
a party from a contract. By operationalizing this term, I am tracing the forces that led up 
to the protests, the ways in which protests are forcing a renegotiation of the contracts 
between local governments and chemical companies, as well as the relationships between 
the people and their government, and the forces that emanated from the protests. In this 
final section, I will revisit assemblages described above to outline how force is articulated 
via networks. I will then outline how this leads to renegotiations before tracing the 
impacts. 
A force majeure is an “irresistible” and “overwhelming” force that moves, in this 
case, through networks. The networks forged via blogs, BBS, and cell phones linked 
academics to farmers to bloggers to real estate agents. As exaggerations, fear, and facts 
spread across the networks, they coalesced in various configurations to move people to 
action. These networks helped to gather real estate agents fearing a housing market 
collapse at the same time they helped to mobilize the an academic interested in building a 
biopharmaceuticals factory. The emergence of online platforms was able to connect 
groups with disparate motivations, allow them to stay true to these goals, and then still 
march along the same route as environmentalists and people paid to hold signs.  The 
pathways constructed by blogs and cellphones carried waves of amalgamating polysensus 
that ultimately disrupted plans for the plant.  
One reason people turned to blogs and BBSs was that information about PX was 
largely absent from mass media sources, especially in the early stages. The dearth of 
official information forced people to turn to alternate online networks. The information 
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they found online ranged from that which deemed PX to be dangerous, to what PX was, 
to the illegality of the plans for the plant. Though censorship ultimately occurred online, 
alternate routes including cell phones helped to circumvent these barriers. Outrage 
proliferated on these platforms despite attempts to stop it, interrupting the networks of 
corruption that allowed the plans to be approved and laws to be circumvented. 
This leads me to explore a force majeure as something that nullifies existing 
contracts. In the Xiamen protests, the contract between the local officials and the Xianglu 
Dragon Group was not just altered by what occurred; it was broken. After the people in 
Xiamen took to the streets, the government was forced to renege on its promise to let 
Chen Yuhao build on the plot of land in Haicang, causing Chen to lose the money he had 
already invested in the project. Though the plant was ultimately relocated, Chen lost both 
time and money in the wake of the protests.  
In Xiamen, after the protests, the relationships between the people and their 
government also changed. Though the leaders are supposed to serve the people, this duty 
had long been overlooked. Local officials in Xiamen were making decisions for the 
people without asking for their input or perspectives on environmental matters, which 
was illegal in this case according to national laws. However, in the wake of these 
protests, the people took back these rights by force and caused a renegotiation of the 
procedures in place. Local people were forcing officials to follow the rules. In so doing, 
they offered possibilities for civic engagement and interaction heretofore unseen. People 
speaking in a tone and volume their leaders could not ignore changed the tenor of their 
conversations. 
Finally, protests as force majeure help to highlight various impacts of the protests. 
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Yes, the protests were successful is disrupting plans for the plant. However, the 
movement they initiated continues to reverberate. After the protests, people followed up 
with their government, demanded an Environmental Impact Statement be conducted, and 
expressed opposition in the public forum. This ensured that plans for the plant were never 
resurrected for Xiamen, and likely kept other similar companies from trying to establish 
factories in the area. In the years following the event, Xiamen has increasingly taken on 
the identity of an environmentally conscious city with numerous developing ENGOs, 
including Xiamen Little Gull and China Mangrove Protection Alliance. Xiamen 
University is also home to a number of university sponsored environmentally focused 
student groups. 
The movement continued outside of Xiamen. Years after the protest, people from 
Dalian and Maoming stated that the Xiamen protests served as an inspiration and model 
for the protests in which they participated in 2011 and 2014, respectively (personal 
communication, 2015). When domestic and international press do cover PX protests in 
other cities, the Xiamen protests are often brought up as the first example of widespread 
opposition to PX. As the protests continue to erupt, they are always linked to Xiamen. 
 
Changing Relationships, Changing Politics 
According to China’s environmental protection minister, as of 2009 “‘[m]ass 
incidents’— or riots and protests—sparked by environmental problems have been rising 
at a rate of 30 percent per year” (Le & Hornby, 2009, para. 13). As the success in Xiamen 
was relayed over and over again, the force of the triumph inspired people in Jiangmen, 
Hangzhou, Qidong, Kunming, and numerous other cities across China to stand up to local 
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authorities and protest against pollution. Bloggers and citizen journalists recognize this. 
For example, blogger Du Jianguo (2013) states, “Without Xiamen’s 2007 walk, the same 
types of events would not have been possible in Chengdu or Kunming” (para. 2). A 
citizen from Chengdu echoes this sentiment. Upon reflecting upon the protests in his 
town, the anonymous witness told the press, “We’re definitely inspired by the events in 
Xiamen” (Wong, 2008, para. 21). By the time the people of Dalian protested against the 
PX plant that threatened their town in 2011, Xiamen was not the only success they had 
heard tell of in China, but still served as a beacon of hope. 
Information about what happened in Xiamen continues to impact China’s 
environmental movements as its success and subsequent victories circulate across 
Internet platforms, which are growing and extending at rapid rates. As resistances spread 
virally from one city to another, the residents of these cities are fundamentally changing 
their relationship with their governments through protest. These protests garner force 
through international publicity, affective appeals, and digital media networks. They are 
eruptions resulting from assembling assemblages, or assemblages becoming. 
By examining Xiamen as a force majeure rather than a protest initiated by rational 
and unified groups of environmentalists, I have begun to explore a new way of studying 
social movements that presupposes neither deliberative democracy nor rationality. This 
model moves away from linear progressions to trace multiple becomings. This analysis 
focuses on the conglomeration of forces, or assemblages, that coalesced to move people 
to the streets, which moved the government to back down, and which inspires others to 
also fight against corruption using China’s environmental laws. It examines protest 
through force. These rhizomatic eruptions are changing China, but not leading down a 
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path to a predetermined political system. What these eruptions are doing is igniting 
movement and cultivating a diverse ways of thinking, being, and doing, which will 










THE DISAPPOINTMENT IN DALIAN 
 
In describing the protests that provoked the mayor of Dalian to stand on top of a 
police van and announce that the city would move the Fujia Dahua PX plant off their 
coastline just hours after people began gathering at the Capitol building, the two young 
IT specialists sitting across the table from me said Xiamen’s 2007 protests served as 
inspiration. They had heard about the people of Xiamen’s success in stopping a PX plant 
projected to bring in $10.8 billion annually (roughly three fifths of Xiamen’s GDP) from 
being built via newspapers, television, and BBSs (Ansfield, 2013). They saw information 
about the protests, saw that Xiameners succeeded, and thought they, too, could succeed.  
Xiamen’s was the first case in China in which people used new media to protest. As a 
result of this mass mobilization, local officials bowed to the people’s wishes and said 
“no” to industry. The two IT specialists with whom I spoke that day, and many others 
who came together to form the mass of over 10,000 people who took to Dalian’s streets 
in 2011, had heard about Xiamen’s triumph and wanted to duplicate it in their own city 
by lacing together outrage, hope, Weibo, bodies, and Baidu’s tieba. 
It seemed to have worked. Just hours after the protest began, the mayor promised to 
move the plant to a safer location. His impromptu speech was caught on video by the sea 
of smartphones that surrounded him and posted to social media immediately. The people 
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had proof from the mayor himself of their triumph. Several years after the event, when I 
visited in late 2014, it quickly became apparent that the mayor had lied. The people with 
whom I spoke told me that they did not think the plant was shut down for even one day 
and that it definitely was never moved, as promised. Their mayor had lied to them, to all 
the people that gathered in the square, and all the people who watched the events unfold 
online.  
The event was a huge disappointment for the people of Dalian, many of whom had 
engaged in a very risky form of protest and some of whom had been beaten, jailed, and 
hospitalized. After talking to protestors and residents of Dalian, I too, felt deflated. The 
reports I had read while conducting my preliminary research did not describe the failure 
that had followed what appeared to be an amazing and rare success. Moreover, I had 
watched the video in which the mayor stood atop the van and acquiesced to the people 
and heard the crowds demanding details. The front page of the local newspaper carried 
news of the success. The government had won by lying to the people, dragging their feet, 
and waiting for the opposition to subside.  
However, it was not that simple. Yes, the plant was never relocated, but the protests 
did both evidence movement and move the social in important ways. This chapter builds 
on the lessons from the previous chapter by moving away from conceptualizing protests 
as either a success or failure. It is, instead, an account of changes to what McGee (1980) 
calls “human consciousness,” of how what happened in Dalian ultimately created social 
movement (p. 242). To do so, I engage in elaborate tracings of the circumstances that 
coalesced to erupt into a force majeure as well as the changes that occurred in its wake 
using, as was the case in the previous chapter, news reports from both Chinese and 
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English language outlets, blog posts, onsite research, and conversations with people who 
lived in Dalian at the time of the protests.  
In looking at reports and following the protests on social media, the protests in Dalian 
were portrayed as a success. The vast majority of the news coverage occurred within the 
first several days of the protests. On social media, the news of the government bowing to 
the people was transmitted almost instantly. The people protested, they endured violence, 
but they won. As a result, the legend of Dalian, when it reached people in other cities 
confronted with plans for a PX plant, served as an inspiration. The people in Kunming, 
Maoming, Shanghai, and elsewhere saw what Xiamen and Dalian had achieved through 
mass mobilization and believed they could have the same successes. Just as when people 
from Dalian searched for “PX” on Baidu and found out what occurred in Xiamen, saw 
Lian Yue’s blog posts, confronted images of people “strolling” the streets holding 
banners, and read that the plant had been moved, when people from Kunming, Maoming, 
Chengdu, and Shanghai searched for PX years later, they found not only reports about 
Xiamen, but reports about Dalian and their “success.”  
Two cities that were geographically, politically, and socially distinct had both won in 
fights against PX. Furthermore, the people of Dalian appeared to have won against a PX 
plant that was already built. When examining reports from other cities that staged PX 
protests, the protests in Dalian and Xiamen are repeatedly mentioned as protests that had 
paved the way for these subsequent mobilizations. The cases are also, however, 
oftentimes oversimplified. For example, reports of the protests do not discuss the details 
surrounding Dr. Zhao Yufen’s family business, nor do they often talk of the people who 
were paid to participate. Some fail to mention that the plant was ultimately relocated to 
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Zhangzhou. The protests in Dalian largely discuss only the victory, not what came to be 6 
months afterward. The reports, most of which are unofficial, are also littered with rumors 
and misinformation (Jia, Fanxu, & Shuo, 2014). Precisely because the stories were 
simplified and construed in a multitude of different ways, they had a particular force that 
persuaded and inspired others to also engage in similar forms of risky protest that 
travelled via relationships. 
Much of the literature on social movements looks to events that are deemed successes 
because they achieved their instrumental end goal, as can be seen in literature from the 
civil rights movement to the environmental movement to the Arab Spring. For example, 
scholars who have written on civil rights campaigns have focused on successful speeches 
by great leaders, including Martin Luther King Jr. (Vail, 2006) and Malcolm X (Terrill, 
2001). Others, including DeLaure (2008), for example, brought forward people who they 
perceive to have been overlooked in social movement scholarship, including Ella Baker, 
a woman whose radical rhetoric led to her success as a leader of the civil rights 
movement. These studies focus on how rhetoric was used to achieve an instrumental 
goal. 
This tendency to talk about social movements in terms of instrumental success is also 
evident in both mainstream media as well as academic studies of the Arab Spring, which 
often look at the movement as a success and then debate the role of social media in its 
success (Christensen, 2011; Johnson, Nuseibeh, & Tudor, 2013; Kassim, 2012; Schleifer, 
2009; Zuckerman, 2011). For example, Al-Rawi’s (2014) essay on the Arab Spring 
examines the role of Facebook and YouTube in the victory of Iraqi protestors in 
convincing four top Iraqi officials to resign. It considers neither the relationships nor the 
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accumulation of forces that made possible this eruption. Yes, Facebook and YouTube 
were important, but they are but one actant in a network and this network was made 
possible by relationships. 
The move to frame protest events within the instrumental success/failure binary is 
also apparent in lesser known initiatives. Asenas, McCann, Feyh, and Cloud (2012), for 
example, focus on the combined efforts to save Kenneth Foster from capital punishment. 
In the section of the paper titled “Anatomy of a Victory: Lessons Learned about 
Communication Activism Scholarship,” the authors explain how the campaign to save 
Foster resulted in a judge commuting his sentence to life in prison, an instrumental 
success that justifies the study. This section addresses how scholars can learn from the 
instrumental success of the movement rather than acknowledging the multitude of forces 
that made possible that outcome.  
While focusing on successes is warranted and necessary, scholar’s analyses also must 
extend beyond examining events in terms of intended repercussions and incorporate 
failures as well (Golinski, 2005; Hughes, 2000). As Enck-Wanzer (2006) argues, “While 
the practical goal of rhetoric may be to persuade people to act in one way or another, 
instrumental ‘success’ may not be the best criterion on which to base our judgments” (p. 
189). If, as McGee (1980) asserts, the work of social movement scholars is to trace the 
social, then we should be tracing the multiple repercussions of protests, of the protest as a 
force majeure that disrupts relationships and forces renegotiation in a variety of realms, 
rather than focusing solely on whether they were an instrumental success or failure. 
Instead, scholars can ask questions like: What changes did the event leave in its wake? 
How did it impact the social? And, in this case, how have the protests made possible new 
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ways of being in the world for those in Dalian as well as those across China? 
Some work has been done to complicate the issues at hand and answer similar 
questions. For example, Pezzullo (2011) argues in her piece on boycotts and buycotts that 
it is “inadequate to judge them as ‘positive wins’ or ‘negative losses’” and, instead, 
scholars must “consider the possibilities for change enabled by specific campaigns within 
specific contexts” (p. 139). This call to action, however, appears in the conclusion and 
could be further engaged. DeLuca, Lawson, and Sun (2012) complicate Occupy Wall 
Street beyond its achieving or failing to achieve instrumental success by tracing the 
repercussions the protests had on national conversations. They found that “in a mere few 
weeks, OWS changed the national conversation despite the initial neglect and dismissive 
framing by traditional mass media organizations” (p. 484). This study offers a means by 
which to trace diverse repercussions beyond the movement’s instrumental success or 
failure. This more complicated perspective can also be found in Enck-Wanzer’s (2006) 
essay on the Young Lord’s Garbage Offensive, in which he complicates the movement 
beyond the success/failure binary by considering how the movement altered relationships 
and created possibilities for alternative futures. 
By using the Dalian 2011 protests as a case study in this chapter, I will map the 
repercussions of the protests beyond the instrumental success framework. To do so, I will 
treat the protests as a force majeure, meaning that I will first describe the factors that 
coalesced to create this eruption. I will then elaborate upon the event itself before 





An Explosive Past 
The Fujia Dahua PX plant against which the people protested in 2011 was located on 
the shore north of the city of Dalian. Large dykes had been built to protect the plant in the 
event of a storm, but when a typhoon hit the coast in August of 2011, the dykes were 
broken and, according to many reports, the holding tanks were damaged and leaked 
dangerous chemicals into the water. This damage and the subsequent alleged spill may 
have been a result of poor construction. One person I met told me that he had been inside 
the Fujia Dahua PX plant and saw the components being used on many of the large 
storage tanks (personal communication, 2014). According to him, they were not of 
sufficient quality and, therefore, were less likely to withstand an accident. When the plant 
was built, corners may have been cut. The problem was not with the plant, but how it was 
constructed, he said. Its location on the coast made it all the more susceptible to damage 
from ocean storms that could lead to all sorts of leaks and spills that would then, in turn, 
pollute the water and everything to which it was connected.  
The damage the Fujia PX plant suffered during the typhoon in August, unfortunately, 
was not the first time the people of Dalian had experienced a major disaster in their 
waters. To understand the force of this accident, we must trace other environmental crises 
the people of Dalian had to endure. On July 16, 2010, China’s second largest oil port 
suffered an accident, creating an explosion so large that it led many residents to believe 
an earthquake had just occurred. Flames shot hundreds of feet into the air and the harbor 
that divided the city of Dalian from the adjacent Yellow Sea was rendered invisible by 
the blaze. The flames and clouds of smoke lasted into the next morning despite 2,000 
firefighter’s best attempts to douse the orange and yellow plumes. Tanks full of oil had to 
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be released into the ocean to prevent further explosions.  
Fifteen hours after the two pipeline explosions responsible for the blaze occurred, the 
fire was finally extinguished. Residents, however, were left with another major 
emergency. The government estimated 420,000 gallons of oil had been dispersed into the 
bay, where it was suffocating fish, clams, and seaweed (Greenpeace estimates for the oil 
spill exceed 27 million gallons). Fishermen flooded to the scene, some donning rubber 
suits and others wearing nothing other than the clothes on their backs and submerged 
themselves in the oil slick that had grown to cover between 140 and 165 square miles of 
water and was 20 cm thick in some places. They brought with them empty barrels, straw 
mats, and any absorbent materials they could find in an effort to sequester the oil that 
threatened their livelihood, their home, and their lives. This was the worst oil spill in 
China’s history.  
Images of the event show fisherman using their helmets to scoop up the sludge 
floating on the top of their beloved waters. Others hung their bodies over the side of a 
boat, using what appeared to be large ladles to capture and contain the black oil. The 
people involved that were jumping to the rescue were variously motivated. According to 
Wines and Bradsher (2010) 
The Dalian government offered volunteers about $44 for every barrel of recovered 
oil. The ensuing cleanup frenzy was so intense that the government ran out of barrels, 
creating a black market that increased the barrel price fivefold. Some four- or five-
person boat crews said they raked in as much as $14,000 for a day of work. (para. 20) 
 
The oil was not difficult to capture. It was everywhere. 
Despite the 40 oil skimming vessels and 800 additional boats that were working to 
clean up the spill, the beaches and the water that lapped up on its shores remained layered 
in the same dark black crude oil, making it difficult to see where one ended and the other 
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began. Just days after the explosion, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) showed up to 
help contain the spill by placing protective booms on the beaches. Greenpeace sent in 
volunteers. People from around the area cut off and donated their hair so it could be used 
to soak up the oil floating on the surface. In total, between 10,000 and 20,000 fishermen 
showed up to help using their own bodies and boats. According to Greenpeace (2010) 
official reports, none of the fishermen they observed wore hazmat suits and many were 
coated in oil; as a result, dozens of people were taken to the hospital with symptoms of 
acute chemical exposure.   
Nine days after the spill, the Dalian Daily reported that the spill had “basically been 
cleaned” and had not spread to international waters (Chen, 2010, para. 2). Greenpeace 
disagreed, reporting several days later on July 29, 2010 that the bays remained covered in 
oil and were unsafe for human use. The remaining oil did not prevent business from 
resuming. Immediately after the government announced that the port was clean, Dalian 
reopened Port No. 1 and began receiving tankers. As the second largest oil port in China, 
businesses and the government alike could not afford to completely halt commerce for 
long without suffering economic losses. Fisherman, too, prematurely resumed operations, 
but reported that they were still encountering oil two miles off the coast. According to 
Chinese newspapers, experts agreed that it would take about 10 years for the marine life 
affected by the spill to recover (Chang & Zhang, 2010). 
 
Developing a Green Reputation 
This oil spill was devastating for the people of Dalian, who prided themselves on 
being a model “green city,” a position they had worked hard to acquire, but which was 
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slipping from their grasp. Dalian’s identity as an environmentally conscious city 
impacted the movement of information and outrage over networks. It would influence the 
coalescing of anger, which helped to forge new pathways between people. From the early 
1900s through the Maoist era, Dalian was a city known for its industry, including “oil 
refining, chemical production, and ship building enterprises—and for pollution” 
(Hoffman, 2009, p. 108). In 1984, Dalian (like Xiamen) was designated a Special 
Economic Zone in an effort “to attract foreign investment and companies to the area” 
(Zhang, Kotze, & Yu, 2012, p. 96). As a port city not too far away from Japan and South 
Korea, it was seen as being an ideal location for international trade. After Bo Xilai took 
office as mayor of Dalian in 1993, Dalian began changing its image to move away from 
its reputation as a polluted industrial city. Bo enticed international business to Dalian by 
turning it from a gray metropolis to a green city. He created parks, moved industry out of 
the downtown areas, and held polluting businesses accountable by either forcing them to 
adopt greener practices or shutting them down. 
Regional, national, and international bodies took notice. Just 5 years after Bo took 
office, in 1998, Dalian was designated a National Model City for environmental 
protection and, that same year, was named China’s Top Tourism City. A year later, in 
1999, the United Nations (UN) deemed Dalian the Asia-Pacific Region’s Leading Urban 
Governance Model City and the UN awarded Bo the UN-Habitat Scroll of Honour 
Award. In 2000, the National Advanced Forum for Real Estate named Dalian one of the 
Ten Best Habitable Cities in China. The praise kept coming, and with it, global 
enterprises were drawn to do business in Dalian—a city with international renown 
(Hoffman, 2009). In 2001, Dalian initiated 84 environmental protection projects and was 
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recognized for its environmental protection efforts as the recipient of both the UN 
Environmental Program’s “Global 500 Award” and the UN’s Human Habitat Award, 
which was largely a result of the infrastructure Bo Xilai had built (Economy, 2010; 
National Research Council, 2008). In 2003, the city and its mayor both won awards, with 
Dalian as the recipient of the China Habitat Environment Prize and Bo Xilai the recipient 
of the China Environment Prize (National Research Council et al., 2008). 
Dalian’s numerous awards had important economic impacts on the city. In addition to 
creating more jobs via environmental agencies, the value of buildings in Dalian rose 
significantly with each new award. The city was designed in such a way that the majority 
of buildings were within close proximity to green spaces. The city’s efforts to create 
green spaces with their urban planning initiatives were apparent in the layout of the city, 
which had moved factories to the outskirts, set aside a large tract of land for recreational 
activities along the bay, and managed its growth so as to make it more sustainable while 
still prospering. In 2012, a survey conducted in Dalian reported that over 75% of the 
respondents lived in close proximity to open spaces (Zhang et al., 2012). Dalian’s high 
profile as an environmentally friendly city also drew business from near and afar. In 
2001, Dalian was already home to 1,767 foreign invested enterprises.  
Of course, many factors were at play in Dalian’s transformation to a green city. The 
decentralization of power in the 1980s offered local leaders more control over their 
jurisdictions, but also held them responsible for meeting certain economic and 
environmental targets, thereby encouraging a prioritization of the environment (though 
many cities did not comply). When Bo Xilai took office in 1993, he was taking over in a 
city with an open local economy, or one that was friendly to foreign investments. 
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According to Shin (2004), “Dalian’s high degree of economic openness provided local 
leaders with material basis (capital and technologies) for better environmental policy,” 
which converged with Bo Xilai’s “particularly strong commitment to the environment” 
thereby accelerating  
the effective utilization of the foreign resources for environmental protection, which 
might explain the city’s extraordinary environmental performance compared with 
other Chinese cities whose degree of economic openness is similar to that of Dalian. 
(p. 278) 
 
Bo, indeed, left a legacy in Dalian. 
 
Bo Xilai’s Legacy 
On the way back to my hotel from a meeting, I ended up in a taxi with a driver who, 
seeing I was a foreigner, took it upon himself to offer me a tour of Dalian. As he drove 
me around the city, we took one of the large roundabouts in Dalian that bordered an 
oceanside park. It was easy to tell where the park ended, as the area was rimmed with a 
series of incredibly tall high rises that circumscribed its border. My friendly guide 
pointed the buildings out to me, telling me that when Bo Xilai was mayor, these buildings 
were not there. He was upset by the fact that they had been built because, in his opinion, 
they ruined the view. Dalian used to be 70% green, he told me, but now there were 
buildings everywhere. When Bo was mayor, he went on to say, the focus was on the 
natural beauty of the park, but now the new leaders have allowed businesses to build in 
areas once set aside as green spaces. As we continued on, he showed me the different 
parks, city squares, and architecture for which Dalian was famous. Before he finally 
dropped me off at my destination, I told him that he was a wonderful tour guide and 
thanked him for showing me the city. He replied by telling me that, when Bo was mayor, 
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Bo told the taxi drivers of Dalian that they should all be ambassadors for Dalian and 
show visitors the beauty of the city, a duty he still took to heart despite what he felt was a 
disappointing change in regime—a change that had brought multiple major disasters and 
a deep sense of disappointment. This would not be the last time I encountered 
disappointment in Dalian. 
Bo’s environmental campaign was part of his legacy in Dalian. Though, certainly, 
many factors had to coalesce in order to create the changes that occurred, Bo was the 
spokesperson for environmental change and people credited him with the improvements 
to the city itself, its economy, and its image. According to one report,  
Even people too young to remember Bo’s tenure seem to know about his 
environmental policies. “I was really young when he was in office,” a shop assistant 
in a Dalian shopping center told [Martin], “but everyone says he was really good, 
particularly at protecting the environment.” (Martin, 2012, para. 7) 
 
The people of Dalian embraced the redefinition of their city and its transition from a 
polluted industrial metropolis to a seaside tourist destination. Dalian’s new identity as a 
“green” city was one people took seriously and wanted to protect. According to Economy 
(2010), the people participated because as people’s incomes went up, so too did their 
level of environmental awareness; higher salaries correlate with higher environmental 
awareness, and in Dalian, people became involved. According to Economy (2010) “40 
percent of the almost two thousand cases investigated by the [Environmental Protection 
Bureau] EPB stemmed from citizen complaints” (p. 123). Residents were invested in 
Bo’s vision and complained when they saw violations. 
Unlike many other mayors, Bo was not afraid to confront businesses about 
environmental violations. Rather than privilege business over the environment, Bo 
encouraged sustainable growth that adhered more strongly to the central government’s 
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environmental policies. For example, in 1996, Dalian rejected 14 projects due to 
“potential pollution impacts and 206 factories were fined for failing to follow 
santongshi,” a Chinese policy put in place to “ensure that environmental regulations are 
addressed at the planning, construction, and operation stages of project development” 
(National Research Council et al., 2008, p. 314). As part of a joint Japan-China pollution 
prevention program, Dalian received $100 million USD to finance 13 cleaner production 
and technological transformation projects. As a result of these initiatives, annual 
emissions were reduced by 20,000 tons of SO2, 20,000 tons of fly ash, and 1,000 tons of 
NOx. Additionally, several factories lacking pollution control devices were shut down, 
including four lime factories, 11 charcoal factories, and 150 small scale charcoal ovens 
(National Research Council et al., 2008, pp. 313-314).  
The laws in Dalian also called for responsibility at the individual level for car drivers 
by implementing an annual motor vehicle emissions inspection program, requiring gas 
stations to carry higher quality and lower polluting gasoline, and fining those who were 
noncompliant. Dalian encouraged residents to use public transit, which was convenient 
and affordable. As the number of cars rose in China, public transit users declined in 
Dalian, but not at the rapid rate witnessed in other cities. As of 2008, “approximately half 
of Dalian’s residents [3 million people] utilize[d] public transportation for trips in the 
city” (National Research Council et al., 2008, p. 315). 
Greening Dalian was a community mission. With the support of the people, between 
2001 and 2005, Dalian “invested 12.9 billion RMB, or nearly 2.1 percent of GDP, into 
environmental protection” (National Research Council et al., 2008, p. 313). The 
investment paid off. In 2005, Dalian’s air quality ranked 16th nationally, according to the 
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annual Air Pollution Index (API) rating and “there were 441 registered industries 
reporting environmental statistics in Dalian” (National Research Council et al., 2008, p. 
308). Environmental consciousness and action was widespread. As a result of the 
attention to natural surroundings, green space, the existence of pollution, and the 
concerted effort taken to rid Dalian of said pollution, people were more environmentally 
aware and active. Thus, the events that would befall Dalian need to be understood as 
occurring in a city acutely aware of the importance of environmental protection. The 
environmental network had established important relationships between the people and 
their land, air, and water. 
Bo’s decision to invest in the environment even if it meant slower economic growth 
sits in direct contrast to the actions of numerous other cities that welcomed polluting 
businesses with open arms, regardless of their potential negative impact on the 
environment. These cities (including Xiamen in 2007) were quick to turn a blind eye to 
environmental violations, but Bo was shutting down factories and fining those that did 
not meet environmental standards. In so doing, Bo was forging a model of growth that 
was unique. He took this model to Chongqing when he was promoted to mayor of the 
city. His way of conducting affairs and managing the people and businesses came to be 
known as the “Chongqing Model.” The main goal of this model was “to revitalize 
socialist ideals and populist claims,” and sat in direct contrast to the “Guangdong 
Model,” which was characterized by “a more free market approach, rising inequality, and 
an export orientation” that was far less friendly to environmentally sustainable practices 
(Zhao, 2012, p. 1). Bo not only followed the rules set forth by the central government, but 
he was proactive in acquiring funds to support environmental initiatives. He met the goals 
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outlined by the central government by forcing businesses to comply with regulations 
rather than overlooking them. According to Shin (2004), “There is no doubt that Bo 
Xilai’s personal commitment to the environment and his political power to achieve policy 
goals played a significant role in Dalian’s environmental protection process” (p. 278).  
This legacy lasted after Bo left, though it began deteriorating, in part, because his 
successor, “Xia Deren, decided to turn the tourist haven into northern China’s 
petrochemical capital” (East by Southeast, 2013, para. 7) despite his original pledge to 
“take up the national call for ‘raising consciousness of ecological safety’ (tigao shengtai 
anquan yishi) and building an ‘environmentally friendly society’” (Hoffman, 2009, p. 
60). Between 2008 and 2013, “the city...dealt with huge oil leaks, massive industrial 
explosions, and all seafood [that came] out of its surrounding waters [was] polluted” 
(East by Southeast, 2013, para. 7). Xia Deren, who earned a PhD in finance and taught at 
the Northeast University of Finance and Economics in Dalian before entering politics as 
Vice Mayor of Dalian, quickly developed an image problem by prioritizing the oil 
industry over the environment. According to Larson (2011), Xia “was widely despised in 
Dalian as corrupt and inattentive to popular will—in marked contrast with his 
predecessor, the charismatic and beloved Bo Xilai, who had effectively positioned 
himself as the people’s champion” (para. 10).  
Despite local admiration for Bo Xilai, his work was sullied as a result of the scandal 
that indicted him on charges of corruption. After the case was brought against him and he 
was arrested, Bo and what came to be known as the “Chongqing Model” came under 
attack, and  
liberal intellectuals and market-oriented media outlets expressed considerable 
hostility toward Bo and the Chongqing experiments.... They viewed them at best as 
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Bo’s hypocritical scheme to use Chongqing as a launching pad for his bid for national 
power. (Zhao, 2012, para. 28)  
 
Zhao (2012) goes on to explain further that “Bo posed a challenge to the ideological 
legitimacy of the CCP central leadership and its succession plan” (para. 26). Furthermore, 
his model threatened the type of capitalism that China was embracing and which many 
high-level officials supported. This, Zhao alleges, is why he was removed from power on 
corruption charges in 2012, which cast a different light on his past successes.  
Bo moved from being a beloved official to a criminal whose wife was convicted of 
poisoning a UK businessperson. The scandal was widely publicized and discussed across 
China, making headlines and flooding networks. The reaction was so intense that the 
government was concerned problems might ensue. Bo Zhiyue, a senior research fellow at 
the National University of Singapore’s East Asian Institute, was quoted as saying, “If 
they can somehow find evidence against Bo Xilai and have him dealt with before the 
18th party congress, his supporters will be silenced” (Bloomberg News, 2012, para. 4). 
As a result, leaders in Dalian had reason to shift away from the legacy he had left, away 
from the Chongqing Model, and towards the Guangdong Model of unbridled 
development. 
Zhao (2012) ends her essay on Bo Xilai and the Chongqing Model by leaving readers 
with this question: “Will the removal of Bo as a contender for national power and the 
concomitant suppression of leftist communication make China safe at last for the kind of 
‘political reform’ that will secure China as a haven for global capitalism?” (para. 32). Bo 
left Dalian in 2000, and one can witness marked changes in the years following along 
with the slippage of environmental protection. In 2011, Dalian was still ranked sixth in 
China’s top 10 cities in sustainability, but it had gradually been falling behind according 
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to The China Urban Sustainability Index of 2013 (Li, Li, Woetzel, Zhang, & Zhang, 
2014). Changes were also occurring in regard to the physical landscape. As the cab driver 
with whom I spoke lamented, in the years after Bo left, large buildings also went up in 
what used to be precious green spaces. As I walked along the path by the shore during my 
visit, I witnessed several new massive hotels being built that were encroaching upon the 
park area. The air quality was consistently above recommended levels each day I was in 
Dalian in December of 2014, registering between 150 and 250 PM 2.5 (a rating of 
“Unhealthy” to “Very Unhealthy”). In 2013, Greenpeace ranked Dalian as having the 
57th worst air quality in China (Tan, 2014).  
 
Waning Environmental Policies and Waxing Pollution 
The people of Dalian were watching what they had built and worked for—a healthy 
environment—slipping away from them. As a result, their relationship with their 
government was changing, which meant that networks were shifting in ways that 
positioned many people in opposition to their local officials. First, environmental laws 
were beginning to be circumvented to benefit big business. For example, the Fujia Dahua 
Petrochemical Company that people protested against in 2011 (the largest PX plant in 
China at the time) opened in 2007 and began full-scale production in 2009, though they 
did not receive mandatory environmental approval from the EPB until 10 months after 
they opened. Furthermore, the factory was located a mere 20 kilometers away from the 
city center, which falls short of government standards. While “These serious breaches of 
process should themselves have led to severe sanctions,...thanks to local government 
support, the project quietly went ahead, out of public sight” (Hao, 2011, para. 4). When 
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people found out about the plant as a result of the damage it endured in 2011 when 
typhoon Muifa hit, it created a public storm that serves as evidence of what McGee terms 
an important indicator of social change—shifting “human consciousness.”  
The people of Dalian also had to endure the oil spill of 2010, which would leave their 
beaches damaged for a decade by expert estimates. The government’s response to the 
crisis was questionable. As was made evident in the Greenpeace reports, the local 
government likely grossly underreported the amount of oil that was released into the port 
(by 60 times). Nine days after the spill, local officials announced the oil had largely been 
cleaned up and contained despite reports of large slicks floating in the sea two miles 
away. Fishermen were allowed to continue their work though a massive burst of 
chemicals and pollutants had been released into the area. Beaches were opened up for 
public use even though traces of oil could be found on the sand and rocks as well as in 
the water that lapped up on the shores, ostensibly because they did not want to lose local 
revenue from tourism. The government was clearly privileging revenue over safety, and 
the people of Dalian were attuned to these changes.  
The central government was also losing the people’s trust over corruption issues, 
which were garnering a great deal of publicity and altered relationships between the 
people and their officials. On July 23, 2011, just weeks before the Dalian protests, two 
high-speed trains collided in Wenzhou killing over 40 and injuring over 200 people. 
Reports and images of the event were transmitted via the wild public networks that linked 
the 235 million people using social networks in 2011. Social media trumped mass media 
coverage. Weibo became the most used platform to discuss and share information about 
the accident, and it was on Weibo that people discovered that local officials literally tried 
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to cover up the crash by burying the train and barring reporters from accessing the site 
(Bondes & Schucher, 2014). The damage, however, had already been done. Average 
citizens had already documented and disseminated information about the event using 
smartphones and social media and, in just over a week, 10 million people were talking 
about the incident and expressing their outrage (Bondes & Schucher, 2014). Many of the 
people discussing the issue blamed corruption for the incident, which the central 
government investigated. In the end, the Minister of Railways, Liu Zhijun, was fired and 
charged with corruption. The people’s suspicions were corroborated by official action 
and trust in officials plummeted.  
Two weeks later, on August 8, 2011, Dalian was hit by typhoon Muifa. Torrential 
rains pounded the city and thousands of people were forced to evacuate as 60-foot-tall 
waves hit the coast, breaching protective dykes around the PX plant. The Fujia chemical 
plant and the chemical storage tanks it housed, which were located on the coast just 
northeast of Dalian, were threatened by the walls of waves. According to reports, a 
CCTV team was flown in before the storm hit to cover the potential damage the typhoon 
could inflict on the plant, which drew attention to the imminent dangers. After the 
reporters were denied access to the plant (and reportedly beaten by plant workers), CCTV 
pulled the story, which “further frightened an already-alarmed populace and reinforced 
the belief that company and government financial interests would supersede any health 
risks” (Gunter, Jr. 2015, p. 150). Those who lived near the Fujia Dahua plant witnessed 
the breach and the one thousand Chinese military personnel dispatched to conduct 
emergency repairs (Watts, 2011b). Four hundred trucks were deployed to carry about 
20,000 tons of rock and concrete slabs to repair the breaches (China Daily, 2011). 
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Residents in nearby areas were evacuated from their homes. People’s Daily reported on 
the event, stating that “If the breach cannot be blocked up, toxic chemical products may 
spill, and that would be extremely dangerous” (quoted in Watts, 2011b, para. 5). 
Authorities repeatedly assured people that the situation was under control. However, the 
lack of specifics given cultivated the spread of (mis)information and speculation online.  
As conversations proliferated on the wild public networks of Weibo, QQ, Renren, and 
BBS, rumors and fear began spreading like wildfire. As Harold and DeLuca (2005) 
argue, rumor and speculation have important rhetorical force in times of crisis. People 
were concerned that damages to the Fujia Dahua chemical plant could cause the same 
kind of devastation and health risks that the oil spill a mere year prior caused while others 
feared it would have impacts akin to the ones caused by the recent Fukushima nuclear 
power plant disaster that happened in Japan. Interviewees made reference to the oil spill 
and stated they were afraid a PX spill could have similar impacts. The people of Dalian 
were still recovering from the oil coated beaches and polluted waters that drew 
international attention in 2010. Dalian was only 1 year into the 10-year recovery period 
from the spill when typhoon Muifa hit its shores.  
Those who had read about the Fukushima nuclear plant disaster were concerned that 
they would suffer the same types of losses that the areas surrounding the plant did 4 
months prior in Japan. The networks of environmental concern vibrated in relationship to 
what had occurred to Dalian’s Japanese neighbors. A magnitude 9.0 earthquake and the 
resulting 15-meter tsunami created a power outage at the Fukushima nuclear power plant 
on March 11, 2011. The government evacuated 150,000 residents within 20km of the 
area over the course of the next few days. On Monday, March 14, the problem was still 
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ongoing and an explosion created further damage to one of the reactors and sent 
radioactive debris flying. The following day, there was another explosion that further 
damaged one of the reactors. An unknown amount of radioactive debris was released into 
the air and water (World Nuclear Association, 2015). A year after the meltdown, 
contamination was shown to have substantially decreased, but was far from gone (World 
Nuclear Association, 2015). Four years after the event, many residents had yet to be able 
to return to their homes and reports of cancer proliferated. Professor Toshihide Tsuda of 
Okayama University conducted a study finding that children living in the Fukushima area 
at the time of the incident were between 20 and 50 times more likely to develop thyroid 
cancer than children in other areas of Japan (McCurry, 2015). The Japanese people have 
been dealing with the impacts of this disaster for years and will continue to do so. The 
cleanup will take approximately 40 years (McCurry, 2015).  
Thus, the people of Dalian who saw typhoon Muifa breach the dykes next to the Fujia 
Dahua plant, watched people being evacuated, and witnessed emergency crews’ efforts to 
contain the damage, saw striking parallels between what happened in Japan and what was 
happening with them. According to a local NGO representative, when the 
aforementioned reporters were blocked from getting near the PX plant, word of the 
breach was further disseminated. Once again, access to information was obstructed in 
official outlets and, as a result, people became all the more curious and concerned, 
turning to wild public networks. This event, in which reporters were barred from the plant 
ostensibly to prevent them from covering the story, had the opposite of its intended 
effect. The story exploded online and people began discussing, researching, and sharing 
information and links about PX. This is how they came to find out about the plant’s 
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violation of environmental laws. They feared the worst and the government’s increasing 
lack of transparency as well as its valuing of industry and GDP over the environment did 
not set minds at ease. People feared that their only child may become the victim of 
pollution.  
 
A Culminating Storm 
Citizens, lacking faith in their government, turned to the Internet to gather 
information, where they began navigating wild public networks that led to accounts of the 
protests in Xiamen, fear-induced conversations about Fukushima, and the exaggerated 
reports by Dr. Zhao Yufen described in the previous chapter. They learned that PX was a 
dangerous chemical and they learned that protests had been an effective way to protect 
the local environment in Xiamen. People traded links to stories and summarized their 
findings for others, which they shared in friend groups. Social media was abuzz with 
chatter, and anger at officials drove much of the conversation. On screens and streets 
“wildness in the form of transgressions, shifting networks, speeds, and disruptive 
creativities” characterized the flows of communication (DeLuca & Brunner, 
forthcoming). 
One post on Weibo read: “the power of the 1,000 missiles aimed at Taiwan is far less 
than that of the [anticipated] PX explosion” (anonymous, 2011). The comparison of PX 
to an atomic bomb was appropriated from communications during the Xiamen protests 
and repeated again and again in various iterations. The same horrific impacts were used 
to drum up dissent, including the false accusation that the PX would cause leukemia and 
birth defects, which spread like wildfire across wild public networks. One post that still 
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remains on Weibo, QQ, and BBSs warned Dalian citizens that the PX plant was 
transferred to their home after the Xiamen people protested against it, even though the 
Xiamen plant was transferred to Zhangzhou. One interviewee also repeated this false 
rumor during the interviews. This warning told readers that the location of the plant 
northeast of Dalian would cause the winds that blow toward the city center to carry with 
them “highly toxic material and means that an atomic bomb will settle in Dalian.” As a 
result, “Many people will suffer leukemia and more babies will be born with congenital 
defects... A paraxylene project should be at least 100 kilometers from a major urban 
settlement.” These last two sentences are taken directly from the text message that 
circulated around Xiamen, which were taken from an interview with Dr. Zhao Yufen. It 
ends by repeating the same rumors and the same exaggerated claims before, as the text in 
Xiamen did, asking residents to forward it to others. It raced across the wild public 
networks that had been extended through social media.  These rumors were charged with 
an affective force that moved more enraged bodies into the public spaces. 
Another piece of information from the Xiamen protests that was spread around Dalian 
was the story in Southern Weekly that proclaimed the people of Xiamen collectively as 
person of the year. This award justified Dalian’s outrage and protests. Blogs and social 
media feeds were overwhelmed with stories and rumors, which depicted PX as “highly 
toxic” and as leading to birth defects or miscarriages. Even local news outlets were guilty 
of exaggerations, making claims that the whole city of Dalian and anything within a 50 
kilometer radius would be instantly leveled should the plant explode. Such an eruption 





As fear and rumors spread, plans for a protest began coalescing over the very same 
networks. This was evident in the interviews. One interviewee heard about the protests on 
Baidu’s tieba, and another through a colleague, which prompted them to investigate 
further online. Another participant found out about the protests online and also heard 
about them from a friend. One interviewee, who works with NGOs across China, 
compared the firestorm of information and rumors in Dalian to the text message 
disseminated during the Xiamen protests (Dalian interviewee 4, personal communication, 
2014). Rumors fueled the fire. The information about the protests was easy to access, and 
as the protests drew nearer, the government posted a warning that appeared across from 
the Baidu tieba used to organize the event that told users not to participate in the protests. 
As was the case in Xiamen, teachers and government officers received a message from 
local authorities telling them not to join. This did not, however, suppress the turnout. The 
people, disillusioned by their government’s repeated privileging of industry over citizens, 
were willing to risk freedoms for a safer living environment. 
According to interviewees and social media feeds, the protests started off peacefully. 
Citizens gathered in People’s Square in front of the government buildings with 
homemade signs and banners that read “I love Dalian and reject poison,” “Refuse PX,” 
“Today, we ask that the country unite for the people of Dalian,” and “Give me back my 
home and garden! PX out! Protect Dalian!”  They sang the national anthem in tshirts that 
compared PX to a bomb, making their opposition visible and their love for their country 
audible. Some people donned gas masks and air masks while others shouted “My 
Dalian!” and asked officials to “Serve the people!”. From the start, there was a heavy 
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police presence, as the officials were well aware of the organizing that was occurring on 
QQ, Weibo, and BBSs.  As the hours wore on, the crowd grew so large that it overflowed 
from the square into the streets. 
The people who marched through the streets were largely white collar workers and 
were careful not to litter, trample the lawn, or make a mess (see Figure 4). Some 
protestors brought their children and pets. As the people who gathered stood in the 
square, protestors repeatedly reminded one another to not act out or become too radical 
(Hao, 2011). The people were proud of their efforts. One tweet proclaimed that “The 
Dalian protests will become a model for citizen movements in Northern China” (Tian 
Ma, personal communication, August, 13, 2011).  This level of participation from white 
collar workers was remarkable, as they have largely been considered to be “apolitical 
actors,” but this crisis was able to bring “first-time demonstrators into the political arena” 




Figure 4. Protestors gathering in People’s Square by the thousands and avoiding the 
grass (@cctvWeb, August 13, 2011). 
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Most people wielded nothing but smartphones, which they used to capture images 
and video of the event. Aware that censorship would likely descend upon the people 
livetweeting the protests, one user recommended that independent reporters turn to 
Weibo “quickly” to view the images and text (@Hualonglee, August, 13, 2011). Another 
encouraged people to post and check quickly (@wenyuchao, August 13, 2011). Still 
others posted links to social media outside the Great Firewall on which people could view 
a collection of photos from the protests, like Twitter. At one point, one of the users 
helping to curate the image gallery, @wenyuchao, asked other people to help upload 
photos to the collection because his Internet connection was slow (August, 13, 2011). 
This post was picked up and retweeted by numerous others, who were able to save 
images before they were deleted. Wild public networks helped to save this important 
information and documentation of the event. 
When Baidu, the country’s largest search engine, began deleting information related 
to the protests (likely in response to official orders), it was immediately tweeted to fellow 
social media users. Weibo was the next platform to shut down, deleting references to 
“Dalian.” Users quickly adapted by adding a space between the two characters that 
compose Dalian (大 and 连), which evaded the auto censoring and shared this trick with 
friends and followers. According to China Digital Times, the words take a walk, Dalian, 
Fujia, and PX were all censored on Weibo. 
Woven throughout this stream of posts were proliferations of accusations that PX was 
a highly toxic chemical. Lian Yue, the blogger from Xiamen, posted in solidarity with the 
people of Dalian. Images, posts, and retweets forged new paths the further extended the 
wild public networks. Eventually, the local officials disrupted mobile service in a last 
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ditch effort to prevent the protests from getting bigger and garnering publicity. The force 
majeure was building. 
As the crowd tried to march through the streets, they were met with a wall of armed 
police. Unable to move forward, the protestors sat down on the pavement. Images on 
Weibo show hundreds of people calmly and peacefully sitting on the sidewalks that 
crisscross People’s Square. Following the social media feeds, it is apparent that tensions 
were mounting between people and the police, who were confiscating banners and 
blocking access routes in an attempt to control the situation. This force majeure, 
however, was beyond their control. Tensions were only exacerbated by the fact that 
outside police were brought in to deal with the situation. These outside armed guards 
were not necessarily sympathetic to the plight of the local people and were more likely to 
use unnecessary force.  
It is unclear what started the violence. Images of protestors throwing water bottles at 
armed police speckled the feeds. The police charged the crowd. According to one 
interviewee who was onsite, the people in the front rows received the brunt of the 
offensive and were hit with billy clubs, which resulted in “a lot of serious injuries” 
(Dalian interviewee 3, personal communication, 2015). Behind the first line of police 
were more police and the people were advised to quickly leave the square, but many 
stayed into the evening darkness. 
Though numerous reports do not discuss the violence, interviewees reported that 
many people were arrested during the protests. One participant was included in a group 
of people who were put in prison, and another interviewee was beaten. The scene after 
the police charged the crowds was rather messy. Cellphones were strewn across the 
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ground, dropped in a mad dash to evade the nightsticks being swung at heads. Others 
were holding their smartphones in their hands and capturing images of the violence, 
which they quickly uploaded for others to download before the evidence was deleted. On 
social media streams, one user commented that censors would be working overtime to 
delete all the images. A participant who was jailed for a night stated that the police took 
his phone and looked through the photos (Dalian interviewee 1, personal communication, 
2015). They did not, however, delete them perhaps, he said, because the Dalian police are 
also citizens, also victims of the pollution. The police officers did ask him for his QQ, 
Weibo, and Renren account information. After this, he anticipated being monitored and 
he acted as if he was being watched.  
Another protestor said he was able to run fast enough to evade the police but his 
friend was not so lucky and was beaten. He had to be taken to the hospital where he had 
multiple stitches. These images of the violence and battered bodies also made their way 
onto social media and were saved by those quick enough to capture them moving on wild 
public networks before they were censored. Images as such posed both opportunities and 
problems for protestors. On the one hand, they could not be automatically deleted in the 
same way words could. Images transmit information differently than text, thereby making 
them much more difficult to block using automatic censoring software. However, the vast 
amounts of images and footage uploaded online also acted as a repository of visual 
evidence the police could access that showed who was participating. According to one 
interviewee, the police reviewed this footage and used it to arrest the people involved in 
the protests by asking people they identified to turn themselves in to the police (Dalian 
interviewee 3, personal communication, 2015).  
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After the peaceful gathering turned into a violent free for all, the authorities 
announced they would shut down and move the plant. Dalian’s party chief, Tang Jun, 
stood atop a police van with a megaphone to announce the plant would be relocated. His 
announcement was met with skepticism from the chanting crowds who asked for the 
terms of the move. Others quickly uploaded the video of Tang with text urging people to 
watch it before it was deleted (@fluteking5, August 13, 2011). The people refused to 
disperse until they were given a timetable for the shutdown and relocation. Hours later, 
officials announced again that they would close the factory. Word of this decision spread 
rapidly and was even covered on CCTV, the state-run news agency.  Screens and streets 
wildly overlapped and became intimately tangled. 
This decision, like the protests, did not follow the laws in place or “properly attribute 
responsibility.... As with the original decision to build the plant, the local government’s 
resolution to move it was not the result of due legal and administrative procedures” (Hao, 
2011, para. 6). Rather, it was a rash response to an uprising and, as a result, there were no 
measures put in place to hold the government to its promise. Ultimately, the government 
defaulted on its agreement. A source that had direct knowledge of the plan’s operation 
corroborated the testimony by one of the people with whom I spoke; the source told 
Reuters that the plant was operating as normal and had not made any changes days after 
the protests (Chen, 2011). Though the protests were an instrumental failure, they still 
created a force majeure in that they created a massive disruption that forged new 
pathways by which people communicated with their government. People were not calling 
the city environmental hotline to report this issue. Their human consciousness had 
shifted. This failure made evident problems in current relationships by highlighting the 
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need for transparency between citizens and their government, the lack of public trust in 
officials, and the level of investment people had in their living environment. In moving 
the PX opposition outside the systems in place designed to tame dissent, it permanently 
disrupted them and made clear that crises create new grounds for negotiation. 
 
Motivating Movement 
As was the case with Xiamen, motivations for joining in the protests were varied, 
which helps to advance my argument for attention to polysensus within what appear to be 
unified protests. Much of the support was rooted in Dalian’s identity as a green city and 
people’s allegiance to cultivating a green environment. In short, many people in Dalian 
had a high level of environmental awareness that had been fostered through a particular 
relationship with their government via almost a decade of reforms, city planning, and 
policymaking. This is evident in some of the responses. When asked why they joined in 
the protests, participants replied that Dalian was their city and they did not want anything 
bad to happen to it (Dalian interviewees 1 & 2, personal communication, 2015). They felt 
responsible for their city and wanted to support efforts to protect it. One participant said, 
“It’s very simple, to open this kind of chemical plant in a densely populated area is 
unsafe” (Dalian interviewee 3, personal communication, 2015).  The plant put their 
beloved town in danger. These sentiments were echoed on Weibo, some of which were 
reposted on Twitter, including @fluteking5 who posted “I love Dalian and reject poison” 
(August 13, 2011) and @kansir, who wrote “For China and for the next generation, we 
work together” (August 14, 2011). This plant threatened to further disrupt their waning 
status as an environmentally safe city, which in turn threatened their relationship with 
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their home. Their action through protest discloses information about the nature of their 
relationship and of changing consciousness (Bateson, 2000). 
Another major thread was woven through the protestors’ testimony—a lack of trust in 
their government. In the wake of the accidents Dalian had suffered and the subsequent 
lack of transparency from government officials, most were reticent to believe much that 
came out of officials’ mouths. In addition to underreporting the amount of oil leaked by 
the 2010 explosions, the government also failed to report that there was a massive oil leak 
into the Bohai Sea near Dalian in 2011. Seventeen days after it began, the news did 
become public, but it was the result of a microblog post, not an official statement (Watts, 
2011a). When the PX plant was allegedly damaged during the typhoon, few believed the 
government’s official statement regarding the plant. Though the government evacuated 
people from surrounding areas, officials maintained that no leaks had occurred. People, 
however, were certain that they had. The waning trust in officials was apparent in 
protestor’s comments. One protestor told reporters, “Even if there was contamination, the 
government would restrict the news,” (quoted in Watts, 2011c, para. 11). People were 
aware that government officials were not transparent about environmental issues and 
potential threats to the health of the population. One person told reporters that he 
protested because the people of Dalian “know that the typhoon caused some leak of 
poisonous chemicals from the PX project and we are all worrying about it because it is a 
threat to our life” (quoted in “China protest closes toxic,” 2016, para. 15). Unfortunately, 
they could not even trust the government to protect their health. The relationship between 
many people and their government had been permanently altered due to their changing 
awareness about these issues. 
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The disillusionment of the Dalian people was evident in the protestor’s behavior as 
well as the images and words that were coalescing into a massive torrent of information 
about the protests mobilized over wild public networks of screens and streets. At one 
point during the protests, a group of people collectively gave the middle finger to the 
government offices. People on social media reported it to those watching. A Twitter user 
who was crossposting from Weibo proclaimed that “the People’s Congress system is 
shit” (@bornanit, August, 13, 2011). Still others compared the Dalian issue to other 
corruption cases, including the Wenzhou train. One user linked Wenzhou to the Dalian 
protests using the hashtag #DalianPX (#大连PX) (@TinylightWong, August, 13, 2011). 
Another by the username @WSHNHONG commented that though the officials 
announced the PX plant would be moved, the “government’s trustworthiness” was 
nonexistent, which will provoke speculation (August 14, 2011). As the protests 
continued, the posts questioning authorities mounted. “If the government thinks PX is 
safe,” posted @tatamama, “then they should build the government offices next to the 
plant” (August 14, 2011). Others went even further, posting “Every time we stand up, 
they will be forced to weigh the cost of evil” (@Jwong1202, August, 13, 2011). 
A third theme that arose that drove people to action was the success of past protests. 
As was discussed previously in this chapter, when residents discovered that the typhoon 
could damage the Fujia Dahua PX plant and cause a spill, they went online to find out 
more. They found the government propaganda proclaiming PX to be safe, but they also 
found information about the protests that occurred in Xiamen and saw that the people 
were successful. This transmitted not only inspiration, but also the implicit message that 
PX must be truly harmful if the government was willing to submit to the people. It 
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bolstered the exaggerated claims made by Dr. Zhao Yufen and the text message that 
appeared on one million cell phones. It also directed people to Lian Yue’s blog where he 
told the people of Xiamen that they would be considered dimwitted if they failed to 
protest against the plant. People saw pictures of the march and the banners people carried.  
In talking with protestors and looking through social media feeds, many references to 
Xiamen existed online. One social media user called the protests in Dalian part of a new 
wave of social unrest that began in Xiamen (@mninuof, August, 13, 2011). Another 
wrote, “from Xiamen to Dalian, citizen awareness is worthy of celebration” 
(@fredericshen, August 14, 2011). People retweeted Lian Yue’s post during the protests 
and linked to Xinhua and Reuters news stories that compared Dalian to Xiamen 
(@abc226, August, 13, 2011). “The south has Xiamen, the north has Dalian,” wrote 
@Yisuca, thereby comparing and linking the two “successes” (August 13, 2011). The 
momentum of the Xiamen protests and the affective arguments served as a force that 
helped people redefine their citizenship. 
 
Distancing Differences 
Though similarities existed between the 2007 Xiamen protests and the 2011 Dalian 
protests, major differences were also apparent. One user expressed disappointment that 
Dalian’s protests were not as peaceful as Xiamen’s (@bleutee, August, 15, 2011). 
However, the circumstances the people in Dalian were facing were quite different. First, 
an independent businessperson from Taiwan did not own the PX plant in Dalian. Rather, 
the Dalian Chemical Group (a local government-backed company) and a private real 
estate company called Fujia Group jointly own the company (Chen, 2011). This 
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company, as the largest producer of PX in China at the time (manufacturing 700,000 tons 
of PX per year), was in the top 10 biggest revenue generators for Dalian. Gunter, Jr. 
(2015) elaborates: 
As is often the case, financial concerns drove the decision to reopen the plant. On the 
one hand, the local government feared Fujia would sue the city for breach of contract 
and Dalian would be liable for compensation, as the $1.5 billion plant is owned 
jointly by the city and Fujia. Additionally, the local government would lose 
approximately $330 million annually in tax revenue if it moved one of the ten biggest 
factories in Dalian to outside the city. (p. 152)  
 
This brings forth the second major difference, unlike the case in Xiamen, the Fujia 
Dahua plant in Dalian was already built and in operation. To follow through with their 
promise, officials would be creating an economic disaster in Dalian because they had 
invested so deeply in the plant. They were very aware of this. Yang Guang, an official 
from the Dalian Propaganda office, was quoted as saying “We need to consider the profit 
of business. It takes time to move the plant. If the production is halted before the 
relocation, the business will be bankrupt” (quoted in Gunter, Jr., 2015, p. 152). While the 
Xianglu Dragon Group in Xiamen also lost money in the move, the losses they suffered 
were far less significant in comparison.  
Third, Dalian is a northern city. As has been gestured to in some of the comments 
above like “The south has Xiamen, the north has Dalian,” many Chinese people find 
there to be important differences between northern and southern people. Though 
generalizations are difficult and dangerous to make, they do influence how people view a 
movement like the one that happened in Dalian. In general, Southerners are considered to 
be more liberal and more environmentally minded; whereas, Northerners tend to be more 
conservative and less concerned with environmental protection. Part of the reason for this 
difference in political leanings is that those areas that lie the furthest away from the 
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capitol were less strictly governed in China’s long history simply due to distance, which 
to an extent, increased their freedom. Historically speaking, “given the geographical 
distance, South China developed on its own terms and at its own pace into a diverse, rich, 
open, and vibrant region” (Siu, 1993, p. 23). At points in China’s history, the south had 
its own currency and trade relations. Siu (1993) elaborates:  
Scholars in Beijing considered themselves legitimate heirs of the May Fourth 
tradition while those in the South were irrational romantics and ruffians. Many 
southern scholars, on the other hand, equated the North with enclosure, chaos, and 
backwardness” (pp. 25-26).  
 
These sides, so to speak, carried with them a certain identity. 
In terms of environmentalism, the south is home to many nature reserves, including 
the first ever established in China, Dinghu Mountain Nature Reserve, which was founded 
in 1956. Numerous others came after, including Xishuangbanna Nature Reserve (founded 
in 1958), Fanjing Mountain Nature Reserve, Wolong Nature Reserve (China’s largest and 
most important sanctuary for giant pandas), Shennongjia Nature Reserve, Zhangjiajie 
Nature Reserve, Lushan Nature Reserve, Poyang Lake Nature Reserve, East Dongting 
Lake Nature Reserve, and the Chinese Alligator Nature Reserve. While nature reserves 
do exist in northern China, they tend to be concentrated in Xinjiang in the west and the 
remote areas near Inner Mongolia. The presence of nature reserves, the development of 
ecotourism, and the attention and praise they draw from national and international 
organizations have helped to heighten awareness and place value on nonhuman 
environments.  
Some of this heightened environmental awareness in the South may also be related to 
particular sets of beliefs. For example, Stimpson (2003) argued that Confucian concepts 
such as feng shui, which “can be described as a popular and utilitarian view of the 
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Chinese approach to nature” can become “a force for environmental conservation” 
characterized by attention to relationships between things (p. 56). He goes on to write, 
“For some Chinese people at least, particularly in Southern China, [these beliefs] are part 
of their covert belief system and direct how the environment is perceived” (Stimpson, 
2003, p. 56).  
Thus, attitudes toward the environment, in some ways, have the propensity to stoke 
environmental activism in the South since the people already possess a certain level of 
awareness in, reverence for, and value in the surrounding environment, which impacts the 
movement and reaches of wild public networks. In the North, the lack thereof combined 
with close proximity to Beijing has made protest less likely. If one considers the location 
of the larger environmental protests that have occurred in China—Xiamen’s 2007 anti-
PX protests, Zhangzhou’s anti-PX protests in 2008, Quanzhou’s 2009 protests against a 
faulty sewage facility, Dalian’s 2011 anti-PX protests, Ningbo’s 2012 anti-PX protests, 
Hainan’s 2012 protests against a coal fired power plant, Shifang’s 2012 protests against a 
molybdenum and copper refinery, Qidong’s 2012 protests against a wastewater pipeline, 
Chengdu’s 2013 anti-PX protests, Kunming’s 2013 anti-PX protests, Hangzhou’s 2014 
protests against a waster incinerator, Maoming’s 2014 anti-PX protests, and Shanghai’s 
2015 anti-PX protests—one can see that the only protest that took place in the north was 
the 2011 protests in Dalian. The Dalian people were fighting a difficult battle with 
Beijing in close proximity.  
Beyond these three major differences, the Dalian protestors lacked a well-known 
scientist like Zhao Yufen, who had ties to the CPPCC, to take the issue to Beijing and 
publicize them during a joint meeting of the CPPCC and NPC. Nearby Hong Kong news 
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outlets were not picking up the story and making it public. The people with whom I 
spoke were well aware of the fact that their battle was significantly different than the one 
waged by the people of Xiamen. They knew that when the people of Xiamen won, the 
fact that the plant had not yet been built was crucial, whereas the one in Dalian had been 
up and running for over 2 years when the protests occurred. They were very aware that 
moving China’s largest PX manufacturer, which also manufactured numerous other 
chemicals, would be extremely costly, and their government officials were mostly 
concerned with profit. They knew that Dalian, as a northern city, faced different 
difficulties. Two of the participants I interviewed together debated whether cities in 
northern China could successfully protest. Though both the protests in Xiamen and 
Dalian were forces majeure, the forces that coalesced to create the eruptions were 
distinct, as were the reverberations the ensued in the aftermath over networks. 
 
Stacking Networks in the People’s Favor 
Other major differences between the 2007 Xiamen protests and the 2011 Dalian 
protests existed that aided the Dalian protestors. The existence and adoption of an array 
of social media platforms meant that anger could travel further faster. By 2011, more 
people were online, more social media platforms had been developed, more people had 
smartphones, a higher dependence on online networks existed, networks were becoming 
more complex, and more people were communicating more often. In 2011, China had 
485 million Internet users and 235 million social media users, which is 137 million more 
than the 98.2 million that were using BBSs in 2007 during the Xiamen protests (Wee, 
2011b). Furthermore, the number of options open to people to connect had exploded. In 
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2007, people mostly communicated online using BBSs and the only social media 
platform available, QQ. At the end of 2007, China Internet Watch (2013) reported that 
QQ had just broken 100 million users, but by 2011, QQ users had reached 500 million 
registered users and QZone was China’s biggest traffic distribution platform.i In late 
2011, registered Weibo accounts were upwards of 233 million, and the number of Renren 
accounts sat at approximately 137 million, meaning that people were using multiple 
platforms to connect (China, 2011a, 2011b). People were also engaging on BBS 
including Baidu’s tieba. In short, in 2011, “microblogs in China [were] mushrooming 
across the web, including variations from Xinhua, Baidu, Netease, and Shanda’s Tuita” 
(Wee, 2011b, para. 4). The strength of connections across these various platforms, as was 
previously mentioned, was crucial when censorship practices were used during the 
protests. Users encourage one another to post on all platforms available and, when 
possible, to use a Virtual Private Network (VPN) to post on sites like Twitter, which were 
impervious to Chinese censorship (though the number of people using VPNs was 
considerably smaller, especially after the government crackdown on VPNs in May of 
2011).  
In 2011, China became the world’s biggest smartphone market and boasted 900 
million mobile phone users, the highest number of users in the world (Wee, 2011b). This 
means that people were connecting over social media platforms using mobile devices, 
especially in Dalian, a relatively wealthy city where people were more likely to invest in 
iPhones and Androids. Having smartphones in hand, rather than the more basic models 
the people of Xiamen used in 2007, meant that images were more easily transmittable 
and had a major presence across wild public networks. Video footage was also more 
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easily captured and uploaded. When the protests began, participants could report events 
in real time rather than having to find a computer, download, and then upload images and 
video.  
Next, people were becoming increasingly intertwined with online networks, which 
they used to communicate with colleagues, family, and friends. People also began turning 
to online networks for news because information was provided in real time and the 
content was not as controlled as it was in state sanctioned media. In 2011, according to 
the Communication University in Beijing’s report, “Microblogs like Sina Weibo [were] 
the third favorite online news source in China.... The research revealed that breaking 
news such as official corruption and scandals drew a lot of traction on microblogs” the 
year prior (Wee, 2011a, para. 1). Weibo became the place where networks of corruption 
were exposed while networks of common people commented, argued, and debated. These 
wild public networks were home to all kinds of information, rumors, dissent, and ideas, 
but officials acting inappropriately were a favorite topic among users. The University’s 
report stated that improper behavior or remarks made by government officials account for 
70% of trending topics (Wee, 2011a). People in China were increasingly turning to online 
networks for more reasons, increasing their connection to devices. 
As more people joined in on conversations, shared stories and pictures, and 
commented, they became increasingly drawn into the fold and networks became larger 
and more complex. People were able to connect to people they would otherwise have 
never known. Weibo users could follow the feeds of celebrities and bloggers and interact 
with fans from across the country. This high level of activity kept networks buzzing, 
changing, expanding, and moving, so that when users wanted to connect over more 
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political issues, the networks had already existed. Government officials, seeing these 
networks as a means by which to connect with and monitor public opinion, hopped 
onboard. In 2011, 630 government departments in China had microblog accounts, which 
they could use to transmit messages and respond to the people (Wee, 2011a). The people 
could also interact with these accounts and draw them into conversations. Networks upon 
networks formed these complex moving labyrinths that wove between and connected 
people in new and powerful ways that influenced the shape, size, and characteristics of 
the 2011 protests.  
The fact that more people were using networks and that they were becoming 
increasingly dependent on social media for news and personal communication meant that 
they were spending more time online. According to a 2010 McKinsey Quarterly report, 
people in China’s 60 largest cities spend 70% of their leisure time online and those in 
smaller villages, 50% (Atsmon & Magni, 2010). Users went online to watch videos, chat, 
play games, download music (most of it for free), and buy products. The level of 
connection people had with their devices—whether that be smartphones or personal 
computers—was increasing rapidly, which ensured that the people posting during the 
Dalian protests had a large audience following their feeds and watching what unfolded.  
This high level of engagement, these vast audiences that were able to connect to one 
another so quickly, the mobile phones that allowed people to upload documentation of 
what transpired, the presence of authorities on Weibo, the tangled nature of the platforms 
being simultaneously operationalized, and the transformation of mobile phones into 
necessary equipment for daily life—these factors helped to lay the pathways of wild 
public networks by which a force majeure could erupt and upend order, changing 
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relationships and making possible new ways of being in the world. 
 
From Disappointment to Unexpected Implications 
As has been outlined previously in this chapter, the protests in Dalian were ultimately 
an instrumental failure. The plant continues to operate at the time of this writing (2016). 
The loss was something I felt during my time in Dalian. I left my first interview feeling 
deflated after the protestors told me their efforts failed to move the plant. I thought back 
to the taxi driver who so graciously served as my tour guide and how he cursed the 
current mayor under his breath. I woke up each morning and looked at the air quality 
index (AQI) only to find I would need to again don an air mask as the PM 2.5 levels were 
continually at unhealthy levels. I compared the concrete shores of Dalian to Xiamen’s 
soft sandy beaches and felt a certain edge to the city. I considered my conversations with 
the Xiamen interviewees who had been part of a successful environmental event and felt 
sympathy for the people of Dalian who had been lied to by their officials and some of 
whom had been beaten and jailed. 
The Dalian protestors said the event and the violent nature of it damaged their 
enthusiasm towards the country and city. Their relationships had been altered, and this is 
where we witness the movement of the social. Whereas they had previously defended 
their country when it faced harsh criticisms during the Beijing Olympics, they now were 
disillusioned. As one interviewee put it, “This protest has little effect on the factory, but it 
has a great effect on society....It impacted people’s confidence in their government” 
(Dalian interviewee 1, personal communication, 2014). Not only were they, themselves, 
distraught over the outcome, but they were also afraid that the violence and instrumental 
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failure would create despair for the youth who participated. This younger generation was 
next in line to protect Dalian, to fight for their home. If this was how the government 
reacted to protest—a constitutional right—this next generation would likely be more 
reticent to participate in uprisings. Perhaps, they conjectured, protests were not an 
effective way to voice their opinions. 
The instrumental failure also created an increased lack of trust in the government. The 
outcome, the protestors said, hurt the mayor’s image and caused people to lose 
confidence in the government. The current mayor, they told me, judges his worthiness on 
his economic development, not his environmental safety record. This is why the plant 
was allowed to be built in the first place. The Fuijia PX plant was primarily a revenue 
generator for the city and helped to supply the country with PX, which is an important 
ingredient in many manufacturing processes and, in turn, tied to China’s export economy. 
If factories were missing an essential ingredient in the creation of certain fabrics and 
plastics, they simply could not make the products. Revenues across the country would 
drop.  
The impacts of the protest reverberated beyond it as an instrumental failure. Scholars 
must consider and trace the unanticipated movement of the social. As Gunter, Jr. (2015) 
argues,  
To label Dalian a [Not In My Backyard] NIMBY failure, using Western 
democratization-school standards of civil society activity, is perhaps...a rush to 
judgment.... Much more interesting than the wins and losses of continuing plant 
operation is the process by which environmental activists let their displeasure be 
known—and the process by which governmental actors reacted. Dalian, thus still 
serves as an example of countervailing political power in China. (p. 152) 
 
If we consider the protests as a force majeure, the repercussions of the protests, indeed, 
extend beyond whether it counts as a win or a loss. Gunter, Jr. (2015) asserts that “Dalian 
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highlights the degree to which NIMBY events are much more complicated than the 
black-and-white rhetoric of victory and defeat” (p. 153). I agree and extend Gunter, Jr.’s 
argument to consider how it moved the social within and outside of the locus of the 
event.  
Within Dalian, the protests reinforced distrust in their officials and spread it to new 
networks of people, yet another marker of social movement. As will be discussed in the 
next chapter, distrust in officials is a growing problem in China that is creating a type of 
social unrest and instigating increasingly more intense and violent protests that extend 
beyond environmental issues. People are also protesting networks of corruption and the 
repercussions of the decisions made by crooked officials, including reckless economic 
development. They are coalescing in numbers previously unimaginable. As GDP 
continues to trump the health, well-being, personal interests, and financial stability of 
people in China, more and more citizens are fighting against the systems and networks 
that ignore the people’s interests.  
One impact of the protest was that it raised awareness about the issues at hand, which, 
in turn, increased support for the protestors that extended far from the streets. For 
example, during the protests, as was the case in Xiamen, those who were not willing to 
engage in an illegal gathering showed support by buying water and snacks for the people 
holding signs and chanting. Others showed support in additional ways. For example, one 
protestor whose friend was injured during the protests was very concerned about taking 
time off from work to go visit his injured friend, as he was reticent to reveal to his boss 
why his brother had been injured. Not only did his boss give him leave from work to go 
see his friend, but he also covered the hospital fees. This sign of tacit support was clearly 
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meaningful. As unrest grows, networks of support continue to coalesce, which means that 
the potential for further movement in Dalian exists.  
Repercussions pulsated beyond Dalian’s jurisdiction as well. While the people of 
Dalian dealt with the disappointment, the people of Ningbo, Kunming, Maoming, 
Hangzhou, Qidong, Quanzhou, and other cities saw it as a success. After the 2012 anti-
PX protest in Ningbo, the newspaper, Qilu Wanbao, reported that “Because of the 
problem with PX, this same mass incident have [sic] already occurred in Xiamen, Dalian 
and other cities, and there is no way that Ningbo didn’t know about these incidents in 
other cities” (quoted in van Wyk, 2012, para. 8). Social media and Internet search engines 
made searching for “PX” easy. The results, inevitably, included information about what 
happened in Xiamen, and then Dalian. For those who were aware that the plant in Dalian 
was not shut down, this lesson gave protestors reason to continue to protest even after 
local officials made promises. Those in Ningbo continued to protest “even after the 
authorities pledged to halt the PX project, in part because suspicion of the government 
runs so high. ‘We don’t trust them at all; we think [their promise] is a stalling tactic,’” 
said 1 participant (Larson, 2012, para. 6).  
In 2013, the people of Kunming staged two separate protests in a single month 
against a planned PX plant. They, too, went online to find out about PX, but as Li Bo, the 
head of China’s first ENGO, Friends of Nature, put it, the people of Kunming “had a lot 
of difficulty getting satisfactory information” about PX (quoted in Kaiman, 2013b, para. 
18). Li went on to say that “A lot of worries and doubts have accumulated [around PX], 
which is more or less what happened with the previous PX projects in Dalian and 
Ningbo” (quoted in Kaiman, 2013b, para. 18). After witnessing the protests in Kunming, 
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the authorities in Chengdu “appear[ed] nervous that large scale environmental rallies 
could spread there because of public anger over a PX plant in Pengzhou, on the city’s 
outskirts” (Phillips, 2013, para. 15). And they did. The people in Chengdu also rose up 
against their government, demanding that “PX get out!” 
The protests in Qidong against a wastewater pipeline in 2012 were also inspired by 
the anti-PX protests in Xiamen and Dalian. Though the people were not protesting 
against PX, they had been inspired by the successes that preceded them. Willy Wo-Lap 
Lam, adjunct professor of history at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, reacted to the 
protests in Qidong by asserting that they “demonstrate that ordinary people’s awareness 
of their rights has increased and they are more willing to assert their rights” (quoted in 
Zhou & Sanderson, 2013, para. 4).  The people were also finding that protest was far 
more successful in convincing leaders to adhere to environmental laws than public 
hearings, letter writing, petitions, or calls to a hotline. People were finding that the 
systems in place were broken. As Lubman (2012) writes,  
in order for public participation to work, both officials and citizens must be educated 
and trained on its mechanics, such as the conduct of public hearings. This is no easy 
matter, since local officials often neither seek nor heed public sentiment and the 
public, in turn, has often grown doubtful about officials’ motivation. (para. 8) 
  
This is a problem across China and, until it is addressed, will likely continue to contribute 
to further clashes and citizen’s use of any means necessary to ensure a safe environment 
for themselves and their children. Protests in China jumped 120% between 2010 and 
2011 (Duggan, 2013). Consciousness was changing; the social moved.  
As the protests garnered increasing attention locally, nationally, and globally, leaders 
were forced to address the issues at hand. In July of 2012, then President Hu Jintao, in a 
speech addressed to CCP leaders and officials, told his audience that “people’s demands 
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for a better life and expectations for prompt solutions to prominent social problems were 
increasing” (Zhou & Sanderson, 2013, para. 6). Surveys of people’s concerns show 
President Hu was correct. In November 2012, China Daily found that environmental 
degradation ranked fourth on over half of the respondent’s list of concerns, only after the 
wealth gap, corruption, and the power of vested interests (“The East is grey,” 2013). This 
may have been part of the motivation behind the announcement made during the 
Communist Party conference in 2012, in which central party officials “added the 
environment to the four ‘platforms’—basic beliefs that define what the party stands for” 
(“The East is grey,” 2013, para. 22). Additionally, the government increased its budget 
for weiwen, or “stability maintenance” so much so that it spent more on internal security 
than defense beginning in 2010 (Blanchard & Ruwitch, 2013). This disparity “shows the 
party is more concerned about the potential risks of destabilization coming from inside 
the country than outside, which tells us the party is much less confident,” according to 
Nicholas Bequelin, a researcher at Human Rights Watch (quoted in Blanchard & 
Ruwitch, 2013, para. 5). The consciousness of the government changed as well. 
Each protest, as a force majeure, changed relations between the people and their 
government not only in a particular location, but also across China. Each new protest 
adds force, creates a precedent for change, and inspires other people to stand up for their 
rights and ask for increased transparency, a better system of checks and balances, reduced 
corruption, and a safe living environment, even if it means reduced GDP growth. The 
problem of transparency, however, persists. People in many places do not trust their 
government, which means they will believe rumors before they believe propaganda, so 
they are protesting against PX, but it is far from the most dangerous chemical being 
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produced. They are, however, justified in doubting that such plants will be properly built 
and regulated, as was the case in Dalian. Meanwhile, the government is desperately 
trying to convince people that PX is safe and, in some cases, taking it too far by alleging 
that PX is no more harmful than a cup of coffee. Such campaigns only exacerbate 
mistrust and add to the factors coalescing into a force majeure.  
More dispersed repercussions also splintered out of the Dalian protests as well as the 
subsequent uprisings in other cities. In 2014, one of my friends in China who was 
studying for the civil service exam (a test anyone interested in a government job has to 
take) told me that she had first heard about PX when taking a practice test. In the study 
guide was a question that asked the respondent to suggest solutions to the problem of 
people protesting against PX plants in China. The sample answer provided offers Japan’s 
method of dealing with uprisings as a solution. The question specifically mentions PX.  
This question makes evident that the government was struggling with these uprisings. 
Dealing with the protests had become and remains an important national issue. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter addresses two issues by focusing on the 2011 protests in Dalian. The 
first is that to judge a protest on the basis of its instrumental success overlooks the 
impacts it has on moving the social, which I have outlined above. Instead, I traced 
changes in relationships and consciousness to document the movement of the social. The 
second issue I want to bring to the fore here is another change in consciousness—the 
transformation of civic engagement. As has been established in preceding chapters, the 
U.S. privileges a very particular form of democracy and a very particular form of citizen 
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engagement. This chapter helps scholars to elaborate further on the differences between 
civic engagement in China and the U.S., and in doing so provides a mirror by which we 
can better see how protest in U.S. culture functions in relationship to the government. 
In times of protest in the U.S., the people are often positioned as fighting against their 
government for the betterment of the people. People do not “partner” with the 
government during protests. In Dalian (and elsewhere), people are definitely protesting 
against, but they are protesting against a PX factory and corruption. The difference is 
nuanced, but important. For example, the protestors are saying “PX get out!” in between 
singing songs of national pride. They are asking their leaders to serve the people while 
carrying banners crafted in the same style as the ones that pronounce government 
slogans. Protestors who participated in the Dalian protest also participated in the protests 
in Japan during the Olympics to help keep the flame lit as it made its way to China, and 
they did so out of a deep sense of national pride. They saw the anti-PX protests 
functioning in a similar way. In light of this, “The conventional Western 
conceptualization of civil society as a countervailing power to government is thus 
inappropriate” (Gunter, Jr., 2015, p. 144). Citizens are willing to work with the 
government and “engage in more of a partnership with the government, in which they 
contribute important resources that the government lacks in order to help solve common 
public problems” (Gunter, Jr., 2015, p. 144).  
This sentiment was reflected in the interviews I conducted with ENGO employees 
throughout China. Representatives repeatedly told me that the government wanted to 
partner with these NGOs—whether they were legally registered or not—because they 
could collect, share, and analyze information that would help improve policymaking and 
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implementation. As was previously mentioned, in 2015, the central government officially 
gave NGOs the right to sue polluting industries. The government is recognizing, on some 
levels, that partnering with NGOs can help them carry out important work.  
Civic engagement is changing in China and changing China. People are becoming 
involved and trying to determine how they can renegotiate relationships with their 
officials to create more productive exchanges. Regardless of the instrumental success or 
failure of protests, these events continue to have force. They are moving the social in 
important ways and more and more people in cities across China are standing up and 
insisting that the government serves more than the local GDP. Ideally, developing 
partnerships between the people and the government via NGOs or committees could be a 
means by which to restructure citizen/government relationships. However, the 
government has much work yet to do to create the space for productive relations. 
 
 
                                                
i This number—500 million—conflicts with the 235 million total users likely for two 
reasons. First, users will often register more than one account to a single name, either 
because they want to use more than one account or because they re-registered with a 
different username after forgetting an old username of password. Second, social media 
companies do not often account for this precisely because higher numbers equate to 









MAOMING: NETWORKS OF CORRUPTION  
AND ACTIVISM 
 
The protests that occurred in Maoming once again drew people fighting for the 
environment and angered citizens fighting against corruption. As it culminated into a 
force majeure, it entangled people in the violence, as is evidenced by the following 
account:  
I wasn’t at the protests until 9pm of the second day.... At about 9pm, people started 
throwing things.... The police started to disperse the crowd. Then a group of people 
overturned a car. Prior to this, there was no direct conflict with the police or armed 
guards. But after 9pm, the police started using violence to disperse the crowds. It was 
then that I saw a child overtaken and hit by the police with a baton. I looked back and 
he had fainted. I went over to yell at the police and tell them they shouldn’t hit a 
child. They just hit me and took me away. (Maoming interviewee 2, personal 
communication, 2014) 
 
This onlooker, who was determined to stay peaceful, was drawn in by the violence, by an 
affective response to an injured child, by her sense of civic duty. She was swept up by the 
force majeure that was erupting in her town and became part of the violence, which led to 
her detention by police. The Maoming protests, which coalesced from a dispersed 
network of actants, erupted with a force that would overwhelm those there with peaceful 
intentions. In their wake, the people of Maoming, local officials, industry representatives, 
and mainstream media would be left to deal with broken relationships and a change in the 
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way citizens interact with their government. In this final chapter, I will trace how social 
media networks carrying the force of previous anti-PX protests interrupted networks of 
corruption and forced another renegotiation of relationships. To begin, I will trace the 
networks of corruption that crisscross through and beyond Maoming. I will then turn to 
the protests to track how corruption and the backlash to it helped to foment the protests as 
corruption charges created tremors across social media before turning to the 
renegotiations and impacts of this force majeure. 
 
Historical Reaches 
Though Maoming’s history dates back 4,500 years, it was not promoted to city status 
until 1959, approximately 4 years after Sinopec Maoming Petrochemical Company was 
founded. Maoming proved to be an ideal site for oil extraction, as it sat on a large tract of 
oil shale. In the 1950s, a mining area was constructed to extract the black gold from a 50 
by 7 kilometer area along with 112 industrial scale retorts, which are used in shale oil 
production (Qian, Wang, & Li, 2006). Four decades after this massive oil industry was 
built, production in Maoming slowed after a large deposit of shale oil was discovered in a 
different area of China, Da Qing. To compensate for the loss in revenue, the city 
expanded into chemical industries and constructed plants that produced ammonium 
sulfate and other chemical compounds (“Maoming,” 2015; Qian et al., 2006). Maoming 
also remained active in the oil industry. Although Maoming was no longer a hotbed of oil 
extraction, the massive network of oil pipelines extending across the country provided the 
means by which to secure a steady influx of oil, which provided the raw material to 
sustain the refineries. As a result, Sinopec became the second largest state-owned oil 
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industry, with Maoming housing their headquarters. The city’s coastal location is perfect 
for sustaining a robust export industry and Sinopec has helped secure Maoming’s ranking 
as having the eighth highest GDP in Guangdong Province. To give an idea of its 
influence, the industry sector accounts for 41% of Maoming’s GDP, with the production 
of petroleum and chemical products ranking as the two highest grossing industries in the 
city.  
Maoming’s success was an example of the “Guangdong Model” of development, 
which symbolizes “a more free market approach, rising inequality, and an export 
orientation” and stands in stark contrast to the “Chongqing Model” that looks “to 
revitalize socialist ideals and populist claims” put forth by Bo Xilai (Zhao, 2012, p. 1). 
After Bo Xilai’s ousting, there was little support left for the more socialist leaning and 
people centered Chongqing Model as leaders turned to fast forward capitalist approach. 
Maoming grew as fast as possible with little regard to sustainability. As a result, the 
people and the environment suffered. 
Sinopec’s presence means that Maoming is by no means a stranger to factories and 
the pollution that comes with them. One interviewee stated that living in an industrial city 
meant “we encountered some pollution, a pungent taste,” which was so thick people 
would walk faster to get away from it (Maoming interviewee 2, personal communication, 
2015). Other media reports confirm that residents often complained about awful smells 
emanating from the surrounding plants (BBC, 2014). Residents, however, have had little 
recourse. In the words of 1 interviewee, “We want to get rid of the common chemical 
industry, but it won’t go away” because they have existed in Maoming for so long and 
are deeply tied to the interests of the government (Maoming interviewee 3, personal 
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communication, 2015). Simply put, “Maoming, itself, is a heavy industrial zone” 
(Maoming interviewee 1, personal communication, 2015). When the PX plant was 
proposed, it would have added to the already industrial nature of the city. Maoming was 
the perfect site because PX is a derivative of oil and the city had the infrastructure to 
support such a plant. Moreover, as has been developed in the preceding chapters, the 
country was facing a growing PX shortage. 
Thus, the approximately 1,000 people who united to oppose the proposed Paraxylene 
(PX) plant on March 30, 2014—a number that grew to estimates of anywhere between 
7,000 and 20,000 as the protests continued—were facing an enormous hurdle. The PX 
factory they were protesting against was deeply entangled with over 60 years of oil 
infrastructure, a state-owned oil company, a city famous for corruption, and a country 
faced with a PX deficit. This may explain part of the reason why officials did not 
immediately halt plans for the project. The protests continued for days. The city did not 
see peace again until April 7. 
This intertwining of oil, local government, corruption, and PX also distinguishes the 
Maoming protests as unique. The protests that occurred were not simply a fight against 
PX. As I will argue in this chapter, the Maoming protests represent the morphing of 
environmental protest to also include other related social issues. The 2014 Maoming 
protests were against PX and corruption. These protests are especially threatening to the 
local and central government because the people used an environmental platform to also 
address local corruption and demand political change beyond this single issue, thereby 
increasing the sense of civic duty that was and continues to threaten state-sanctioned 
nationalism. In addition to furthering my arguments concerning wild public networks, 
  
236 
forces majeure, and affective forces, this chapter contributes to social movement 
scholarship by tracing how the movement of the social can splinter and change course, 
thereby emphasizing movement. 
 
Face(ing) Corruption 
Just as Maoming is no stranger to industry, it is also no stranger to corruption. 
Networks of corruption run deep in Maoming and the relationships between government 
officials and industry are strong. A force majeure could, however, disrupt them.  
Beginning in the 1980s, stories of corruption began slowly surfacing in the town. In 
1982, a Maoming Shale Oil Plant party secretary was dismissed after he was found to 
have grossly exceeded the one child policy limit by having seven children (Wren, 1982). 
His high status afforded him the financial means to care for them, but it also put him in 
the public spotlight enough to draw attention to the issue. This case was the beginning of 
a long streak of corruption indictments. Just a few years later in 1988, four city officials 
were sent to prison for profiting from the illegal sales of automobiles and foreign 
exchange to the tune of $120,000. At this time, those found guilty of corruption were 
often “paraded on national television with shaven heads in manacles to discourage others 
from following in their footsteps and to bring shame on to their families” (Shariff, 1988, 
para. 75). As the numbers grew, the means of shaming changed, but corruption charges 
remained very public and garnered local media attention. 
After these cases became public, the corruption networks in Maoming slowly started 
emerging into view. By 1993, corruption had become such a serious problem in 
Guangdong Province that officials set up an anti corruption bureau, which 4 years after 
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its inception already had 2,000 employees in 20 cities across the province and had 
handled 17,582 cases (South China Morning Post, 1993). One of these involved the head 
of the Maoming city development division, Jia Sukun, who took 110,000 yuan in bribes 
related to approving engineering tenders (South China Morning Post, 1993). This event 
marked a short respite during which corruption charges stayed out of the headlines of 
local newspapers. Instead, Maoming began appearing in academic journals and 
publication outlets such as Fuel (Guo & Ruan, 1995), Oil and Gas Journal (Piepul, 2001; 
“U.K. Firm to refinery expansion” 1994), Asian Chemical News (Lee, 2002; Tan, 2003, 
2004), and Chemical Week (Alperowicz, 1993; Oey, 1998). The stories that appeared 
herein discuss Maoming in terms of transnational partnerships, oil, and chemical related 
ventures. This did not, however, mean that corruption itself had disappeared. After this 
boom in business, corruption cases once again rose to the surface, but this time with 
much greater force. 
The introduction and widespread use of the Internet played no small part in exposing 
corruption and spreading news of what took place. In 2009, the Maoming prison’s chief 
warden and seven senior prison officials were fired after an anonymous article published 
on the Internet exposed them as having had corrupt dealings with prisoners that resulted 
in 10 million yuan of annual profit for them (Tam, 2009). The article circulated in chat 
rooms, and after gaining enough attention, spurred an investigation that uncovered all 
sorts of illegal behavior. In 2009 alone, “377 senior officials were investigated 
for corruption related offences...and 80 of them received party disciplinary punishment” 
in Guangdong province (Lau, 2010).  
Following the traces left via dealings and relationships, the aforementioned 
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investigation continued into the following year and eventually exposed the vicemayor of 
the city, Yang Guangliang. He was removed from his post for accepting bribes and 
selling official positions that earned him 34 million yuan. He was eventually sentenced to 
19 years in prison. After he was arrested, 10 other high level officials were also either 
removed or taken away for investigation (He, 2010). This investigation moved from the 
lower level officials upward as the wild networks of corruption were traced. In 2010, 
Chen Shaoji, otherwise known as the “King of South China” for his influence in political 
circles and his role as chairman of the Guangdong committee of the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference, was investigated for corruption (Zhai, 2010). He was 
outed on the Internet by a Beijing reporter, whom he deceived about business prospects 
and with whom he had an affair. After he defaulted on his promises to her, she posted 
information about his extravagant lifestyle—one which he would never have been able to 
afford on his salary alone—as well as scandalous videos online for anyone with an 
Internet connection to see and share. Though this was not the first time the Internet had 
been used in this manner, “the growth of the Internet... allowed many such deeds to be 
exposed to the public” because citizens “have become increasingly intolerant of the 
abuses of power and corruption by government officials” (Xinhua, 2010, para. 6). With 
the public watching, those in power were left with no choice other than to sentence Chen. 
He received a suspended death sentence for corruption (meaning his sentence was 
commuted to life in prison). 
Chen’s arrest was just the beginning, as investigators traced corruption up the power 
ladder. His sentencing led to the investigation of over 100 senior officials from around 
Guangdong. In 2011, right after the start of the Spring Festival, Luo Yinguo, the city’s 
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Communist Party boss, was asked to travel to the provincial offices for a meeting with 
the Guangdong Provincial Committee, but no sooner did he arrive than he was detained 
for corruption charges. After searching his home and office, investigators found more 
than 10 million yuan in cash. Just a few days later the party head of Maogang district, 
Zhong Huoming, and deputy head of the district, Tan Weihua, were also taken away for 
questioning (He, 2011). Maoming officials as well as officials from across Guangdong 
province were being investigated and charged at levels and in numbers never before seen. 
The same month Luo was detained, then Premier Wen Jiaobao conducted an 
interview with Xinhua News. This interview was unique in that it was formatted around 
questions and commentary from Netizens (Xinhua, 2011). This format is demonstrative 
of the fact that officials and news media alike could not ignore the influence of the 
Internet on local and national issues, and so Premier Wen was asked to respond to the 
common people directly. Nearly one million netizens submitted their questions to Wen, 
and many asked him to address China’s rampant corruption. Wen was asked to respond 
to a number of Netizen questions, which he did not just in this interview but also in 
subsequent conversations with the media. 
 
Pathways of Panmediation 
This interview makes clear that China’s various landscapes were changing, and so too 
were the ways in which the people and their leaders were interacting. An authoritarian 
government leader was conversing directly with the people to listen to and address their 
concerns. What spawned this new and direct connection between the people and their 
leader? China’s changing economic status was one factor that made this kind of 
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interaction possible. In 2011, then President Hu Jintao led China to overtake Japan as the 
world’s second largest economy. Many people in China were being lifted out of poverty 
and catapulted into an increasingly panmediated world in which computers and 
smartphones were progressively available and people were adopting them as quickly as 
they were released.  
This brings me to the second major factor at play. Social media in China were 
flourishing, with over 235 million social network users by the beginning of 2011. 
Netizens had created substantial intersecting systems via Weibo and QQ over which they 
could disseminate information quickly and do so without having to adhere to the same 
strict regulations that govern mass media. The Internet was becoming recognized as a 
tool the masses could use to unite not just to share innocuous photos and messages, but 
also to participate in the political system. And some Chinese did adopt the Internet to 
foment change. Murmurs of a Jasmine Revolution had flitted over social media that year, 
frightening leaders across the country and prompting officials to increase censorship and 
preemptively detain a number of people including lawyers and outspoken human rights 
advocates (FlorCruz, 2011). The networks were growing quickly and wildly in ways that 
made them difficult to contain or control. 
Simultaneously, other networks were also developing at breakneck speed that 
connected people in different ways. The third major factor at play was that China was 
creating an impressive system of high-speed railways that linked cities across the 
country. This was occurring as families were, for the first time since the forced move 
during Cultural Revolution, moving away from one another in large numbers. People in 
rural areas were packing up and opting to take their chances in big cities. Children were 
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going away to college and not necessarily moving back home. In 2011 alone, 21 million 
people moved from rural to urban areas, bringing the ratio of city dwellers to above 50% 
that year (Simpson, 2012). This meant more people were traveling more and intersecting 
with one another. 
Communication and travel networks were developing side by side, and these were 
shifting the way people interacted as well as with whom they connected, making the 
networks people were navigating increasingly more wild. For example, since more 
people were going to college and then moving to a new place to find a job, they had 
social circles in their hometown, college social circles, and professional circles, thereby 
joining people from different places. People were able to stay in contact from afar via 
social media, and this meant that people were becoming more and more attached to 
Weibo and QZone to maintain relationships. This also meant that local news often no 
longer remained local because it could spread across the country via various social media 
platforms. People back at home were telling those who moved away what was happening. 
Whereas previously, local issues were often kept private, new networks offered the 
potential for these news stories to garner national and international attention—something 
that threatened local networks of corruption by putting them on a national stage. This 
transition from the local staying local to the local going national was apparent when two 
trains collided on the newly constructed high speed rails in Wenzhou in July of 2011 
killing over 40 and injuring over 200 people, which I touched upon briefly in the previous 
chapter but want to elaborate on here. Reports and images of the event spread far and fast 
over social media, creating China’s first online huo, or firestorm. Reports of what had 
occurred were immediately disseminated over social media feeds. Weibo was home to 
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the most vibrant discussions and within “less than an hour [after the accident], staff at 
Sina Weibo had set up a page devoted to the train crash that served as a major platform 
for the online debate” (Bondes & Schucher, 2014, p. 51).  
Though local officials literally tried to cover up the crash by burying the train and, in 
the media, by forbidding news agencies to send reporters to the actual site, images of the 
accident taken by average citizens bounced from screen to screen along with calls for 
help and action. Within just over a week, the incident engaged over ten million people to 
participate in heated conversations about what was happening, who was responsible, and 
what should be done (Bondes & Schucher, 2014). These discussions drew attention to the 
issue and to the corruption that clearly played a role in causing the crash. After an 
investigation, the minister of railways, Liu Zhijun, was dismissed from his office on 
corruption charges. This would not be the last mass online movement for China. 
However, before I go on, I want to turn briefly to how the wild public networks that were 
growing and expanding were predicated on a particular economic situation that made 
possible certain forms of corruption.  
 
Economic Relationships 
The stakes over corruption were mounting as China’s economy continued to grow at 
a heretofore unseen pace. The temptation to fall prey to corruption was exacerbated by 
China’s tax system, which was set up in such a way that it made taking bribes easy. 
China’s tax system depends heavily on industry for revenue rather than individual income 
tax, which makes sense in a country where according to the World Bank, the average 
annual income was $5,000 in 2011. Since Deng Xiaoping’s decentralization of power in 
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the 1980s transferred much of the decision making to local authorities, the local officials 
were the ones responsible for generating local revenue and the easiest way to do so, 
especially for poor areas, was by bringing in big industries and the tax revenue that 
accompanied them. China’s period of economic reform also changed the rules of the 
game in that it welcomed different strains of international businesses that were happy to 
come in and take advantage of China’s cheap labor and lack of environmental 
regulations, lack of knowledge about environmental laws, or their willingness to overlook 
such laws. Local officials knew that these companies would not only bring in revenue for 
the area under their jurisdiction, but they would also increase their own personal bonuses 
and bribes, so the monetary incentives to solicit factories to come to one’s city or town 
were quite tantalizing.  
A further influx of foreign business came with the expiration of the Multi-Fiber 
Arrangement (MFA) in 2005, which (when in effect) imposed limits on the amount of 
goods small countries could export. This was done so to help spread out the 
manufacturing, but also limited the scale of production. Thus, buyers with a high level of 
demand like the U.S. had to turn to multiple different countries in Southeast Asia to meet 
their needs rather than, for example, concentrating their production solely in China or 
Vietnam. Once the agreement expired, however, U.S. buyers could consolidate the 
number of countries from which they outsourced, and China became the beneficiary of 
these movements largely because of its size and massive labor force, taking business 
from other small developing countries (Hung, 2009). As a result of these massive 
consolidations, many manufacturers looked to China to establish factory complexes, and 






Maoming, as it moved from being a hub for oil shale to also become a hub for 
chemical industries and petroleum processing, ultimately became a highly industrialized 
city that courted foreign companies for the above described reasons. In light of the 
economic changes, the fact that corruption was spreading in Maoming should not be 
surprising. Neither should it be surprising that much of the corruption could be traced 
back to Sinopec.  
Sinopec Maoming Petrochemical Company was and continues to be the largest 
company in Maoming. The state-owned business was founded in 1955 and has its hands 
in both the oil and chemical industries that compose much of Maoming’s industrial area. 
Sinopec alone has partnered with international companies, including Honeywell, Phillips 
66, and even McDonald’s (where you can fill up on gas at drivethrus). Sinopec’s 
investment and ties to oil means that it and the city are both also deeply enmeshed in the 
global oil trade, which connects it to places including Kuwait and Qatar and to oil giants 
including Shell, BP, Exxon Mobil, and Saudi Aramco (Chen, 2014; Sinopec, 2015b). On 
its company website, Sinopec boasts its worldwide success in targeting “markets 
including the Middle East, Russia, Africa, [and] Southeast Asia” as well as its export of 
their “own technology to Malaysia, natural gas compressors to Africa, high impact tank 
plate [sic] to Iran and hightech coil heat exchanger [sic] to Taiwan” (Sinopec, 2015a). 
Sinopec’s success means it is a large and important revenue generator for Maoming’s 
local economy and that it was tied to local officials, with whom it had to work closely. It 
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also means corruption was likely lurking in the company’s ranks. 
 The corruption charges being leveled in 2011, however, did not touch the oil industry 
explicitly in Maoming and, instead, focused heavily on government officials. In fact, 
corruption was so problematic for the Maoming local government that 46 new senior 
officials had to be recruited in 1 month after a graft investigation left dozens of empty 
seats in office (Tam, 2011). Moreover, each graft investigation implicated more officials 
as the rhizomatic connections of the canopy of corruption were traced. The networks of 
relationships—which can be better understood as guanxi—were, indeed, both tangled and 
complicated. However, they were an integral part of both government and business in 
China, especially within a one-party system. Xie and Mol (2006) help to explain why: 
...in the hierarchical one-party political system, individual networks are an essential 
element in successfully accessing government.... In the economic realm, industries 
construct, maintain and utilize guanxi frequently...“private” economic actors tend to 
rely on guanxi and a gift economy to organize the necessary resources to keep their 
business going. (p. 276)  
 
Thus, to investigate the officials is to trace a system of guanxi gone corrupt.  
If Xie and Mol (2006) are correct in asserting that systems of guanxi function as “a 
mechanism for coping with the absence of a formal and reliable system of laws and 
regulations” (p. 276), then these mechanisms may have strengthened in the wake of the 
massive decentralization of power that occurred during China’s opening up when local 
officials had to take on new responsibilities within an unfamiliar and nebulous system 
characterized mostly by change rather than rigid rules. This is evident in testimony from 
Zhu Yuying, former vice director of the Standing Committee of the Municipal People’s 
Congress, who was convicted of corruption. When confessing as to why he turned to 
corruption during his trial, he said, “I didn’t dare to accept bribes at the beginning...but in 
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my 50s, I found my family was extremely poor compared to others. I started to accept 
bribes from 2006 and couldn’t stop because bribe-givers would be angry if I didn’t accept 
their money” (Tam, 2012, para. 8). The channels of bribery were deep seated and 
corruption was so ingrained that one could not hold office without participating. In 
Maoming, by 2013, the plants operating there had already “been in operation for more 
than 50 years and...produce[d] 1 million tons of petrochemicals a year” (“Honeywell to 
Modernize,” 2013, para. 2). Thus, the systems of guanxi in Maoming had been shifting, 
morphing, and growing around and through new economic and political pathways since 
the 1950s, and with them, many avenues for corrupt practices. 
 
Shifting Networks of Corruption 
The corruption that was plaguing China in the 21st century was different than that 
which had preceded it. China, up until about 2002, “had what [Overholt] would 
characterize as well-managed emerging-nation corruption,” meaning that, “as is true 
almost everywhere, most officials had a palm outstretched expecting grease, but the 
amounts were proportionately modest, the corruption did not detract much from 
economic efficiency, and it did not undermine political legitimacy” (Overholt, 2013, 
para. 3). However, by the end of the first decade of the new century, corruption had 
become more serious and more rampant. Once one string was pulled in the fabric of 
corruption, it elicited a chain reaction of unraveling. As is the case with ecological 
systems, if one node in the network is removed, the repercussions are felt throughout the 
entire system. Thus, the investigations of Maoming officials in 2011 did not stop there, 
but led to the arrest of the director of the Guangdong party committee’s United Front 
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Work Department and a member of its standing committee, Dr. Zhou Zhenhong, in 2012. 
The previously mentioned investigation of Luo Yinguo implicated 24 city level officials 
and 218 county level officials in Maoming (Yan, 2012). Once the widespread nature of 
the corruption was made apparent, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection 
(CCDI) sent more than 70 graft busters to Maoming to further investigate the issues. The 
number of local officials implicated quickly rose to around 300. Exposing the networks 
of corruption meant that people were beginning to view officials differently. Their 
relationship with the government was deteriorating and would ultimately become an 
important factor in the coalescing of a force majeure. 
The influx of investigators to Maoming was connected to Xi Jinping’s pledge to crack 
down on corruption shortly after he took over as China’s president in 2012, though it was 
only the beginning. When Xi assumed power, he did so “at a moment when China, 
despite its economic success, was politically adrift. The Chinese Communist Party, 
plagued by corruption and lacking a compelling ideology, had lost credibility among the 
public, and social unrest was on the rise” (Economy, 2014, para. 2). Evidence of Xi’s 
commitment to weeding out corruption was a moral and far reaching one (as well as 
political and self serving) that can be traced back to before he became Party leader. In 
2004, at an antigraft conference, “he warned officials: ‘Rein in your spouses, children, 
relatives, friends and staff, and vow not to use power for personal gain’” (MacFarquhar, 
2015, para. 8). Xi followed through with his pledge. In 2013, just a year after he took 
office, 182,000 officials had already been punished for corruption, which surpassed the 
annual average for the previous 5 years by over 50,000 (Economy, 2014). In 2014, over 
71,000 officials were punished for violating anticorruption rules (MacFarquhar, 2015). 
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Xi’s campaign also called upon the masses to participate “by allowing some oversight 
online, either through the microblogging site Weibo or the official ‘informant pages.’ It 
[was] also very cognizant of the risk that things could spiral out of control” (Bishop, 
2013, para. 3). Netizens had been discussing corruption for several years over social 
media and using it as a platform to expose offenses. Link and Qiang (2013) examine one 
case that occurred in 2008 when video of a Communist Party official trying to molest a 
young 11-year-old girl in the bathroom of a restaurant in Shenzhen was released on the 
Internet and went viral. The official, Lin Jiaxiang, was woefully unaware that his 
behavior had been captured on tape when the father of the young girl confronted him 
about what had happened. Lin yelled at the man, telling him his rank placed Lin far above 
the man and that “You people are farts to me!” (Link & Qiang, 2013, p. 83). After the 
video was released, Lin was fired from office and “fart people” became a term of pride 
used by netizens to describe themselves.  
This was only one episode of many. Anyone with a cell phone also had a camera in 
their pocket, which they used to expose corruption in cities and towns across the country. 
Some snapped pictures of local officials wearing multiple different expensive watches, 
driving cars way out of a civil servant’s price range, and interacting with mistresses and 
prostitutes. They then uploaded this visual evidence of corruption onto Weibo, where 
their behavior was exposed to the public. This move not only gave the laobaixing, or 
common people, a means of participating in the corruption purges, but also established 
new connections, relationships, and networks between people over social media. Thus, 
while the corrupt were being exposed by following bribery networks that caused their (at 
least partial) collapse, netizens were extending theirs and, like a patch of grass, began 
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spreading rhizomatically across China. This growth, initially, did not pose a threat, but 
would become something the government found could threaten their stability. 
 
Attacking Corruption from Both Sides 
This growth of relationships among the common people via online networks is 
monumental. Link and Qiang (2013) agree, arguing that of  
all the transformations that Chinese society has undergone over the past fifteen years, 
the most dramatic has been the growth of the Internet. Information now circulates and 
public opinions are now expressed on electronic bulletin boards with nationwide 
reach. (p. 79)  
 
Moreover, they are able to exchange and spread information despite complicated and 
massive censorship apparatuses. Since the concurrent development of the Internet and 
censorship tools, “Chinese netizens have shown that they possess boundless creativity 
and ingenuity in finding such ways to express themselves despite stifling government 
restrictions on online speech” and that, “with their growing numbers, expanding social 
networks, and increasing influence, seem to be evolving from ‘voices under domination’ 
to ‘networked agents of change’” (Link & Qiang, 2013, pp. 81, 85). 
At the same time netizens were using online networks to expose local and provincial 
level government representatives, President Xi was also investigating high-ranking 
officials, which stirred fear and unrest in the upper echelons of the CCP. In 2014, Zhou 
Yongkang, the former head of China’s security service, was brought in on corruption 
charges, which made front page headlines around the globe and reverberated across 
social media. As soon as the information was released, it began quickly bouncing across 
smartphone screens, stirring conversations across China. Zhou was the most senior 
official to be fired under Xi’s antigraft campaign and in the history of the People’s 
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Republic (MacFarquhar, 2015).  
Once Zhou came under scrutiny, an investigation made clear three interlocking 
systems implicated in corruption—national politics, oil, and regional power (Wu, 2015). 
Zhou had deep ties to the oil industry. He worked for China National Petroleum 
Corporation (the country’s largest oil and gas producer) for over 30 years. He got his start 
working in the oil fields after graduating from Beijing Petroleum Institute in 1966 with a 
degree in geophysical survey and exploration and rose up the ranks, developing ties with 
local authorities that would help him transition from a position with a state-owned 
enterprise (SOE) to a seat in the local government (Wu, 2015). In 2002, Zhou was 
promoted to member of the Politburo, and then, later that year, the minister of public 
security. Though he transitioned to political life his ties to the oil industry still were 
strong, as is evidenced by the fact that his son, Zhou Bin, became an oil and gas 
executive with ties to Texas.  
Five years later in 2007, Zhou Yongkang rose to China’s highest level decision-
making body and was appointed chairman of the Central Political and Legislative Affairs 
Commission, a position he held until his retirement. This means that Zhou was 
responsible for security during the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the period of time during 
which threats of a Jasmine Revolution proliferated in 2011. In 2012, Zhou retired, but 
this did not render him exempt from investigation. When Zhou was finally sentenced to 
life in jail in June 2015, the charges brought against him included corruption, abuse of 
power, and leaking state secrets. Along with his wife and son, he was said to have 
amassed 2.1 billion yuan in illegal income. 
The networks exposed by Zhou’s arrest and sentencing, to some degree, mirror and 
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extend the networks of corruption in Maoming and the larger Guangdong province. It 
also helps to illustrate how deeply tied oil and government are at local and national 
levels, and how deeply corruption runs. After the growth and widespread adoption of the 
Internet, these networks of corruption had to contend with growing networks of 
citizen/activists tired of corruption. This quickly expanding system of social networks 
offered the common people an alternative means of sharing information as well as a way 
to unite en masse against the deep roots of corruption in rhizomatic fashion. 
 
A Return to Protests: Battling the Rhizomatic  
Reaches of Skepticism and Mistrust 
The landscape of mistrust in China, and especially Maoming, is an important 
component in and surrounding the Maoming anti-PX protests because it had cultivated a 
deep distrust in government officials that would influence the form and force of the 
events that unfolded. This changing relationship between citizens and their local officials 
is important to map in tracing the movement of the social because, for many people in 
Maoming, it “forced a reconfiguration of the self along different lines” (Harold & 
DeLuca, p. 280). The people had to civically engage to stop corruption that was bringing 
a PX plant to Maoming. They had to enact a different form of citizenship.  
The PX plant proposal that prompted the 2014 protests was a joint venture between 
the city and the state-owned Sinopec. The two had been partnering on the plans for a 
period of time before they were made public. Failing to inform the public is a move that 
is questionable at best according to protocol, which stipulates that an environmental 
impact statement must be conducted to assess the relative danger of the project, which 
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then must be made public. After this occurs, residents must be given an opportunity to 
voice their concerns and opinions during a public comment period. However, plans for 
the PX plant were publicly announced in March and not preceded by an EIS, but instead 
by a propaganda push that included press releases, television segments, and newspaper 
articles touting the economic benefits of the plant as well as the safety of PX beginning as 
early as October 2013, or 6 months before the protests.  
In the weeks before the protest, 100,000 households received brochures that promoted 
the plant and all it could bring to Maoming (Tiezzi, 2014). During this time, government 
officials also campaigned for popular approval by having schools circulate a petition of 
support for the proposed PX plant. Teachers were asked to have students and their 
parents sign the form, thereby agreeing to not only endorse the project but also refrain 
from becoming involved in any potential protests against the plant. When some refused, 
the government threatened to prevent their children from graduating and/or to expel 
them. A similar tactic was used with employees of Sinopec, though the threats leveraged 
against them related to their schedules and wages (Lee & Ho, 2014). In all government-
owned businesses, employees were asked to sign a form agreeing to refrain from joining 
protests against the plant. 
Though many people did end up signing the agreement, this strategy backfired 
horribly. When word of the government’s coercive tactics spread among citizens, it 
fueled outrage and exacerbated the public’s mistrust of officials over wild public 
networks. Maoming residents were still reeling from the aforementioned graft 
investigation that led to the arrest of 300 officials. They did not look favorably on 
coercive tactics. This mistrust would serve as one of the main motivating factors for the 
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violent protests and would guide people’s interpretation of the events that unfolded.  
 
Mass Media as a Mouthpiece With No Voice 
In addition to the letters of commitment, the government also staged a press 
conference that was broadcast on local television. According to a television employee 
from Maoming, this news conference simply sang “the praises of the leadership,” 
discussed “how good the PX project was for economic development,” and talked about 
how little pollution it would cause (Maoming interviewee 6, personal communication, 
2015). It was not followed by questions or comments from residents, nor did reporters 
offer any critical engagement of the information presented—not because they did not 
want to, but because they simply could not do so. According to the same employee, “the 
television industry is unable to engage in critical reporting” and can only report “facts” 
(Maoming interviewee 6, personal communication, 2015). Thus, reporters simply 
publicized what the government asked them to without engaging. Reporters, as local 
media, “cannot criticize the local government. You cannot cross this line” (Maoming 
interviewee 6, personal communication, 2015).  
As a result, according to another local mainstream media employee, the general 
public does not view mass media reports as credible. She remarked, “Of course we 
cannot gain the public’s trust” (Maoming interviewee 4, personal communication, 2015). 
People treat local television and newspapers simply as the government’s mouthpiece and 
“prefer to believe the media reports on the Internet because those sites reflect the views 
of the common people.... They [online media] have the public’s trust” whereas 
mainstream media are viewed as “standing on the side of the government” (Maoming 
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interviewee 4, personal communication, 2015).  
This was reflected in the interviews with protestors as well as the online discussions. 
One interviewee stated that he thought the press conference “was not worth watching” 
because it was “just bureaucratic jargon” with no content (Maoming interviewee 3, 
personal communication, 2015). Another said that, though she did hear about the press 
conference, she did not watch it because she gets most of her news and information from 
QQ. She was unsatisfied with the press conference, as she understood it, because “they 
didn’t have any public deliberation” (Maoming interviewee 2, personal communication, 
2015). After such a long and intense battle with corruption, people were not content with 
one-sided conversations with leaders. Another interview put it simply: “If I was satisfied 
[with the press conference], I estimate that everyone wouldn’t have demonstrated in 
opposition” (Maoming interviewee 1, personal communication, 2015). Indeed, if people 
had trust in their officials and if the official press had the power to curate a robust 
conversation with their leaders, perhaps the protests would not have occurred. 
Thus, when officials try to use the power of the mainstream media, they are placing 
their eggs in the wrong basket, so to speak, because “the media did not have the ability to 
guide public opinion” (Maoming interviewee 6, personal communication, 2015). Nor are 
they a trusted source of information about the environment. The television employees 
know this. They are aware that “younger generations can find information on the web and 
various other channels. The middle-aged and older generations then can get information 
from the younger generations and via word of mouth” (Maoming interviewee 6, personal 
communication, 2015). Wild public networks overlap to transmit information. Citizens 
are no longer looking to official media reports because their reporters are not critical. In 
  
255 
short, local media’s ability to successfully disseminate environmental information is 
“very small” (Maoming interviewee 6, personal communication, 2015).  The skepticism 
in anything the government released indicates a shift in relationships. Lacking trust in 
their government, people moved to new networks. 
 
Weixin Webs and QZones Swell to a Force Majeure 
As mistrust, skepticism, anger, and fear swelled in reaction to the proposed PX plans, 
a force majeure once again arose. As we think through force majeure in this chapter, I 
will turn to Massumi’s (2011) musings on activism to draw attention to the subtleties and 
nuances of an activist event capable of moving the social:  
The elements have to come together just so, in just this disjunctive way, for the effect 
to lift off. The timing has to be right. The elements have to been brought into just the 
right proximity, in just the right way so that they detonate into a self-detaching 
experiential event. Technique is everything. . . . The appearance of the effect is a 
spontaneous experiential combustion event. But the setting-in of the conditions is 
prepared. Meticulously prepared. (p. 148, emphasis in original) 
 
Massumi (2011) goes on to clarify that the “preparation may be classifiable as ‘naturally’ 
occurring” and that “human” and “cultural” conditions should be considered as “natural” 
(p. 148). As I delve into the pulsating networks that helped to connect elements in just 
this disjunctive way, I want to emphasize that the conditions at hand created a 
spontaneous experiential combustion event in which accumulations of agency that I have 
traced thus far were dispersed among many different factors. As I track the moving and 
shifting networks, I want to emphasize that the factors at play are, in many ways, unique 
from the preceding case studies and that there is no formula for protest; no single agent 
could meticulously plan what was about to transpire. 
The lack of trust in local government and local media led to a heightened dependence 
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on social media, which came to play no small role in the Maoming uprisings and the 
toppling of government plans. During the protests, the wild public networks that 
connected Weibo, QZone, WeChat, and other social media platforms served multiple 
functions that influenced the tenor of the protests by 1) linking information seekers to 
news about past protests; 2) providing a platform by which people could find information 
outside mass media outlets; and 3) providing access to networks wild enough to offer the 
movement, slipperiness, and space to evade the censorship practices in place.  
People in Maoming followed the pathways forged by the Internet to link themselves 
to existing discussions about PX. Many of the protestors, after performing online 
searches about PX, found pages and pages of results about the protests that had occurred 
in other cities. They read stories about the people in Xiamen who marched through the 
streets. They saw images of people carrying signs and shouting slogans. They read the 
blogs that Lian Yue wrote discussing what PX could do and how not opposing the plant 
would mean the people of Xiamen would be considered “weak and dim-witted.” They 
saw video of the mayor of Dalian standing atop a van with a megaphone announcing the 
government would move the PX plant. They saw the images of people carrying signs and 
shouting on the local government’s lawn. Social media networks helped to connect and 
spread (mis)information and to wildly link people from Maoming to the 2007 protestors 
in Xiamen and the 2011 protestors in Dalian. These relationships waxed as people’s 
relationships with officials waned. 
When protestors in Maoming searched for “PX” on Baidu, they found “reports on the 
Internet. If you opened them, you could see all the headlines.... Before we knew about 
these protests, we had no understanding of PX” (Maoming interviewee 3, personal 
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communication, 2015). As has been previously established, the Internet in China is 
saturated with stories on Xiamen’s 2007 PX protest. A Baidu search for “PX protest 
Xiamen” in October of 2015 produced approximately 2,000,000 results on Baidu from 
China without a VPN. Within these results is a hodgepodge of propaganda, rants, 
affective appeals, information, and news stories. The articles that appear are then littered 
with links to stories about other protests in cities across China as well as literature on PX 
to which readers can link on an ever expanding web of information.  
One participant said that after the project was announced in Maoming, “everyone 
went [online] to check for information, and after that, everyone knew about Dalian. A lot 
of people also made reference to Xiamen, where the opposition was greater” (Maoming 
interviewee 1, personal communication, 2015). As 1 participant pointed out, “In fact it 
wasn’t just the Xiamen protests, but also several other places that protested against PX... 
other places, indeed, followed in Xiamen’s footsteps.” Even the government’s 
mouthpiece, People’s Daily, when covering the Maoming protests referred back to the 
Xiamen protests and condemned the leaders for acquiescing to the people. The 
respondents from the mass media in Maoming agreed that the enormous amount of media 
coverage available online helped to provoke further protests, including the one in their 
city. One employee said that the Maoming people saw the opposition online that had 
occurred across China and asked, “If it [PX] is good, why do other cities not want it?” 
(Maoming interviewee 6, personal communication, 2015). The long list of successful 
anti-PX protests fueled further distrust because related reports indicated PX was 
dangerous and because other local governments cancelled plans. The fact that local 
governments were succumbing to the people was evidence enough for many of an 
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implicit admission of wrongdoing. 
Once people found out about the “success in Xiamen,” “they studied it as a reference” 
(Maoming interviewee 1, personal communication, 2015). One interviewee stated that 
Xiamen proved to be a main source of inspiration for what would transpire in the streets 
of Maoming because the online reports “were all very positive” (Maoming interviewee 1, 
personal communication, 2015). Another participant recalled that “during [their] 
discussions about the protest, [they] were saying that Xiamen should be a model” 
(Maoming interviewee 3, personal communication, 2015). While it became standard to 
turn to Xiamen when dealing with PX, one protestor noted that the exact same model 
could not be applied because the circumstances in each town are different. He said, “we 
studied it as a reference,” but could not completely mimic it because “Maoming’s 
corruption is much greater” (Maoming interviewee 1, personal communication, 2015). 
This observation adds insight into one of the shortcomings of looking to wild 
networks for information. Though people could look online for information about 
protests in Xiamen, Dalian, Chengdu, and Kunming, these reports were partial and 
largely produced by amateur citizen journalists. As one mass media employee put it, 
“social media give them access to and perceptions of environmental risks and knowledge 
about the environment,” but this awareness “does not come from their own participation 
in the environmental movement; it comes from what they see about the worsening 
environmental problems in the media” (Maoming interviewee 4, personal 
communication, 2015). She went on to say, “for example, the Xiamen protests influenced 
and inspired [the people’s] perceptions of environmental awareness,” but no organization 
helped people to interpret these findings (Maoming interviewee 4, personal 
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communication, 2015). Thus, when the citizens of Maoming confronted this vast array of 
information, they interpreted it through a lens of distrust that was fostered by rampant 
corruption. For example, some protestors thought the plant being proposed in Maoming 
was a relocation of the plant proposed for Xiamen. In other words, they thought officials 
were trying to relocate the failed Xiamen plant to Maoming even though the Xiamen PX 
plant had been relocated to Zhangzhou years ago. As one media employees put it, “this 
situation and the logic that drives it are totally a result of the authorities’ long-term 
control over the media and the lack of public trust” (Maoming interviewee 6, personal 
communication, 2015).  
The people do, however, trust their friends and compatriots, many of whom are active 
on social media. This brings me to my second point: social media offered the level of 
trust necessary to raise opposition, organize a demonstration, and draw further support. 
Social media provided connections that were supplanting ones they could have had with 
officials, evidencing a movement of the social to social media. Though largely 
decentralized, word of the gatherings extended rhizomatically across networks via 
“hyperactive microblogger communit[ies]” who shared and reposted information (Smart, 
2014). This helped to gather the first wave of protestors who marched in front of 
government offices on March 30, 2014. When asked how they found out about the 
protests, each interviewee pointed to social media. One stated that she found information 
“on the Internet, for example, QZone, QQ groups, and friend circles. Two or three days 
before the protest, a lot of people posted about [PX]” (Maoming interviewee 2, personal 
communication, 2015). According to the same interviewee, “everyone knew this event 
was happening in Maoming” because information was forwarded among and between 
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friend groups. Another participant found that “everything was on these platforms. I use 
QQ and Weixin all the time” (Maoming interviewee 1, personal communication, 2014). 
He looked to these platforms and participated by forwarding information because “what 
other people sent was intended to help us understand the facts. We could forward it to our 
circle of friends or some acquaintances.... Everyone would share their online searches so 
they could better understand” (Maoming interviewee 1, personal communication, 2015). 
This was true for others as well, one of whom said it was through a QQ friend group that 
he found out about plans for the plant and information “about Maoming wanting to build 
the PX project” (Maoming interviewee 3, personal communication, 2014).  
Information about PX, news stories, and the planned stroll could all be found on the 
Internet. Once the protests began, images started circulating, which brought curious 
onlookers from near and far. People wanted to witness this event, which would certainly 
become an important historical moment for the city. One person, who went to the protests 
said he went “to see the action” after reading about it on social media and seeing images 
(Maoming interviewee 3, personal communication, 2015). Once he arrived, he found that 
“the scene was very shocking. More than 1,000 people were there and it felt like they 
were very passionate” (Maoming interviewee 3, personal communication, 2015). But 
before long, he was interpolated into the protest activities. After the police dispersed the 
crowds, they selected five people to be representatives and attend a meeting about the 
proposed PX plant. 
Another person who attended the protests found information about the event on QQ 
and forwarded information out to her friends because “forwarding is a way we could let a 
few more people know this event was happening in Maoming” (Maoming interviewee 2, 
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personal communication, 2015). As the number of violent images increased, so too did 
the number of protestors and onlookers. According to Lee and Ho (2014), “[s]ome people 
decided to join the rally because they felt angry after seeing pictures of police 
suppression” (p. 38). Anger and outrage increased when images of injured bodies and 
people lying in pools of blood started bouncing across social media feeds. Anger, 
especially when related to issues of domestic social problems, “can spread quickly as the 
users want to show their sympathy to the victims by retweeting tweets and criticizing the 
criminals or the government” (Fan et al., 2014, p. 6). This brought even more people to 
the streets and increased the amount and speed of information traveling across QQ, 
Weibo, and Weixin. Although most of the most violent pictures were a sham and were 
not taken in Maoming, they still had force, and brought people to the streets.  
The impact of these rumors was intensified by the fact that there “were no 
professional journalists on the spot to report on the anti-PX rally, [so] participants had to 
play the dual role of protesting and news-making.... Maoming protestors could only rely 
on social media” (Lee & Ho, 2014, p. 38). Censorship and distrust in the local media 
drove people online. This is part of the reason why people became so engaged on their 
smartphones—because they needed to become decentered knots of news making so the 
event did not go undocumented and could not be covered up like officials attempted to do 
with the Wenzhou train incident. This strategy worked. Local and international news 
outlets picked up the story along with the images, which were gathered from social media 
feeds, including Weibo. Social media became a way to organize protestors, rally crowds, 
document events, disseminate information, and raise awareness beyond their borders.  
The government was aware of the activity occurring on social media, but launching 
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successful censorship practices becomes difficult on wild public networks. Protest 
participants were able to fly under the radar of censorship and then circumvent it by 
utilizing more private platforms, word play, and by creating a dynamic flow of 
information censors could not immediately trace. First, the fact that information was 
being circulated among friend groups on QQ and Weixin is important because that means 
it was not drawing attention the same way a more public discussion on Weibo, for 
example, would. The protestors using QQ were circulating information within friend 
groups, where only those in the group can see the information. Weixin also privileges 
privacy. If a user posts on her/his Weixin “Moments” feed, only those people who are 
friends with that user can see the post. Friends of friends can access neither the post nor 
the comments to it. Weixin has a private group chat feature in which you can send 
messages to a select group of people, which will remain private. Though some 
commentators decreed the turn toward privacy on Weixin to be the death knell for social 
movements (Davison, 2012; “From Weibo to WeChat,” 2014), it has proven to be an 
enormous asset for protestors. According to Lee and Ho (2014),  
WeChat [Weixin] became the only online channel relatively free from official 
Internet surveillance. Information on WeChat was shared on the basis of friendship, 
which certainly limited the scope of its circulation. Nevertheless, this drawback was 
compensated by greater reliability, because receivers tended to know senders on a 
personal basis. (p. 38) 
 
Much of the information was being circulated between friends, not publicly where it 
could be shared and commented on—both actions that would draw the attention of 
authorities and cause a feed to be censored. Therefore, the lack of public dissemination 
helped to insure that the information could and would travel, which it did as it bounced 
between friend groups. 
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Of course, much of what was posted was censored: “It wasn’t just Weibo. On QQ 
forums, attachments and content was also deleted. If the content was related to PX, it was 
very easy for it to disappear in a short amount of time” (Maoming interviewee 1, personal 
communication, 2015). Much can be learned from what is missing from contemporary 
discourses (Wander, 1984). According to China Digital Times’ list of censored words on 
Weibo, the words Maoming and PX were blocked on the first day of the protest, March 
31, 2014. According to the spreadsheet, no additional censorship occurred for several 
days. However, after both legitimate and fake images of injured and bloodied protestors 
began circulating in the following days, on April 5, 2014, the censored search terms grew 
exponentially to include Maoming+take to the streets+take a walk, Maoming+assemble, 
Maoming+march, Maoming+demonstration, Maoming+conflict, Maoming+massacre, 
Maoming+tank, Maoming+police, Maoming+bloody, Maoming+petrochemical 
engineering project, Maoming+chemical industry, and Maoming+P[X]. The numbers of 
people and force of indignation were increasing as images of the violence made their way 
onto the smartphone screens people were refreshing every couple minutes. The 
government reacted by attempting to interrupt those flows, to cut connections, and to turn 
images of bloodied bodies into error messages. 
Panicked local officials went even further than simply censoring. In some cases, 
whole friend groups were either deleted or the chat function was shut off. However, the 
censors were often at least a few minutes behind the people posting: 
...usually about 30 minutes afterwards [after posting], it was deleted. Everyone was 
more attentive. If you checked within 10 minutes, you could see it once...Everyone 
was looking at a certain time...usually it was early in the morning or late at night. 
(Maoming interviewee 1, personal communication, 2015). 
 
Another participant discussed the windows of opportunity amidst censorship: “I also saw 
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[news about the protests] several times on Weibo. Usually you could see it late at 
night...one or two in the morning...and then the next morning they were usually deleted” 
(Maoming interviewee 5, personal communication, 2015). If the content was sensitive, 
people checked often, stayed up into the wee hours of the night, and immediately 
downloaded anything they wanted to keep. 
In times of protest, when networks swell and tremor with activity simultaneously 
generated by thousands of citizens turned activists, government officials, and onlookers, 
people adopt new practices of looking and new habits of engagement. If participants and 
spectators want to follow what is happening, they must look often, upload strategically, 
and download quickly. Speed becomes an important ally for protestors, which is an 
important characteristic of social media. These new practices then impact how people 
process the events. Careful deliberation is not an option; “[s]peed and images, singly and 
in concert, annihilate contemplation” as people “make do in this new civic space” 
characterized by moving and shifting networks (DeLuca, 2006, p. 89). People are being 
barraged with information and interpreting it quickly. This information is processed 
within a certain network of relationships, and the relationships of trust between citizens 
often trump the relationship between the people and their government in these events. 
Speed is a must and, therefore, integral to protests.  
As information is flying across platforms and more and more bodies are gathering, 
government officials must quickly assess and deal with the situation. Censorship becomes 
a standard tool in attempts to tame the masses, as was the case in Maoming. Before it was 
censored, however, the government attempted to use its own Weibo account to 
discourage protestors from gathering by deeming the activity illegal that was “seriously 
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disturbing social order.” This post garnered more than 1,300 comments, many of which  
criticized both the government’s handling of the protest as well as its involvement in 
the petrochemical plant. One Weibo user asked rhetorically, “Who has ever seen an 
application for protest be approved?” In another popular comment, one user 
suggested sarcastically that in order to prove the plant is not harmful, Maoming 
officials should move their offices and homes next door, and “send their family 
members to work at the plant.”  (Allen-Ebrahimian, 2014, para. 4) 
 
The government responded to these criticisms by running a front page article in the 
Maoming Daily about the safety of PX as well as its importance in the country.  
This tactic failed miserably in an environment in which people deeply distrusted their 
government, and after a few days, officials turned to censorship to curb the flow of 
information. The use of censorship, however, is rarely entirely effective and can often 
draw more attention to what is being censored rather than eliminating it. This is, in part, 
because platforms are never used singularly, but always in conjunction with other 
platforms. Weibo feeds crisscross with Weixin chat groups. Information that was 
downloaded and saved before it was deleted on QQ can be uploaded elsewhere. Digital 
technologies, according to Massumi (2011), are “an expanding network of connective 
and fusional potentials” (p. 81) that are constantly connecting. Wild public networks are 
too tangled for censorship to be a cureall. Information appears on multiple feeds 
simultaneously, people employ code words to get around censors, users download 
information they find sensitive, images that have lain dormant for days or weeks 
resurface once censors let down their guard, onlookers from other countries can access 
information on wild public networks and spread information of the event, and the error 
message telling users that the search term Maoming produces no results can draw more 
attention to what is happening.  
The ability of censored information to create a higher demand is something the 
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government has witnessed numerous times. For example, when the politically leaning 
posts of well known blogger Han Han were censored, it was “an act witnessed by 
millions of casual Internet users who, otherwise, were happy to live their lives without 
ever dwelling on the patronizing mechanics of censorship” (Osnos, 2014, p. 200).  As a 
result, the censors did not silence Han Han, but rather incited awareness and outrage.   
Similarly, when censorship occurred surrounding the Maoming protests, it only increased 
the people’s mistrust in their government and drew further attention to the events and 
violence from casual onlookers. As soon as people found out their government was 
cutting off flows of information on social media, they increased their allegiance to the 
platforms and distanced themselves from their government. The greater the efforts at 
silencing were, the greater the resistance in Maoming.  The censors did, indeed, fail to 
stop the protests, and so did the violence.  
Over the course of the protests, the elements came “together just so, in just this 
disjunctive way”; the timing was right; the elements were “brought into just the right 
proximity, in just the right way so that they detonate into a self-detaching experiential 
event” (Massumi, 2011, p. 148) that forced renegotiations between the people of 
Maoming, Sinopec, local officials, and the central government. The social shifted. 
After 3 days of unruly protests, officials announced that they would meet with 
representatives from the public and hold a press conference. When the meeting finally 
occurred several days later, it was moved from the original site at the last minute, 
ostensibly to discourage protestors from gathering outside the location of the press 
conference. The government was running from the people. Furthermore, the press 
conference was not open to the public and the press outlets invited to attend were only 
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allowed to do so under strict guidance from the local government. It was, however, 
broadcast on the Internet. When officials emerged after the discussion, they announced 
that the PX project would be postponed until “a consensus among citizens is reached,” a 
rather vague promise that certainly drew skepticism (Lee & Ho, 2014, p. 39). As of the 
time of the interviews (May 2015), as far as the interviewees were aware, construction on 
the project had not begun. The government was, perhaps, dragging their feet until 
opposition and awareness faded.  
 
Renegotiating Relationships: Moving the Social 
In the wake of these protests, of this force majeure that left a trail of images, injuries, 
and charred buildings, much needed to be renegotiated. The shifting of the social can be 
witnessed via these renegotiations. First and foremost, the local officials were forced to 
postpone plans for the plant indefinitely. This was a major defeat for local officials, who 
would lose the revenue and bonuses that came with what was to be a 3.5 billion yuan 
($563m) paraxylene (PX) plant. Moreover, this plant was very much needed in China. By 
2014, the massive PX shortage in China that was exacerbated by protests in places like 
Xiamen and Maoming forced the country to import over half the PX they use. Of the 16 
million tonnes China used in 2014 as the world’s largest consumer of the chemical 
compound, it had to import 9.5 million. Much of this PX is used in China’s textile 
industry, which accounted for approximately 12% of the country’s exports in 2014 
(Chen, 2015a). This not only costs China money it could save by producing its own PX, 
but it also creates a dependence on other countries when China is working to be self 
sufficient. PX demand is growing globally and many large oil giants, including Exxon 
  
268 
Mobile, Chevron Phillips, and Honeywell, are building plants in India, Vietnam, Saudi 
Arabia, and South Korea in an attempt to increase supply.  
The plant slated for Maoming was part of a larger petrochemical expansion project 
intended to make the city “a world-class petrochemical base. With an annual production 
capacity of 600,000 tons, the planned PX plant was obviously one of the fundamentals to 
achieve that goal” (Kai, Qing, & Mei, 2014, para. 20). The project, which was listed in 
the Chinese government’s 12th Five Year Plan (2011-2015), was viewed as crucial to 
helping to produce enough product to meet the growing demand. Building a PX plant on 
the scale proposed for Maoming is a wise investment move because, due to infrastructure 
costs, building bigger plants means making PX cheaper. Since China is dealing in 
hundreds of thousands of tons of the chemical, savings add up quickly. Furthermore, the 
PX shortage has driven up the cost of PX as well as chemicals down the processing 
chain. In 2014, a chemical made from PX called PTA rose in price from about $800 per 
ton in late May to around $1,000 in August of that year (Sato, 2014). 
Sinopec was slated to oversee Maoming’s PX project, and as the second largest oil 
company in China, it is a formidable force. The company operates “as a state-authorized 
investment organization in which the state holds the controlling share” with a registered 
capital of RMB 231.6 billion (“About Us,” 2014, para. 1). In 2014, Sinopec Group was 
ranked third in the Fortune Global 500 and in 2015 Sinopec ranked 24th on Forbes list of 
the world’s 2,000 largest companies, second in sales, 60th in profit, and 56th in market 
value (“Sinopec on the Forbes Global 2000 List,” 2015). This combination of size and 
affiliation to the state has allowed it to build and extend its investment in China and 
abroad. For example, after the PX plant in Zhangzhou built by the Xianglu Group (also 
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known as Dragon Aromatics) suffered a second explosion in early 2015, local authorities 
reportedly wanted “Sinopec to participate before allowing the plant to reopen” (Chen, 
2015b, para. 2). Ostensibly, this $3 billion buyout was initiated to insure better safety, 
which is concerning news considering the lack of trust the local Chinese people have in 
Sinopec. This deal also will help Sinopec to expand while shrinking the assets of the 
competition. Furthermore, “the purchase could also allow Sinopec to increase its 
purchases of Iranian oil,” which would allow the company to further expand globally 
(Chen, 2015b, para. 16). This is but one example of Sinopec’s reach within and beyond 
China’s borders. 
This focus on Sinopec is to draw attention to the fact that the people in Maoming 
were battling not just a plant, but a global behemoth. Their success, even if temporary, 
warrants attention. The disruption to the plans for the PX plant reverberated out in many 
directions, forcing not only the local government to renegotiate with its largest 
benefactor, Sinopec, but also the central government to adjust its plans to expand PX in 
the following Five Year Plan. Without this plant, China’s ability to reduce the PX 
shortage will be, once again, postponed, thereby leading to economic losses related to 
textile industries, plastic production, and the manufacturing of other chemicals further 
down on the processing chain. These are just a few potential impacts. The postponement 
or cancellation of the plans for the plant certainly will continue to splinter out in other 
directions.  The aforementioned takeover of the Zhangzhou plant may be related to the 
troubles Sinopec faced in Maoming, especially since it could direct profits (now missing 
from Maoming) away from its Taiwanese owners back to China’s state-owned enterprise.  
In addition to these financial repercussions exists another major renegotiation 
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between the residents of Maoming and their government. If officials want to resume 
plans for the plant, they will have to take a very different path than they did initially. 
Rather than simply initiate a one-sided propaganda push, the local government will need 
to conduct an EIS, present it to the public, and hold a period of public comment during 
which local citizens will be given the opportunity to voice their opinions. Given citizens’ 
deep seated mistrust of their officials, selecting a reputable independent company to 
conduct the EIS will be of the utmost importance if they are to convince the people of 
Maoming to support the project.  
The relationship between the people and their government was and is fractured in 
ways that cannot be easily mended and evidences a shift in the social. Without faith in 
their officials to do what is best for the people, residents in cities across China are 
increasingly more likely to react with opposition to projects. Furthermore, as is the case 
in Maoming, even if the project has been proven to be “safe” in places like the U.S., 
people are extremely reticent to trust that their government will properly manage the 
projects, thereby transforming them into dangerous developments. Interviewees evidence 
a change in consciousness when they repeatedly expressed their complete and utter lack 
of trust in local officials when they, unprompted, said things like “We all know 
Maoming’s government is seriously corrupt. We completely don’t trust them” and “in 
terms of my trust in the government, it is very low, very low. You could say I have none” 
(Maoming interviewee 2, personal communication, 2015). Another participant said, “Of 
course I don't trust CCP officials. As for Maoming, we trust them even less. Maoming 
officials are more corrupt than officials elsewhere” (Maoming interviewee 3, personal 
communication, 2015). This lack of trust became the major issue in protesting the plant, 
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“because management is key...it would be like having a ticking time bomb around.... 
Everybody has this kind of mentality. We don’t have a lot of confidence in this project” 
(Maoming interviewee 1, personal communication, 2015). This lack of trust and 
widespread skepticism is a barrier that has been growing in Maoming for decades, and 
even the central authorities will not be able to dismantle it easily.  
Part of the impetus for President Xi’s war against corruption was to restore waning 
faith in political officials, but rather than increasing trust, the exposure of widespread 
corruption has, to a degree, increased mistrust. According to Lin Boqiang, an energy 
economist at Xiamen University, “the local governments’ handling of Xiamen and 
Dalian’s anti-PX campaign has set a very bad example” because 
The public does not know what level of pollution the project would cause and how 
acceptable the pollution level would be. They see Xiamen and Dalian rejecting PX 
projects and assume that other cities should not have them either. To halt the project 
whenever opposition emerges only causes more distrust. (as cited in Lin, 2014, para. 
8, emphasis added)  
 
In Lin’s view, distrust has spread like a contagion because the local governments are 
implicitly agreeing with the people that PX is dangerous when they cancel plans. With 
each new protest, the belief PX is harmful is reinforced and builds, along with an 
unwavering distrust of any official who says otherwise. The people of Maoming had lost 
most of their faith in public officials due to guilty verdict after guilty verdict in corruption 
cases. Thus, when confronted with the government’s proposal for a PX project, Maoming 
residents turned to wild public networks and quickly learned that people from across the 
country had opposed similar projects. Though the government led multiple information 
campaigns, they were, of course, going to face opposition from the people.  
Ma Jun, the director of the ENGO Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs in 
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Beijing, agrees with Lin’s assessment that distrust in officials is only increasing as the 
number of protests grows. However, he attributes the peoples’ deep-seated suspicion not 
to the government’s caving to public pressure, but to the exclusion of the public in the 
approval process for major projects, saying “the ice of three feet does not result from just 
one day of cold weather” (as cited in Lin, 2014, para. 9). The distrust in Maoming has 
been in the making for years, and the more people are excluded, the more exacerbated the 
problem will become. 
An editorial published in China Daily bolstered this argument, maintaining that “For 
a local government, it is not a matter of just dissuading local residents from opposing the 
project, it is a matter of establishing their own trustworthiness among local residents,” 
which is something Maoming was woefully lacking (China Daily, 2014, para. 5). The 
editorial goes on to state, “many residents believe that local governments choose to 
introduce polluting industries regardless of the cost to the environment and residents’ 
health” and most governments lack “the awareness that transparency can be a way to 
reduce and dispel the mistrust between them and residents” (China Daily, 2014, paras. 6, 
8). However, even if they were transparent, at this point, who in Maoming might listen?  
The China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development 
(CCICED) (2013) found that  
Where public participation in environmental decision making is nonexistent or 
ineffective, public suspicion of development projects is high and levels of public trust 
tend to be low. In the absence of effective channels for public participation in 
environmental decision-making, and in the event of environmental incidents, citizen 
voices frequently find their outlet through protest. (p. 5) 
 
Rebuilding trust is absolutely essential to governmental success. The report goes on to 
state: “Achieving an ecological civilization will require full public participation. Without 
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this, lasting environmental protection cannot be ensured, discontent will continue to grow 
and trust will not be restored” (CCICED, 2013, p. 1).  
What the eruptions of protests have made clear is that the invasive and widespread 
corruption has damaged the relationship between people and the government, perhaps 
irreparably. The tax system that privileges corporations over people, the deeply 
embedded practice of bribery in local governments, and the shifting gap between officials 
and the people they ostensibly serve has created an environment in which mistrust, doubt, 
and skepticism flourish. Things will not change until officials and residents can work 
together to create an environment more conducive to cultivating a relationship predicated 
on openness, which will be difficult given the deeply rooted oil industry and tangled ties 
between it and local government.  
However, the fact that these protests are occurring over and over again is testament to 
the claim that “environmental activism has provided citizens with more opportunities to 
exercise their rights” (Matsuzawa, 2012, p. 81). As was discussed in Chapter One, the 
people’s right to protest is protected under the Chinese constitution, but permits are 
rarely, if ever, actually given, so the Chinese people exercise their right to oppose 
pollution via risky unsanctioned protest. When the citizens of Maoming marched to City 
Hall with signs and then through the streets where more people joined, they knew the 
potential to be beaten or imprisoned existed. They went anyway. As van Rooij (2010) 
explains in his research about the barriers Chinese people face in confronting pollution, 
knowledge of the harmful impacts of pollution “gradually turned them [the villagers] into 
activists” (p. 60), which is also happening in Maoming. As citizens turned activists, these 
“desperate pollution victims try every strategy available to them to get attention for their 
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cause” (van Rooij, 2010, p. 76). This shift in the notion of citizenship and possibilities for 
engagement brings me back to the impacts of these protests, of this force majeure that 
upended the order of things.  
 
Moving Toward New Forms of Civic Engagement 
After 9 days of protests, after 9 days marked by violence, after dozens of people were 
sent to jail, after clashes with outside police, after rumors ran rampant and censors tried 
to shut down wild public networks, after this and more, the government announced that 
plans for the plant would be postponed without support from the people. This was, 
indeed, an important achievement, but the repercussions of the protest pulsated beyond 
this “success”; the protests in Maoming set off protests in other cities, which were 
conducted in solidarity with Maoming. After people protested for several days in 
Maoming, smaller sister demonstrations were launched in Shenzhen and Guangzhou (D., 
2014). Though remarkably smaller, approximately 200 people in Guangzhou and 20 
people in Shenzhen gathered in the face of police presence and heavy rain to also demand 
that the PX plans for Maoming be scrapped and that the people in Maoming detained in 
the protests be released. The protestors in Shenzhen, who were all originally from 
Maoming, were arrested shortly after beginning their march and taken in for questioning 
before being released (He & Li, 2014). This movement of the protests outward helped to 
raise awareness of what was happening in Maoming by creating what DeLuca (1999) 
calls an “image event” in which people not only demonstrate, but then are arrested, 
which, in this case, helped to bolster disdain for authorities attempting to quash the 
protests. Pictures snapped of the protestors in Shenzhen being arrested were quickly 
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uploaded to social media, where they drew attention not only to the opposition in 
Maoming, but also to the fact that protestors across the area were being unfairly treated 
and prevented from expressing themselves.  
Violence was a major force in the Maoming protests. The police beat protestors with 
billy clubs, threw tear gas into crowds, and announced into megaphones that the people 
gathered needed to “clear the field.” Violent beatings drew others in to the fray, as was 
the case with the aforementioned protestor who yelled at police to get them to stop 
beating one of the younger protestors and was subsequently beaten. Images of police 
beating protestors are likely to incite anger, an emotion Fan et al. (2014) have found 
travels faster than other emotions on social media platforms like Weibo. Anger moves 
people to repost, comment, forward, and share, and the Maoming protests were replete 
with images of citizen and police clashes. The bloodiest images, which were found to be 
phony, flew the fastest, and these were the images that drew more onlookers to the 
protest sites and instigated people in surrounding cities to protest in solidarity. 
Violence put a spotlight on Maoming and violence in the form of rumors (and valid 
documentation) forced a response from officials, who put out official statements to 
contest the legitimacy of the most violent images. Reports and images of violence drew 
the attention of Human Rights Watch, who investigated the protests. Human Rights 
Watch China Director, Sophie Richardson, made a public statement that “Accounts and 
photographs suggest that police may have used disproportionate force against 
demonstrators in Maoming.... Authorities should move swiftly to investigate these 
claims, and hold those responsible to account” (Human Rights Watch, 2014).  
As is explicated by Harold and DeLuca (2005), violence acts as a potent rhetorical 
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force and bloody bodies a powerful text that can mobilize masses. As has been the case in 
protests in various locations, “symbolic violence and the uncivil disobedience [fulfill] the 
function of gaining the attention of the distracted media” (DeLuca et al., 2011, p. 151), 
and, I would add, distracted networks. The transformation from peaceful protestors to 
pulsating acts of violence and retaliatory acts of destruction communicated the gravity of 
the event and drew attention to what was at stake—lives. Violence, as a rhetorical force, 
does not exist as the counter, or opposite, of reason, and it should not be discarded or 
eschewed for not being “civil” (Stormer, 2013). Violence, like dissensus, is an important 
force in the movement of the social. Furthermore, violence/force is the essence of civil 
disobedience, of activism, of democracy. As Abel (1999) argues, “Violence is a force—
or rather a multiplicity of different forces” that cannot be judged via a moral stance (p. 
326). Violence forces people to think and rethink relationships.  
Witness the Civil Rights protests in Birmingham during which violence against black 
bodies occurred and were documented (Johnson, 2007). Dogs ripped open pant legs and 
punctured the flesh of Black bodies. Images of violence such as these as well as violent 
images of “Emmett Till, provoked both affect and action because it demonstrated that 
conventional boundaries—between self and others, North and South, life and death—are 
irrevocably blurred” (Harold & DeLuca, 2005, p. 281). These violent images changed the 
way people conceptualized their relationships. More recently, images of Eric Garner 
being wrestled to the ground and suffocated by police in New York City appeared only 
months before images of Michael Brown’s dead body lying in the streets of Ferguson, 
Missouri in 2014. These pictures of violence provoked affect and action in the form of 
violent protests that made evident racial tensions between White police officers and 
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Black bodies. I join DeLuca (2013) in arguing that, “In recognizing that violence imbues 
rhetoric, I conclude that rhetoric is not about good reasons but acts of force” (p. 230). 
Violence must be treated as a form of rhetoric that affects and moves in many ways 
across wild public networks. Violence is force. 
Though violence played an important role in garnering support and attention for the 
protests, the interviewees saw the existence of violence as problematic. They were prone 
to judge it with a moral lens. For one interviewee, corruption “leads to more serious 
situations and can turn into lawless violence,” as was the case in Maoming. For him, the 
protests would have been better and more successful “if there wasn’t any violence. 
Violence makes casualties inevitable...violence will inevitably cause loss” in the form of 
revenue, injuries, and emotional trauma that results (Maoming interviewee 1, personal 
communication, 2015). Another participant adamantly insisted that the violence that 
occurred was not necessary, that she was unsatisfied with the outcome largely because 
the people caused violence by throwing bottles and the police by hitting people 
(Maoming interviewee 2, personal communication, 2015). This sentiment was echoed by 
yet another participant who stated that though violence is inescapable in such situations, 
“Using violence will definitely lead to worse results” (Maoming interviewee 3, personal 
communication, 2015). In times of uprisings, it is the government that is framed as the 
entity wanting to keep the peace and promote harmony. Though this is a small sampling 
of protestors, some people involved in the movement were disappointed in the violence 
that occurred, regardless of its inevitability. Thus, one of the impacts was an aversion to 
violence and a preference for more civil forms of participation. 
Another major impact of the protests was a general increase in environmental 
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awareness beyond PX. In the aftermath of the protests, people saw Maoming anew. For 
some people, it involved experiencing the air anew and realizing that the acrid smells 
they once simply dealt with became something people, “of course, should avoid” 
(Maoming interviewee 2, personal communication, 2015). Another person remarked that 
“before we never paid attention to air quality. . . . [now] when [the air quality] is worse, 
we reduce our outdoor activities” (Maoming interviewee 1, personal communication, 
2015). After the protests, one participant responded that “comparatively, now I am more 
conscientious about the environment” (Maoming interviewee 2, personal communication, 
2015). Part of this is due to the fact that people are learning from others what can be 
done. A media representative remarked that “People are slowly becoming more 
environmentally aware. They are beginning to care about the environment in which they 
live” (Maoming interviewee 6, personal communication, 2015).  
This shift to environmental awareness is important, but is just in its infancy. As 1 
interviewee made clear, yes, the people opposed PX and took to streets, but cultivating a 
sense of environmental awareness must go much further than this. One interviewee 
discussed at length the trash problem in Maoming, which stems from people either not 
knowing how to sort their trash so it can be recycled or ignoring the information they 
have been given. Other problems proliferate in corporate sectors. For instance, companies 
will install the equipment necessary to treat wastewater or emissions, but they do not use 
them because the fines imposed cost companies less than actually operating the 
equipment. Maoming’s NGOs are also rather weak, with no real presence politically or 
socially. In contrast to Xiamen, where Xiamen Green Cross (XGC) had been cultivating 
environmental awareness and encouraging participation for roughly 8 years when the PX 
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protests occurred there or Dalian, where Bo Xilai invested in greening the city, the 
Maoming people had no environmental organizations to turn to for support or 
information when they were confronted with similar plans. 
While raising environmental awareness is an important achievement, each of the 
interviewees was more amazed by the changes this protest made in people’s awareness of 
their rights and civic duty. This was Maoming’s first major protest, and it created a shift 
in the way people expressed themselves, how they interacted with their government. 
“Before [this incident] people did not express their citizenship in this way” (Maoming 
interviewee 6, personal communication, 2015). After the protests, people realized that 
they could force their government to listen and act. “Most of the people stood up for 
themselves. It awakened people so they came to know their rights; they had a civic 
awakening” (Maoming interviewee 3, personal communication, 2015). This was a major 
shift from before the protests occurred when “the Central government would hand down 
the documents, and it would just be implemented. At that time, this kind of situation 
[protest] could not have happened” (Maoming interviewee 6, personal communication, 
2015). The protest as force majeure disrupted government processes and relationships, 
enabling citizens to reimagine new ways of interacting and shifting the social.  
Part of the dispersed agency that drove these protests was fear for future generations. 
Maoming citizens “already live in a polluted environment, so I don't want our next 
generation to have to live under this kind of pollution” (Maoming interviewee 2, personal 
communication, 2015). Many people are, to varying degrees, aware that “It is written in 
the constitution that citizens have the right to assemble” (Maoming interviewee 3, 
personal communication, 2015), but people rarely exercise this right because it is 
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accompanied by serious consequences. However, “A lot of people decided to go [to the 
protests] spontaneously. They knew Maoming wanted to construct this thing and were 
afraid that the pollution would be dangerous to future generations. Everyone...wanted to 
contribute” (Maoming interviewee 2, personal communication, 2015). Rather than 
staying at home, upwards of 20,000 people decided to participate; as 1 participant said, “I 
will participate as much as possible within the scope of my ability” (Maoming 
interviewee 1, personal communication, 2015). 
This reflects an important change for many citizens, a reordering of their priorities in 
Guangdong, a province known for promoting unbridled growth and profit (the 
“Guangdong Model”). As 1 participant put it, “I think [Maoming’s protests] represent 
Maoming’s pride. Most Maoming residents ignore the things that do not affect them 
personally, as long as they make money, they don’t care.... In this case, unexpectedly, 
people went without regard to how it would impact them, personally” (Maoming 
interviewee 3, personal communication, 2015).  This marks a move away from the 
capitalist practices and corruption that have made financial gain the ultimate goal. This 
protest “invoked the people of Maoming’s awareness of their rights. It helped people who 
were under the Communist Party for decades and were deprived of their right to know to 
arouse their sense of citizenship”; after this event, he went on so say, even if the 
government decided to build the plant, this change cannot be erased (Maoming 
interviewee 3, personal communication, 2015).  
This brings me to my final point of this section, which is that this increase in civic 
engagement via environmental issues has also offered people an outlet by which to air 
their grievances regarding corruption. The people were not opposing the PX as much as 
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they were opposing the management of PX by their local officials and by Sinopec. This 
protest was just as much about protesting against corruption, if not more, than it was 
about protesting against PX. Allen-Ebrahimian (2014) describes the situation in 
Maoming as follows: 
For many grassroots observers, assurances of paraxylene’s safety miss the point. 
Zhao Chu, a military affairs expert with over 1 million Weibo followers, wrote in a 
post that was later deleted by censors, “Whether or not PX is toxic is a scientific 
question, but to build a PX-producing factory is an issue of local public policy, and 
the people of that region have a natural right to speak, as well as the right to 
participate in the final decision.” Another Weibo user complained, that the protest’s 
“main cause” was not the plant itself, but an “arrogant approach” by government that 
“makes nothing public or transparent.” (para. 8) 
 
As was the case with Xiamen and Dalian, people protested against the plant for diverse 
reasons using all kinds of (mis)information. However, one of the major threads that is 
woven throughout the protests is a lack of trust in government officials and deep 
dissatisfaction with the ways in which they interact with the people—the lack of 
transparency, their unwillingness to follow protocol, their control over the mass media, 
the lack of dialogue with the public, their manipulation of information, and so on. The 
government has left people “in the dark” about their environment, and the protests 
offered them “an outlet to vent...mainly they [the people] want the opportunity to vent 
their emotions about the government” (Maoming interviewee 3, personal communication, 
2015).  
This is an important turning point for the protests in that dissatisfaction, anger, and 
resentment about years of corruption were expressed via opposition to a PX plant 
proposed by the 24th largest company in the world. PX, if handled properly, is not a 
particularly dangerous chemical, as the government information suggests (and 
exaggerates upon). The problem is that shortcuts, cost-saving measures, and sub-
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contracting has often led to accidents, explosions, and environmental devastation in 
China. Chemical compounds combined with corruption can create ruin. These protests 
are, in part, about people engaging in new ways to follow through with a practice 
embedded in Chinese society—the restoration of the cosmic order. Confucian tradition 
dictates that the people must rebel when officials are misusing and abusing power. It is 
part of their civic duty to hold their governments responsible. They are doing so by 
utilizing, hijacking, circumventing, and operationalizing online networks over which 
force travels like wildfire. After a force majeure erupts, reordering is in order. 
 
Conclusion 
Eventually, Sinopec leaders were implicated in a corruption scandal, but not until 
after the 2014 protests. In April 2015, Wang Tianpu, president of Sinopec, stepped down 
from his position after it was announced that he was being investigated by China’s 
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (the committee that oversees corruption 
investigations) for various violations. This announcement has not slowed Sinopec’s 
growth. In October 2015, Sinopec announced the completion of a joint project with 
BASF (the world’s largest chemical producer)—a worldscale isononanol (INA) plant in 
Maoming Hi tech Industrial Development Zone. This project was just one project that 
resulted from a 50/50 partnership between the two companies that promises to bring 
about more projects. However, the changes in Maoming persist. 
Looking back on the events that transpired, the social media saturated environment 
helped launch, grow, and sustain the movement long enough to capture the attention and 
compliance of officials who were forced, at least temporarily, to give up a project that 
  
283 
would greatly increase local revenue (and their own personal bonuses). According to Lee 
and Ho’s (2014) research, many of the people who participated in the protest were deeply 
inspired by the perceived success of the 2007 Xiamen anti-PX protests as well as the 
victories that resulted from subsequent marches in other cities like Dalian and Ningbo.i 
They felt that if other cities could be successful, so too could Maoming. Peoples’ 
panmediated environment helped news of corruption as well as the protests spread 
quickly—before censors could delete posts. 
As the protests began, people sending invitations and information over Weibo, 
QZone, and Weixin helped to encourage more people to unite as did the circuitous 
marches through the streets that drew the attention of neighbors. Once the protests turned 
violent, the small snippets of information and images that flew from one account to 
another drew people from a wider circle and enticed people to see for themselves what 
was happening. The fragmented pieces of information were not enough to construct a full 
story and people arrived at the scene to investigate for themselves. The violent images, 
arguably, helped fuel further support from people not angered about PX, but angered 
about how the government was treating its citizens. Eventually, the protests spread to 
other nearby cities. The affective content moved people to move to the streets in 
polysensus. The government was forced to respond in ways contrary to its rehearsed 
practices. 
Maoming’s protests were punctuated by violence, and the affective force of violent 
images are what spread across social media feeds. An uncivil society was gathering to 
say no to pollution, no to corruption, no to violence, no to the Guangdong Model, and no 
to GDP. Dissent over the plant erupted and spurred the conflict in which people 
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demanded environmental justice. Police repeatedly retaliated against the crowds using 
tear gas and pepper spray. During the clashes, police reportedly beat some protestors with 
clubs, leaving many injured in the streets and hospital beds full of damaged bodies. 
People fought back by setting fire to vehicles and police outposts. Violence begat further 
violence and the force of violence forced change.  
Arguably, the greatest success of the protests was raising awareness about people’s 
rights and disrupting networks of corruption. For officials and industry management 
alike, Maoming was seen as a perfect home for the $563 million PX plant. First, PX is a 
petroleum derived chemical, which means that Sinopec would not have to transport the 
raw materials outside the city to make PX. Second, its coastal location and surrounding 
highway networks offered convenient means of transporting the chemical. Finally, it 
would help to relieve China’s 9.5 million ton PX shortage (D., 2014), which has forced 
China to rely on imports to manufacture products made with the chemical. Thus, their 
declaration to suspend plans was a difficult decision for them to make, but the force of 
the protestors and the publicity of the event left them with no other option.  
Together, corruption, lack of trust, a long history of oil, Xi’s antigraft campaign, 
media buzz about corruption, and the two million stories about Xiamen’s PX protest 
networked together on the Internet were important factors at play that coalesced to 
“authorize, allow, afford, encourage, permit” protest (Latour, 2007, p. 72). Thousands of 
“small, seemingly insignificant acts” merged in what became a force majeure that further 
eroded trust between the people and their government.   
The Maoming protests function as an example of how networks of environmental 
activism can be hijacked for other purposes, how these networks are wild and unruly, and 
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how wild public networks can contain and nurture diverse motivations. An image of a 
police officer joining in the protest serves as an example. Within the image lies a 
complex intersection of official representation and opposition to official edicts. Attached 
to the officer’s state-owned vehicle is a sign that reads: “Oppose PX! PX get out of 
Maoming!” In the bottom right corner of the image sits a stamp identifying the image as 
one that circulated on Weibo before being picked up by national and international news 
outlets. The officer is unidentifiable, as viewers cannot even glimpse his full profile, 
which means those cracking down on dissenters would be less likely to identify him. The 
people in front of him are unfazed. Only those people behind him, the people in his wake, 
can see his statement of opposition.  
His small, seemingly insignificant act is part of the force majeure that coalesced and 
upended everything, created new connections, and forced renegotiations. These changes 
come with no guarantee other than that new possibilities have been opened up, which are 
neither inherently good nor bad. Rebuilding citizen government relationships will require 
much work outside of protest. Research on how NGOs are helping to imagine and 
implement new practices will help to build on this research. 
 
 
                                                
i	Though the case of Dalian is often perceived as a success because local officials said 
they would move the existing PX plant, the local government never actually shut down or 








CHAPTER EIGHT  
 
FORCE MAJEURE: UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL MEDIA, SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS, AND RHETORIC AS FORCE 
 
This dissertation has focused on three dramatic events, or forces majeure, that 
upended the world for the people of Xiamen, Dalian, and Maoming. These events 
interrupted networks of corruption and forced renegotiations between the people and their 
officials. These protests do work outside of organizations, due process, and government 
systems that have immense rhetorical force precisely because they are able to disrupt 
overlapping structures of official law and networks of corruption. In cases as dire as the 
one that China is facing environmentally, these kinds of eruptions may be necessary to 
force certain changes. Frustrated with the ineffectiveness of the systems in place, people 
have taken to networks of screens and streets. One of the outcomes is a significant shift in 
the notion of civic engagement, which has the potential to lead to alternative systems of 
governance.  
I argue, however, that scholars are often too quick to rename this new form of 
governance, which is constantly changing. This is evident in the work of scholars who 
study China’s changing political and social terrain. Scholars such as Yang and Calhoun 
(2007) call what they saw as China’s new emerging governmental system “the green 
public sphere.” MacKinnon (2011) labels what she witnesses “networked 
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authoritarianism,” and Teets (2013) terms it “consultative authoritarianism.” These terms 
are helpful in tracing the movement of the social, but to implicitly or explicitly assume 
that China, which is a country that spans a vast amount of space and is home to 1.35 
billion people, has adopted a singular new form of governance is to curtail conversations. 
China is changing and moving, not stopping. 
Yang and Calhoun (2007) look to proliferating environmental discourses, or 
“greenspeak,” in China to map the changes occurring to China’s system of governance. 
These discourses occur over mass media, on the Internet, and via alternative media and 
can include everything from greenwashing campaigns to Friends of Nature’s website. 
The point is that people are talking about the environment and spaces like the Internet 
have provided a platform for people to engage in conversation and debate. As a result, 
they argue, a green public sphere has emerged that “fosters political debates and 
pluralistic views about environmental issues, and for this reason it is intrinsically 
valuable” (p. 212). In 2007, Yang and Calhoun saw this conversation as largely driven by 
ENGOs. Since then, the conversations have continued to flourish over wild public 
networks, which have allowed people to organize on their own, collect information 
among the vast jungle of rumors and opinions, and challenge the government in the 
streets. China’s political and social topography have changed. 
MacKinnon problematizes Yang and Calhoun’s (2007) piece as well as Yang’s later 
work, which focuses on the connection between environmental activism and democracy 
by asserting that “rising levels of online activism in China cannot automatically be 
interpreted as a sign of impending democratization” (p. 35). MacKinnon’s concept of 
networked authoritarianism stems from the introduction and adoption of the Internet by 
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the Chinese people and their government. In this  
networked authoritarian state, the single ruling party remains in control while a wide 
range of conversations about the country’s problems nonetheless occurs on websites 
and social-networking services.... As a result, the average person with Internet or 
mobile access has a much greater sense of freedom. (MacKinnon, 2011, p. 33) 
 
In this piece, MacKinnon takes a cybercynic approach, arguing that Internet networks 
have the potential to further oppress the people and give them a false sense of freedom 
and hope. Policy and legislative work, she argues, “are more important than ever” 
(MacKinnon, 2011, p. 44). This stance, however, lacks complexity. 
Teets sits apart from Yang and MacKinnon. She comes to her concept of “networked 
authoritarianism” by examining civil organizations in Beijing and how they have 
cultivated “a new model of state–society relationship...that encourages the simultaneous 
expansion of a fairly autonomous civil society and the development of indirect tools of 
state control” (2013, p. 20). Her study, which is based on over a hundred interviews, 
helps to elaborate upon how citizens and state representatives are working in 
conversation rather than simply vying for control. This study offers a nice counter to 
MacKinnon’s because it is grounded in the realization that the people and their 
government are in a relationship that is not unilaterally contentious. The people are 
interested in working with their government. As was discussed in Chapter Five in the 
case study on Dalian, tracing changing relationships between the people and the 
government is a far more productive way to understand how changes are occurring than 
framing the interactions as two sided. Furthermore, Teets makes clear that “the expansion 
of civil society in China is not leading to a process of democratization but rather to better 
governance under the conditions of authoritarianism, which in turn is increasing citizen 
satisfaction with the regime” (Teets, 2013, pp. 20–21).  
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Evidence of this change is apparent in forthcoming scholarship. Balla and Wu 
recently presented their findings at the Chinese Internet Research Conference (CIRC) 
2015 in Alberta, Canada. After looking at local government websites in China, they 
found that government officials are using the Internet to not only gauge public opinion, 
but also solicit input. They argue that online consultation has become “a prominent 
instrument of governance reform in which officials provide interested parties with 
opportunities to offer feedback on proposed public policies” (2015, p. 1). Though this 
tends not to be used by central authorities, over two thirds of provincial governments 
have initiated online consultations. This may mean that some provincial governments are 
working to increase transparency one step at a time. 
Together, this research shows that shifts are already occurring and—though the 
government may not make a major shift in the name of its governance nor may it change 
from the top down—as a result of decentralization, these changes are happening at the 
local level. This means that China may continue to develop localized forms of 
governance that vary across the country and that take into consideration local needs and 
variances. One thing is certain: change is still occurring. China’s governmental shifts are 
very much in process and cannot yet be named. 
 
China’s Environmental Movement Writ Large 
As is evident in the descriptions of these different forms of governance, NGOs and 
citizen groups are helping to alter notions and enactments of civic engagement. Though I 
have focused on protests in this dissertation for several reasons, they are but one aspect of 
China’s environmentally driven movement. Networks of ENGOs also overlap with 
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ephemeral eruptions of protestors, environmental documentary makers help to stir 
affective winds that compel mothers to fight for their children, and environmental artists 
coping with rapid change and rabid consumption intersect with journalists dedicated to 
forwarding an environmental agenda. The networks of environmental activism are 
vibrating, pulsating, and expanding. Protests are one part of complicated assemblages. 
Environmentalist activity also extends far beyond such overt activism. In the 
introduction, I related stories about two of my friends from two very different parts of 
China whose familial networks were disrupted by pollution and the cancers it caused. 
One could read their stories and label the people “victims.” However, in both cases, the 
disruption of their networks changed their relationships with their careers. The student 
diagnosed with throat cancer used his degree to pursue a career as a journalist, which 
would allow him to report on issues that could influence public opinion. My friend from 
southern China shifted his studies to environmental activism and is currently working 
closely with ENGOs to write a manual that will help emerging and established ENGOs 
navigate the new policies the Chinese government has put in place to make their work 
more effective.  
The networks are further altered in subtle ways. Over the course of my conversations 
with protestors, I witnessed them change just by telling their story. At the end of 
interviews, they were thanking me for doing the research and telling me how important it 
was. They wanted to help—especially the people of Dalian who felt disappointed by the 
outcome of their protests—and knew that academic work could potentially disrupt and 
shift networks in a way that would help create safer living environments. As events, as 
forces majeure, the protests in Dalian left local communities upended and lacking any 
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system that could help ensure that their government followed through with promises to 
close the PX plants. Thus, some were still searching for ways to fully realize the 
outcomes of their risky forms of protest. 
Despite this work, the future of China’s environment remains uncertain. Those who 
are watching are witnessing a great deal of conflicting information colliding regarding 
NGOs, nationalism, and Internet laws. For example, in 2015, the central government 
released the second draft of a law concerning “Managing Foreign NGOs.” This law 
requires foreign NGOs, many of which operate under the radar in China, to register 
formally with the Chinese government. It also places them under the purview of Public 
Security Departments, which is an entirely different branch than domestic organizations 
(domestic NGOs are regulated by the Ministry of Civil Affairs). This move grants “these 
[State] organs broad powers to control [international] NGOs’ personnel decisions, 
programs, and grantmaking, even giving them apparently unrestricted access to the 
organizations’ computers and bank accounts” (Editors, 2015, para. 1). If passed, this law 
also will make procuring international funding more difficult for Chinese NGOs by 
placing a variety of restrictions on funding and will make collaborating with foreign 
NGOs more difficult for domestic partners. Some have interpreted this law as hostile 
toward civil society (Genser & Kuperminc, 2015).  
However, also in 2015, the central government gave NGOs the ability to sue 
industries over pollution violations, as was previously discussed. This was exciting news 
for ENGOs like Greenovation Hub, who saw it as a step forward for NGOs because the 
government was increasingly cooperating with ENGOs in China by holding conferences 
to which both registered and unregistered organizations were invited. As a result of the 
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most recent conference, ENGOs were conducting research to inform national policies. 
The law giving NGOs the right to sue was monumental for environmental organizations 
because it not only gave them important legal rights, but it also further validated their 
importance, their value, and their standing in the community at large. NGOs quickly 
began taking advantage of their new right. According to China Daily, in March of 2015, 
the NGO All-China Environment Federation filed a lawsuit against the Dezhou Jinghua 
Group for damages related to the air pollution they were discharging into that 
atmosphere. This was the first, but not the last lawsuit an NGO would file. 
These two legal actions—a proposed law to invasively regulate international NGOs 
and a law stating that NGOs can sue polluting industries—impact the networks of NGOs 
in myriad different ways. They impact relationships, collaborative opportunities, tensions 
between NGOs and businesses, and interrupt the pathways of funding so crucial for 
NGOs to continue their work; however, this is what NGOs in China are facing and they 
must navigate this complicated terrain. This is not the only contradiction playing out in 
Chinese politics. 
As was explored in Chapter Three, nationalism is being simultaneously coopted by 
the central government and activists for very different purposes. Whereas NGO leaders, 
protestors, and environmental documentary makers are all answering the call to put the 
greater good ahead of oneself in order to better the environment and ensure a safe living 
space for their children (civic duty), government authorities are using nationalism to 
encourage blind devotion to one’s country. They are stirring up feelings of shame to 
encourage allegiance to the nation. Both are working. These variations have created 
conflict, fear, and concern for government officials who want to direct how people 
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sacrifice for the common good as well as the definition of “common good.”  
Finally (and importantly for this dissertation), conflicting information regarding 
Internet policies abounds. The Constitution declares that people have civil rights and that 
they should be allowed to critique and criticize their government. People have taken to 
the Internet to exercise this right. Censorship has been deployed consistently. However, 
harsh critiques, at times, are tolerated. Knowing when a critique of the government will 
result in an invitation to tea (a euphemism for a meeting with government officials 
regarding a person’s behavior or actions) is difficult to predict and always in flux. The 
rules and tactics to prevent mass uprisings are always changing. As scholars have 
watched the government react and analyzed the data they have gathered, what has come 
to light is that the Chinese government recognizes the potential for outrage to be 
organized over networks. This is evident in King, Pan, and Roberts’ (2013) research, 
which demonstrates that, if a user posts a scathing critique of officials, it is not likely to 
be censored unless it gains momentum and begins drawing too much attention in the form 
of views and comments online. Then it disappears.  
The year that the King et al. research was published, the Chinese government passed 
a law aimed at preventing online rumors. This was a valid concern after rumors of PX 
ignited protests in Xiamen, Dalian, Shifang, and other cities after proliferating across 
social media platforms. The law stated that “people will be charged with defamation if 
online rumours they create are visited by 5,000 internet users or reposted more than 500 
times” on social media (Kaiman, 2013c, para. 3). The vagueness of the law allowed 
officials to interpret it in multiple ways, thereby creating concern. The punishments 
include fines as well as jail time. People shuddered, but protests continued.  
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In 2015, the government again announced a law that drew ridicule in international 
circles—they banned puns, claiming that they could mislead the public, especially 
children. Though this appeared to be both nonsensical and an extreme exercise of control 
over the Chinese people, I argue that its enactment was likely linked to the use of puns to 
avoid censorship. The Chinese language lends itself to wordplay, as words depend upon 
tones to convey meaning. Thus, many characters exist for a given sound. If one word is 
banned, users insert a homonym. If one phrase is banned, netizens develop a new playful 
one that often mocks or mimics whatever phrase the authorities have banned. By creating 
a law that can be variously interpreted, it offers officials space to bend it in whatever way 
they deem appropriate. People can be punished for anything officials deem to be pun use. 
Free speech is supposed to be a right for Chinese people, one interviewee remarked, 
but this freedom is often taken away. This is clear in the widespread censorship that 
occurs in China, the jailing of dissidents, and the aforementioned laws that seek to direct 
conversations. This is what MacKinnon (2011) addresses in her work. People are very 
aware of censorship in China. It is not hidden. However, in December of 2015, President 
Xi Jinping addressed the Chinese people and told them they should have the right to 
speak their minds on the Internet. He told those gathered and those listening from afar 
that, “We should respect internet users’ rights to exchange ideas and express their minds 
and we should also build good order in cyberspace in accordance with [the] law as it will 
help protect the legitimate rights and interests of all internet users” (as cited in Phillips, 
2015b, para. 4). Xi says “yes” to free speech, but only in the context of “good order.” By 
publicly addressing people and promoting the value of free speech, Xi is both 
legitimizing the importance of free speech and attempting to redefine it. Freedoms always 
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are circumscribed by restrictions and, in this case, the restriction is “order.” 
What the government meant by order became apparent soon after Xi’s address. Just 
weeks after this speech, the Cyberspace Administration of China announced that its goal 
for 2016 was to make the Communist Party, “the strongest voice in cyberspace” (Hua, 
2016, para. 1). According to People’s Daily, the CPC wants to improve cyberspace by 
increasing governance, deepening online propaganda, and “creating a public opinion 
climate to enable victory in the creation of a society of comprehensive moderate wealth” 
(as cited in Bandurski, 2016, para. 12). In short, the government is seeking to control the 
Internet further as a means to increase national security and economic growth, which is 
written into China’s 13th Five Year Plan. At the same time it is making effort to control 
the Internet, the government is seeking to expand it. By 2020, China plans to invest two 
trillion yuan (U.S.$323 billion) to upgrade its national broadband and 4G capabilities in 
order to provide Internet access to its entire population (Livingston, 2016). 
Looking at all of these seemingly contradictory messages, edicts, and policies, what 
we witness is something far from order. Local governments and the central government 
are, in many ways, operating separately, which can simultaneously increase transparency 
and polluting practices. People feel a sense of nationalism that can, at once, incite anti-
Japanese protests in the streets and drive others to establish an NGO. Online 
communication is tangled and cacophonous, riddled with censorship, and always shifting 
to adapt.  
Much research is yet to be done that further identifies and investigates assemblages 
that overlap to foment environmental protection. Since China is in a constant state of 
rapid change, the job of tracing—whether that be policy, media, law, civic duty, 
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corruption, and so on—is never done. Whereas NGOs once were the main driver of the 
Chinese environmental movement, the people and their protests have also become an 
important force. Others are joining in and developing new methods to make a difference. 
One of the biggest challenges the environmental movement faces is the same thing that 
drives the protests—rumors and exaggerations. Finding transparency and disseminating 
accurate information, however, can only occur once trust between the people and their 




By analyzing protests in China, I have contributed to communication scholarship on 
1) social movements, 2) media studies, and 3) rhetoric. By turning to China, I have 
moved social movement scholarship outside of democratic countries where the right to 
protest is not guaranteed. In China, protestors must contend with censorship, political 
regulations, and risky forms of protest that require creative forms of activism. As the U.S. 
and other countries increase levels of surveillance and adopt censorship practices (i.e., the 
NSA’s widespread collection of data), this scholarship can provide alternative 
frameworks for analyzing protest. In addition to shedding light on China, this research 
offers a mirror by which scholars can see protests in their own country anew. 
Looking to China, I develop a new theory of protests as forces majeure, which can 
also be used in studying movements including Occupy Wall Street and Black Lives 
Matter because it takes seriously social media networks, the agency of nonhuman objects, 
and privileges movement. The concept of force majeure as I have applied it to social 
  
297 
movements 1) argues for a rethinking of protest as a coalescing of forces over networks, 
2) displaces individual agency in favor of dispersed agency that acknowledges nonhuman 
actants, and 3) traces the movement of the social outside the instrumental success 
paradigm. 
In advancing a theory of protests as forces majeure, I am deliberately moving away 
from formulaic definitions of protest to embrace protest as the culmination of many 
factors, including both rational and affective forces, reason and violence, information and 
rumors. To do this, I take a networked approach that allows me to examine overlapping 
assemblages of actors and factors that make possible large scale protest. This approach, 
necessarily, moves scholars from studying protestors as a unified group of actors with 
individual agency to thinking of new media, political systems, and economic changes as 
creating possibilities for certain forms of protest and precluding others. In the case of 
China, protests must be decentralized and organized over networks. They occur on a 
terrain linked by wild public networks that include humans, phones, tainted fish, real 
estate, and political conferences.  
Taking a networked approach also offers space to consider protests outside of 
instrumental successes and failures. The repercussions of a force majeure cannot be 
mapped within such a limited framework. As has been made evident in the case of 
Dalian, an instrumental failure does not mean that the protests as forces majeure failed to 
move the social. Protests as forces majeure ask scholars to consider changes in 
relationships, changes in human consciousness, and renegotiations. The social movement 
that occurred in Dalian (and in the instrumental successes of Maoming and Xiamen) 
extends well beyond whether the PX plant was shut down. It opened up new forms of 
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civic engagement and altered relationships between people, the government, industry, 
and the land. By taking seriously McGee’s (1980) call to map the movement of the 
social, I am extending his work by not only mapping changes in human consciousness, 
but also changing relationships between actants. 
This dissertation functions to advance media studies scholarship by considering how 
social media function differently in international contexts. Since people in China 
primarily use social media platforms outside Facebook and Twitter, studying social 
media in China helps to make evident the limits of Facebook and Twitter while also 
illustrating new possibilities for social media by showcasing Weibo and Weixin (which 
are often multiple steps ahead of U.S. based platforms in terms of functionality). My 
most important contribution to media studies, however, lies in the concept I put forth of 
wild public networks, which 1) acknowledges both the barriers to communication in 
surveillance societies and the creativity used to circumvent such barriers, 2) emphasizes 
the importance of relationships and connections, 3) further functions to weave together 
online and offline networks—the screens and streets—instead of separating them, and 4) 
illustrates how social media and social movements have become inextricably intertwined. 
First, looking to China to trace the wildness of networks helps scholars to see how 
surveillance and censorship fail in the face of creative users. Though China is 
conceptualized as a restricted Internet society in mainstream U.S. media, the case studies 
in China I have discussed in this dissertation make evident that China’s Internet is wild 
and unruly. The proliferation of platforms and practices offer space for circumvention 
and play, and government attempts to control users are sometimes no match for the 
wildness of 650 million people using the Internet. Second, this dissertation helps to make 
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evident that rhizomatic relationships that form wild public networks deserve sustained 
attention because they are essential to transmitting forces, information, and outrage. Their 
tangled overlapping nature offers users opportunities to hijack networks for activist 
purposes. As is evident in the case studies, as citizens lose trust in their government 
officials, they turn to different networks—wild public networks—to gather information 
and cull support for social movements. Third, wild public networks acknowledge that 
online and offline worlds are never separate but always mixed and moving. Information 
and outrage move from screens to streets back to screens in the form of images, text, and 
voice messages. This movement is evident in each of the case studies in that newspaper 
articles appeared on blogs, (mis)information was sent via text messages, and images of 
past protests inspired future ones. Online and offline networks simply cannot be 
separated. Movement flows across networks. This leads to next point—that social 
movements and social media are unable to be separated. Though the role of social media 
in social movements is often debated in the U.S., when we look to China, we can see that 
social movements would be impossible without social media. As is apparent in the case 
studies, the people are increasingly wary of their government and state sanctioned media, 
which has led people to turn to social media for information. This research can add 
insight into U.S. studies of social media and protest. With declining levels of trust in the 
news media in the U.S., people are looking elsewhere to find information, and the force 
of rumors and misinformation must be considered alongside rational arguments and 
reputable data. 
Finally, this research contributes to the study of rhetoric by 1) complicating the recent 
turn to affect and 2) expanding on existing research that conceptualizes rhetoric as force. 
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This dissertation seeks to acknowledge the importance of affect via violence, violent 
images, rumors, and appeals to nationalism and civic duty. In each case study, I carefully 
examine the impacts of inflammatory text messages, police brutality, and rumors in 
moving people to act. However, I am also careful to make the point that rational and 
affective appeals often exist side by side, as was the case with Lian Yue’s blog posts that 
offered information about PX while also telling readers that if they did not act, they 
would be considered “weak and dimwitted,” for “rationality is inextricably entwined with 
emotions, forces, violences, and any number of ‘alien’ components” (DeLuca, 2013, p. 
231). To polarize rationality and affect as opposites creates a false binary that can limit 
thinking. To consider them as intertwined helps to acknowledge the multiple forces at 
play. 
This move depends upon the advancement of my second contribution, which is to 
conceptualize rhetoric as a force that moves—people, information, rumors, and affect— 
which has been taken up by authors such as Abel (1999), DeLuca (1999, 2011, 2013, 
2016), Reyes (2004), and Sillars (1964). This move, which can be seen as stemming out 
of social movement scholarship as explained in Chapter Two, allows rhetoricians to 
contemplate that which lies outside of rationality as rhetoric, including photos, videos, 
inflammatory text messages, and violence. DeLuca (2013) is most explicit in his 
argument when he writes, “Rhetoric is force. The rhetorician’s task is to understand and 
deploy forces that transform worlds amidst the cataclysms of our times” (p. 231). This 
dissertation is a tracing of force over wild public networks. 
Ultimately, what I hope to help readers witness through this dissertation is the 
volatility, chaotic nature, and rapid growth of wild public networks and the concept of 
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protest as force majeure. Wild public networks respond well to creativity and usage but 
are impossible to control. Wild public networks are pregnant with possibilities and 
unpredictable mutations, including forces majeure. They are not relegated for use for a 
single purpose. They are used by many different actants simultaneously. They can erupt 
at any time and leave change in their wake. They are characterized by constant movement 
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